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Abstract 
 
Genocide and politicide are recurrent phenomena in modern history, with forty-
one cases occurring since 1955. Without a solution to this problem of genocide, 
this century looks set to be just as bleak as the last. This thesis is a step toward a 
better understanding of the preconditions and acceleratory factors that allow a 
civil war to develop into genocide or politicide. It identifies conditions under 
which governments or rival authorities choose a strategy of genocide during or 
following civil war. The approach this thesis adopts is that multiple conditions 
coming from both within and outside the country influence the likelihood that a 
civil war will develop into genocide. Each precondition, examined by this thesis, 
is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities‘ choices about whether to 
resort to mass killing in conflict situations. It applies the model to Rwanda and 
Sudan. This thesis proposes that states commit genocide when they cannot win at 
war or succeed in a position of power without the destruction of civilian 
populations. In order to overcome their position of weakness and extend their 
position of power a state or non-state power resorts to genocide/politicide. The 
model identifies the enduring characteristics of regimes and societies that are less 
time dependent, as well acceleratory factors, which have a more immediate effect 
on the escalation of the violent conflict/political upheaval into genocide.  
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Chapter One: 
The Century of Genocide 
 
1.1 Introduction 
"We thought it was 'Never again', but it has been again and again - over and over 
again - ever since... the innocent have been massacred and the perpetrators have 
walked away scot free."  
- Benjamin Ferencz, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg World War II war crimes 
trials, speaking in 1997 
 ―A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic‖. Stalin 
 
―At the beginning of the world‖, said Portugese Jesuit, Manuel de Nobrega, in 
1559, ―all was homicide‖. This sentiment, echoed a century later in Hobbes‘s 
famous phrase, bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, alerts us 
to what historically seems to be a fundamental issue in human relations. The quest 
for human kind to move from that state of nature, to engage in the social contract 
and to form stable political societies has been continually hindered by 
exterminatory campaigns against civilians. While homicide is a word we except as 
an objective, legal label for murder, its counter part, genocide, distresses us 
deeply, for it seems to carry with it echoes of all the primitive, depraved 
tendencies of the human animal since it first walked upright. 
Genocide is a word that has come to stand for the worst thing that human beings 
can do to each other and consequently carries with it such emotional weight that 
in Turkey even the very use of the word to describe the killing of the Armenians, 
in 1915, is an offence punishable by imprisonment. On the other hand, in France, 
to deny the killing of 1.5 million Armenians as an act of genocide is a crime.  
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More than half a century has passed since the adoption of the United Nations 
Genocide Convention, yet cases of states intentionally killing their own people 
continue to mount (Harff, 2003). Rhetoric comes easily for despite the United 
Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, and the international community‘s vow, 
following the Holocaust, of ‗never again,‘ genocide has been a recurrent 
phenomena in the post World War Two period, taking place on an horrendous 
scale in Cambodia  and Rwanda, to name just two countries. The international 
community‘s pledge of never again has become an unfulfilled promise. A more 
apt description than the oft chanted ―Never Again‖ is, in fact, again and again, 
over and over again.  
The list of victim groups during this "Century of Genocide"
 
is long (Rummel, 
1992). Some are well known, for example, Jews and Rwandan Tutsis. Others have 
been murdered in greater obscurity: Armenians, Gypsies, Bengalis, Burundi Hutus 
and Guatemalan Indians (Hinton, 2002, p. 1). These past atrocities, along with 
current crises such as the situation in Darfur, Sudan, make research on genocidal 
processes all the more important. Recent events reinforce the notion that violent 
conflict, including genocide, will be as prevalent in the Twenty First Century, as it 
was the last, unless there is a concerted effort to prevent its recurrence. What is 
startling, however, is not only how often genocide has occurred, but that when it 
has occurred it is so often uncontested. Not only have genocidal events yielded 
virtually no action or intervention by the international community and or major 
powers, like the United States, but such powers have, more often than not, 
refrained from condemning or even acknowledging that the crimes are taking 
place.   
The persistence of genocide, the brutality where it does occur, and the failure of 
the international community to halt it has provoked interest and made imperative 
the development of measures to identify, prevent and halt instances of state 
sponsored mass murder. 
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1.2 Definition of Key Concepts and Terms 
―We are in the presence of a crime without a name‖ Winston Churchill 1941 
Before going further, a conceptual understanding of the word genocide is 
necessary. In order to examine cases of genocide we must first determine whether 
the atrocities committed were genocide. ―A good definition‖, argues 
Andreopoulos, ―has a critical functional value: to assist in the detection of early 
signs of an impending crisis‖ (Andreopoulos, 1994, p. 3-4). 
Genocide long predates the Holocaust of the twentieth century; the destruction of 
a people because of their identity has occurred throughout ancient, medieval and 
early modern history. However, it was not until the atrocity of the Holocaust that 
the word genocide was first used to describe such an event. The magnitude of the 
Holocaust meant no existing word would suffice; it would be a rare term, Power 
(2003, p. 42) stated, ―that carried in it society‘s revulsion and indignation‖. 
 
The term genocide was first coined, in 1943, by the Jewish Polish jurist Raphael 
Lemkin, in his book Axis rule in Occupied Europe (Lemkin, 1944, preface, dated 
November 15, 1943). He created the word genocide by taking its root from the 
Greek word ‗genos‘, meaning race or tribe and the Latin word ‗cide‘ meaning to 
kill. He defined genocide as a ―coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim 
of annihilating groups themselves‖ (cited in Schabas, 1999, p.2). During the 
Holocaust, in which every member of his family except his brother and himself 
were killed, he campaigned to have genocide recognised as a crime under 
international law.  
 
The Genocide Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in December 1948 and came into effect in January 1951. It contains an 
internationally recognised definition of genocide. Article Two of the convention 
defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.‖ 
 
The Genocide Convention of 1948 limits the victims of genocide to ―national, 
ethnical, racial or religious‖ groups. The preliminary resolution included the 
destruction of political and other groups in its definition. Much of the subsequent 
U.N. debate over the legislation on genocide revolved around the question of 
whether political and social groups should be covered by the convention (Kuper, 
1981). A number of countries, particularly the Soviet Union, which, because of 
the atrocities it perpetrated against the kulaks and other ‗enemies of the people‘, 
feared accusations of genocide, argued that political groups should be excluded 
from the convention since they did not fit the etymology of genocide (Le Blanc, 
1988). Such groups, it was argued, were mutable categories, and lacked the 
distinguishing characteristics necessary for definition; unlike membership in 
ethnic groups which was considered permanent. This clearly defies logic as 
religious groups were included in the definition. In the end, the clause on 
"political and other groups" was dropped from the final version of the 1948 
Genocide Convention. 
This omission has generated a great deal of debate. Many of the century‘s 
bloodiest examples of state sponsored mass murder of civilians have been 
directed, not at ethnic groups, but primarily at political or class enemies. As 
currently stated, the U.N. Convention‘s definition has difficulty accounting for 
such events as the Soviet liquidation of its "enemies" or the Nazi annihilation of 
tens of thousands of "lives not worth living" (that is, mentally challenged or 
mentally ill individuals, homosexuals, and communists.) The argument for the 
inclusion of the killing of political and other non-ethnic groups in definitions of 
genocide has resulted in prominent genocide scholar, Barbara Harff, creating the 
term politicide. Politicide refers to ―events in which the victims are defined 
primarily in terms of their political position – their class, political beliefs, or 
organised opposition to the state and the dominant group‖ (Harff, 1992). Harff is 
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consistent with Fein (1993b, p.12) who reasons that ―mass killings of political 
groups show similarities in their causes, organization and motives‖ to genocide.  
 
According to Harff and Gurr, genocide is more of a social action, with victimized 
groups being identified by ethnicity, nationality or religion, whereas with 
politicide, the victims are identified by their political affiliation or opposition to 
the regime in power. In this study, as in Harff‘s research and data set, genocide 
and politicide are studied together and combined empirically. In Harff‘s view, 
genocide and politicide are ―aspects of the same phenomena and need no separate 
theoretical explanation‖ (Harff, 2003, p.3). From a political perspective it may be 
effective to include political groups in the definition of genocide and in the 
international agreements designed to prevent it, however, in academic work 
clarity is paramount. For this reason, and to avoid problems over the use of the 
term, in this thesis genocide, politicide or geno-politicide will also be used to 
describe and distinguish individual cases. Many instances of mass killing are a 
mix of the two types, in which some groups are targeted based on political 
affiliation or activity, and some based on communal identity. The Khmer Rouge, 
for example, killed Buddhist Monks and ethnic Chams, Chinese and Vietnamese 
but also eradicated Cambodians living on the eastern border with Vietnam for fear 
that spies had infiltrated the region (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 309). In Indonesia, in the 
1960's, both ethnic Chinese and members of the Communist party were 
slaughtered by the governing regime (Harff, 2003). 
 
The Genocide Convention does not take into account the possibility that non-state 
actors can and have been perpetrators of genocide and/or politicide. The definition 
of genocide and politicide used in this thesis is expanded to include episodes that 
occur during civil wars, when a territorially based nationalist or revolutionary 
movement targets an ethnic or political group for destruction ―in whole or in 
part.‖ This encompasses situations in which at least one party to a civil war 
systematically uses deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its 
opponents. A definitive example of this is the atrocities perpetrated by Serb 
nationalists against Muslims in Bosnia between1992–93 (Harff, 2003). 
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Defining genocide remains a contentious issue for many scholars. Debate 
continues over what constitutes genocide and which events should be classified as 
such. There are those scholars who define it narrowly and those who use the word 
to describe a wide array of events. The use of the word genocide to condemn such 
diverse phenomena as abortion, dieting and urbanisation has led to the word 
genocide being ―so debased by semantic stretch that its use stirs suspicion‖ (Fein, 
1997, p. 95). The dilemma arising over the use of the word is best expressed by 
Michael Ignatieff: ―Those who should use the word genocide never let it slip their 
mouths. Those who unfortunately do use it, banalise it into a validation of every 
kind of victimhood‖ (Ignatieff, 2005). Virtually everything but genocide is called 
genocide and those in the international community refrain from using the term for 
fear that evoking it would create a legal obligation to act. 
 
Resolution of the definitional dilemmas which arise in this study requires that 
genocide be distinguished from other types of mass political violence. What 
distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity and war crimes is that 
these crimes do not require proof of intent, merely of the criminal action itself, 
such as mass murder. In 1992, during the war in the former Yugoslavia, the term 
ethnic cleansing frequently appeared in the media and non-governmental and 
governmental reports, sometimes used inter-changeably with the word genocide. 
There is, however, an important difference between ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. The former seeks to ‗cleanse‘ or ‗purify‘ a territory of one ethnic group 
by the use of terror, rape and or murder in order to convince the inhabitants to 
leave, whereas genocide seeks to destroy the group by eliminating them 
altogether. In practice, ethnic cleansing and genocide are often closely associated, 
with ethnic cleansing often preceding or occurring as a phase in a burgeoning 
genocidal process (Gellately and Kiernan, 20 and Booth).  
Having examined what genocide is and is not, the next step is to set out a clear 
working definition of the term to be adopted by this thesis.  
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1.3 Operational definition of genocide and politicide 
The following definition is adopted by this thesis to identify historical and future 
cases for comparative analysis. Genocides and politicides are classified as: 
the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by 
governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil war, either of the 
contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a 
communal, political, or politicized ethnic group (Harff, 2003, p. 2) 
 
Harff notes that this definition "parallels those developed by other comparative 
researchers" and deals with four major problems of the legal definition: the 
exclusion of mass murders that target political rather than ethnic, racial, or 
religious groups (which she calls politicides); the use of "mental harm" in the 
legal definition; the definition of "intent to destroy;" and "the possibility that 
nonstate actors can and do attempt to destroy rival ethnic and political groups." 
 
The following guidelines will be used to help distinguish cases of genocide and 
politicide from other kinds of killings that occur during civil conflicts: (1) Is there 
complicity by the state (or, in the case of war, by either of the contending 
authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger human life? (2) Is there evidence, 
even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities to isolate or single out 
group members for mistreatment? (3) Are victims members of an identifiable 
group? (4) Are there policies and practices that cause prolonged mass suffering? 
and (5) Do the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group? 
(Harff, 2003, p. 3)  
 
1.4 The problem  
Genocide and politicide are a recurrent phenomena, with forty-one cases of such 
episodes since 1955 (Harff, 2003). Evidence suggests these instances of mass 
killings often occur in the presence or aftermath of internal armed conflict. If 
violent conflict remains a problem in the Twenty Fist Century, then this century 
looks set to be just as bleak as the last.  
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With the exit of communism from the super power equation, and with the United 
Nations set free from the inhibiting effect of super power rivalry, it was believed 
by some, that in this global arena, peace and stability would prevail. This proved 
not to be the case. The end of the Cold War witnessed the emergence of new ‗hot 
spots‘. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Block, and with it the re-
emergence of previously homogenised geographical and ethno-national identities, 
had deadly consequences. Though, by the end of the 1990s and early 2000, figures 
suggested that the end of the cold war, the spread of democracy and the rise of 
United Nations peacekeeping was having some effect. The 2005 edition of Peace 
and Conflict (Gurr and Marshall, 2005) reported evidence of a sustained post-
Cold War decline in armed conflicts within states and a growing capacity of 
states, acting singularly and multilaterally, to avoid and end internal wars.  
 
The 2008 volume is not so optimistic: ―New evidence, and a closer look at old 
evidence, suggests that if there was a global movement toward peace in the late 
1990s and early years of the 21st century, it has stalled. Some positive trends are 
still evident but they are offset by new challenges. These challenges point to a 
conflict syndrome -- a collection of factors that often operate concurrently to 
undermine the stability of states and erode the foundations of human security‖ and 
acts as a ― a sobering reminder of the resiliency of human temptation to use force 
to resolve disputes‖ (Gurr and Marshall, 2008). There was a sharp increase in the 
number of active armed conflicts, moving from 19 to 25 during 2005. This 
represents, not new conflicts, but the re-emergence of old conflicts. This trend, a 
resurgence of violence or repression that seemed momentarily resolved, is 
evidenced in Sri Lanka and Burma, and from Manhattan to Mumbai and Madrid 
civilians have been targeted in vicious terrorist attacks. Violent conflict is not 
easing; the problem is ongoing. 
 
1.5 Genocide and conflict  
There are many different kinds of conflicts, ranging from very mild cases, for 
example, in Switzerland, where German and French rivalries are real, but peaceful 
and limited, to cases with frequent, widespread violence. Inter-group conflict does 
not always manifest itself in violence, let alone genocide. It is not conflict in itself 
15 
 
that is problematic rather the way it is expressed, resolved, or managed. Conflict 
is an inevitable part of social behaviour and interaction. Conflict can be both 
damaging and destructive or productive: a force for social change. Even among 
violent cases, there is wide variation, ranging from examples with relatively few 
killings, such as the Basques in Spain, to the violence in Kenya, following the 
2007 election, which claimed as many as 1000 lives, to open warfare with very 
heavy casualties, as in Sri Lanka, to outright attempts at complete extermination 
campaigns, as witnessed in Rwanda, in 1994.  
Genocide almost always occur in the context of violent conflict and regime 
change. However, most violent conflicts do not develop into genocide. Harff‘s 
definition that includes genocide and politicide yields a global count of 41 cases 
between 1955 and 2003 (see the table below in Figure 1).
1
 The Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program counts 232 armed conflicts since the end of World War II (Harbom 
and Wallesteen, 2007) and there are some 284 threatened ethnic groups, as 
tracked by  The Minorities at Risk Project. While genocide may make up a small 
percentage of conflict, what is alarming is the high number of fatalities. The 
twentieth century illustrates that the impact of genocide is many times deadlier 
than that of wars. 
                                                 
1
 These episodes are defined as such according to the operational definition of genocide and 
politicide ascribed to by this thesis and outlined in Chapter One. 
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Countries Experiencing Episodes of Genocide or Politicide since 1955 
Harff (2003) 
 
 
Country Deaths 
 
Afghanistan 
Algeria 
Angola I 
Angola II 
Argentina 
Bosnia 
Burma (Myanmar) 
Burundi I 
Burundi 11 
Burundi 111 
Cambodia 
Chile 
China 1 
China 11 
DR Congo (Zaire) 1 
DR Congo (Zaire) 11 
Equatorial Guinea 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Indonesia 1 
Indonesia 11 
Iran 
Iraq 1 
Iraq 11 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 1 
Pakistan 11 
Philippines 
Rwanda 1 
Rwanda 11 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 1 
Sudan 11 
Sudan 111 
Syria 
Uganda 1 
Uganda 11 
South Vietnam 
Yugoslavia 
 
Dates 
 
4/76-4/92 
7/62-12/62 
11/75-11/94 
12/98-3/02 
3/76-12/80 
5/92-11/95 
1/78-12/78 
10/65-12/73 
8/88-8/88 
10/93-12/93 
4/75-1/79 
9/73-12/76 
3/59-12/59 
5/66-3/75 
2/64-1/65 
3/77-12/79 
3/69-8/79 
1/80-12/89 
7/76-12/79 
7/76-12/90 
10/65-7/66 
12/75-7/92 
6/81-12/92 
6/69-3/75 
3/88-591 
6/67-1/70 
3/71-12/71 
2/73-7/77 
9/72-6/76 
12/63-6/64 
4/94-7/94 
6/88-1/91 
7/89-1/90 
10/56-3/72 
9/83-10/02 
7/03-present 
4/81-2/82 
2/71-4/79 
12/60-1/86 
1/65-4/75 
2/96-6/99 
 
Estimated 
 
1,800,000 
9,000-30,000 
500,000 
70,000-100,000 
9,000-20,000 
225,000 
5000 
140,000 
5,000-20,000 
50,000 
1,900,000-3,500,000 
5,000-10,000 
65,000 
400,000-850,000 
1,000-10,000 
3,000-4,000 
50,000 
40,000-60,000 
10,000 
60,000-200,000 
500,000-1,000,000 
100,000-200,000 
10,000-20,000 
30,000-60,000 
180,000 
2,000,000 
1,000,000-3,000,000 
5,000-10,000 
60,000 
12,000-20,000 
500,000-1,000,000 
15,000-50,000 
13,000-30,000 
400,000-600,000 
2,000,000 
260,000 
5,000-30,000 
50,000-400,000 
200,000-500,000 
400,000-500,000 
10,000 
 
(Figure 1: Genocide and Politicide since 1955) 
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According to Rummel, six times as many people have died from democide (the 
murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, 
and mass murder) than have died in battle.
2
  Rummel, whose study spans the 
entire twentieth century and includes colonialism, puts the death toll for state 
sponsored mass murder at 262 million. His findings include 17 cases of democide, 
which caused more than one million deaths; see the table below in Figure 2.   
20th century democides causing more than one million 
deaths 
Location   Dates   Est. Deaths  
Cambodia 1975–1979 2,035,000 
China (KMT) 1928–1949 10,075,000 
China (PRC) 1949–1987 77,277,000 
China (Mao Soviets) 1923–1949 3,465,000 
Colonialism 
1900–
Independence 
50,000,000 
Congo Free State 1885–1908 
est C20th 3,480,000 
total of 10,000,000 
Germany 1933–1945 20,946,000 
Japan 1936–1945 5,964,000 
Pakistan 1958–1987 1,503,000 
Poland 1945–1948 1,585,000 
Mexico 1900–1920 1,417,000 
North Korea 1948–1987 1,563,000 
                                                 
2
 For example, government-sponsored killings for political reasons would be considered democide. 
Democide can also include deaths arising from "intentionally or knowingly reckless and depraved 
disregard for life"; this brings into account many deaths arising through various neglects and 
abuses, such as forced mass starvation. Rummel explicitly excludes battle deaths, capital 
punishment, actions taken against armed civilians during mob action or riot, and the deaths of 
noncombatants killed during attacks on military targets so long as the primary target is military, 
are not included as democide. 
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Russia 1900–1917 1,066,000 
Turkey 1909–1918 1,883,000 
Vietnam 1945–1987 1,670,000 
Yugoslavia (Tito) 1944–1987 1,072,000 
U.S.S.R. 1917–1987 61,911,000 
   
(Figure 2: Democides causing more than a million deaths, Rummel, 1987) 
 
By comparison, international and civil wars have accounted for approximately 34 
million battle deaths in the same period (Valentino, 2004, p.1).  
If the cases examined are limited to cases that occurred in the second half of the 
Twentieth Century and fall under Harff‘s definition of genocide and politicide, 
subscribed to by this thesis, the figure is still alarming. A cautious estimate puts 
the death toll of these 41 cases occurring since 1955, listed in Figure 1, at about 
fifteen million.  
Ten countries are responsible for twenty-two of these episodes, just over half of the total 
count.
3
 An examination of the countries in which the episodes have occurred reveals a 
pattern of regional distribution, as illustrated in the map below. Of the episodes, eighteen 
took place in Sub-Saharan Africa; twelve in Asia; five in North Africa and the Middle 
East. Latin America experienced four episodes and Europe two. Furthermore, another 
pattern is evident: the regional distribution of the genocides and politicides corresponds 
with the global distribution of wealth. Onsets of genocide and politicide appear to cluster 
overtime as well. There are three main periods, since 1955, which include all but five of 
the forty-one episodes: the mid to late 1960s, the 1970s and early 1980s and the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Those ten countries are Angola, Burundi, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Uganda and Congo Kinshasa (Zaire). Burundi and Sudan each have three episodes of genocide or 
politicide; all the others had two. 
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(Figure 3: Map Showing Regional Distribution of Genocide) 
 
 
Before going further, it is important to look at the other ways in which states deal 
with rival minority, communal or ‗out‘ groups. Authorities manage, regulate and 
exploit the differences, conflicts and cleavages that exist in the body politic they 
govern in vastly different ways. Contrary to simplistic myths of primordial, 
‗tribal‘ hatred, the episodes of genocide were not spontaneous expressions of 
bloodlust or inevitable, historical cataclysms but rather a strategic response to 
challenges of state security. While genocidal episodes are examples of large scale 
political violence they are also more than that. They are rational, calculated policy 
choices made by those in power to accomplish their most important objectives – 
to counter threats to their power (Valentino, 2004). The motive common to elites 
choosing a policy of genocide is ―the destruction…of collectivities that challenge 
their claim to authority or stand in the way of an ideologically driven desire to 
create a society purified of undesirables‖ (Harff, 2003, p.70). Genocide is about 
obtaining and maximising power, regime consolidation and regime maintenance 
through the elimination of a threat. Genocide is invoked during times of state 
insecurity (Midlarsky, 2002) and is implicitly tied to the political and military 
dynamics of the conflict. 
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There are many societies with deep social cleavages, which do not have any 
violence. So it is how these differences are managed and exploited that is 
important. In theory, accommodation policies, such as multi-culturalism, entail 
equal treatment and respect of all ethnic groups. A more discriminatory policy 
approach is assimilation, where the group is induced (sometimes coercively) into 
abandoning its identity. At the other end of the spectrum are extremely oppressive 
policies such as apartheid in which the out-group is forced to live, work and reside 
in segregated, ghettoised or enslaved conditions. The strategies adopted can be 
aimed at different groups within the one state or one group can be subjected to 
more than one of these policies at any one time. The Irish Catholics were offered 
the choice of genocide or expulsion by Oliver Cromwell: they could go ―To hell 
or Connaught‖. Federalism is used to resolve conflict between linguistic 
communities in Belgium and consociationalism to deal with its religious groups.  
The policy options that authorities adopt for dealing with inter-societal conflict is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Strategies for the regulation of ethno national differences 
End/eliminate ethno-national 
differences 
Mend/manage ethno-national 
differences 
Genocide - eliminate people  Control - manage people  
Integration/assimilation: eliminate 
relevance of ethnic differences 
  
Consociation: manage while 
preserving ethnic differences 
 
Ethnic expulsion: eliminate people from 
territories  
Arbitration: manage people impartially 
 
Territorial elimination: eliminate people 
and territory through downsizing or 
resizing. 
 
Territorial management: manage 
people and territories – federalism or 
decentralisation. 
 
(Figure 4: Strategies for the regulation of ethno national differences) 
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There have been serious, violent  conflicts, as in South Africa (Horowitz 1991) or 
Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd 1996, Gallagher 2000), that have moved in the 
opposite direction, away from warfare and extreme violence, toward 
accommodation.  
 
At the time of writing, genocidal violence was still underway in Darfur, and the 
Congo, where civilians continue to be wounded, forcibly displaced, conscripted 
into militias, raped, and an estimated 5.4 million people have died as a result of 
the conflict, since 1998, remains on Holocaust Memorial Museum‘s genocide 
warning list. The continuing presence of genocide merits ongoing consideration. 
Immanuel Kant‘s ―depravity of man‖ is a constant force to be contended with. It 
is naïve to assume that genocide will not occur in the future. By increasing our 
awareness of how and why genocide has occurred in the past enables, scholars 
and decision makers, to ascertain where and how it might occur in the future.   
 
1.6 Objective  
For many years now but especially since the devastating violence in Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, historians, sociologists and political scientists alike have been 
struggling to develop coherent and comprehensive explanations for genocide and 
its near relations, such as politicide and ethnic cleansing. Genocide is inevitably 
accompanied by a depth of human suffering and an array of atrocities that appear 
to defy comprehension. According to Campbell (2001), most scholars, policy 
makers and government officials, to the detriment of those concerned, mistakenly 
perceive genocide as a ‗merely‘ humanitarian issue and of little importance to the 
traditional concerns of a state‘s national security interests. The process of 
globalisation has rendered genocide and politicide a trans-national threat. The 
harm genocide causes does not remain within the boundaries of a state but rather 
has regional and global ramifications in areas, such as, security, political stability 
and economic prosperity by inducing huge refugee flows, disrupting economic 
relations and inflaming passions that fuel future conflicts, as evidenced by the 
impact of the Rwandan genocide on the Great Lakes region of Africa. 
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This study warrants serious consideration due to the catastrophic losses suffered 
by individuals, societies and nations,  and the consequent undermining of the 
regional and international institutions and the international system on which they 
are founded. An analysis of genocide is imperative, as it is a crime which aims at 
killing those who are most innocent: civilians without arms, men, women and 
children unable to defend themselves. Genocide is arguably one of the most 
horrific crimes in the history of humankind and the worst crime that can be 
committed in the present international system, which ―[if] left unchecked…eats 
away like a cancer at the structure of global society‖ (Campbell, 2001, p. 25).  
 
This thesis is a step toward a better understanding of the preconditions and 
acceleratory factors that allow a civil war to develop into genocide or politicide. It 
sets out to explore the etiology of genocide and politicide. The theoretical 
objective of this thesis is to identify conditions under which governments or rival 
authorities choose a strategy of genocide during or following civil war, in hope 
that this research will enhance further understanding of the factors and conditions 
that determine a genocidal outcome in war. It is important to draw on the theories 
of armed conflict, since geno/politicides almost always occur in the context of 
violent conflict. The theories of ethnic and civil war, or revolutions and political 
instability, while important, alone do not provide adequate explanations, as they 
do not address the primary research question of this thesis: why some conflicts 
evolve into state sponsored mass murder. In essence, this thesis will ask: why do 
some intra-state wars turn genocidal while the majority do not? 
 
Internal wars have different causal mechanisms than instances of state sponsored, 
mass murder. Genocide and politicide are multi-causal phenomenon. No single 
theory will suffice to explain all instances of this kind of violence. A theory of 
why some intra-state wars evolve into genocide or politicide is developed, which 
centres on conditions existing in the domestic setting, as well as conditions which 
are external (regional and international) to the state in which the geno-politicide is 
committed. This theoretical framework will be tested through the study of two 
cases of genocide: Rwanda (1994) and Sudan (2003). These cases of genocide are 
analysed within their local setting, while simultaneously capturing them in their 
international context. After establishing the preconditions that have led to 
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episodes of genocidal violence in the past, a watch list of at risk countries can be 
developed.  The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework, for states, 
institutions and organisations like the UN and non-governmental organisations, 
which will enable them to develop effective genocide prevention mechanisms. 
Early action does not necessarily mean deploying troops, rather it means using 
tools of accepted conflict prevention and resolution. This can allow for 
international policy makers to have at their disposal the knowledge and tools to 
prevent the escalation of internal conflict into genocide. The application of a 
structural model to current armed conflicts can work as a guideline for policy 
decisions in genocide prevention, facilitating a more quantifiable approach to the 
problem. A structural focus inhibits the constraints occurring from a focus on 
short term political considerations, which can play important catalytic roles. This 
thesis takes a step toward a better understanding of the preconditions and 
acceleratory factors that allow a civil war to develop into genocide or politicide.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
The methodological approach employed in this study is a hybrid of critical 
qualitative and empirical analysis, drawing on evidence from scholarly and policy 
literature, governmental and non-governmental reports and databases in order 
obtain a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the stated problem: why 
some intra-state wars turn genocidal.  
 
The analytic emphasis of the social science explanation, and its necessary mode of 
abstraction, can detract from the individual‘s experience in genocide, leaving it 
devoid of an essential humanistic account. The immense everyday brutalities of 
the individual‘s experience, while not recounted in this thesis, are not forgotten. 
Attempts to explain genocide often require understanding the perspective of the 
perpetrators, which can be viewed as callous or offensive by those who have lost 
whole families or even entire societies. ―Yet to explain is not to condone‖ 
(Midlarsky, 2005, p. xv) and explanation is the first step towards prevention. 
Genocide is not an inevitable consequence, nor an unpreventable one, therefore, 
an understanding of it is paramount.  
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By examining individual cases of genocide since 1955, the thesis will analyse the 
causes, sequences and outcomes of these events. The year 1955 is chosen as a 
starting point for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid the inclusion of cases of genocide 
which are connected to World War Two and secondly, many cases of genocide 
happened in newly independent countries, and decolonisation started in earnest 
from the 1950s.  
 
A comparative study of the chosen cases will be adopted in order to discover 
common patterns and differences, ultimately contributing to the existing body of 
knowledge on both genocide/politicide and conflict. To make a complete analysis 
of genocides and politicides since 1955 is beyond the scope of this study, so I 
have limited it to two case studies. Case studies are important for tracing the 
background and tracking the events of outbreaks of mass violence, as they allow 
for in depth knowledge of the societal and historical roots of the problem 
(Suedfeld, 2001, p. 52). Through comparative case studies, we can find out 
whether each occurrence of genocide is sui generis, or, alternatively, whether 
there are shared causal factors, enabling the application of a universal criteria for 
prediction and intervention. 
 
Africa, the region out of which my case studies were selected, has had the highest 
number of genocides committed, since 1955. It is a logical area for testing 
theories of genoicde given the prevalence of armed conflict and mass violence in 
this region. According to Harff‘s Table of Countries at Risk of 
Genocide/Politicide, this region continues to remain at risk. Therefore, a study of 
genocide in this region is pertinent and will, to some extent, contribute to 
identifying countries at risk of genocide in the future.  
 
The literature and experts  referred to during the course of my thesis come  from 
disparate academic disciplines and specialisations, which  include political 
science, history, international law, genocide studies, anthropology, sociology, 
peacekeeping, military studies and human rights, and area studies.  
The data used in this thesis will come from a number of different data sets and 
projects. Data sources include: Polity IV Database, for annual data on the 
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authority characteristics of all states in the international system; The Union of 
International Organisations; Group Discrimination and Separatism Indicators; 
State Failure Project, and the Correlates of War data set. 
 
1.8 Thesis Structure  
Chapter Two examines the debates in the literature, generating some theoretical 
inferences about the causes of genocide. The framework of the conditions which 
increase the likelihood of genocide is set out in the second half of Chapter Two. In 
the following two chapters this framework is applied to the case studies, Rwanda 
(Chapter Three) and Sudan (Chapter Four). Chapter Three and Chapter Four 
examine the patterns and origins of the genocide in Rwanda and Sudan, 
respectively. These chapters will first establish whether the mass killings are 
genocide, followed by an exploration of the conditions that exist which have 
enabled genocide to occur.  
 
In light of the findings from the two case studies, Chapter Five reconsiders the 
major questions and objectives of this study and summarises the key findings of 
the research. Comparisons will be made between Rwanda and Sudan - the 
similarities and differences in the nature of the genocide and the causes of the 
genocide in these two countries. 
 
 The research findings will be discussed with reference to genocide prevention 
and the identification of at risk countries. Policy recommendations will be 
presented. The study concludes by briefly considering the continued importance 
of research into genocide and deadly violent conflict. 
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Chapter Two: 
Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
“Genocide is not war! It is more dangerous than war!”   
Lemkin (Quoted Power in 2002; 51). 
“Dry up the human sea, in which the guerrilla fish swim” General Efrian Rios Montt, 
Guatemala, 1982. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Policy and scholarly interest in genocide and mass violence has grown 
dramatically in recent years. The field of genocide studies was pioneered in the 
1970s and 1980s but remained the interest of a select few scholars
4
 until the 
1990s.  Two major developments pushed genocide from the margins of academic 
scholarship to greater prominence within the social sciences; the end of the Cold 
war, which saw a new interest in international human rights, of which genocide 
and it associated atrocities is a part; and the genocidal violence in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and the failure of the international community to respond to such 
violence. Consequently, genocide and mass violence became a matter of high 
profile debate.   
To date much of the literature on genocide has been written by historians or 
specialists of specific genocides who focus on the analysis of individual cases of 
genocide (For Armenia see, Hovannisian, 1992; Balakian, 2003. For Cambodia 
see, Chandler, 1988; Kiernan, 1996; Vickery, 1999. On Rwanda see, Des Forges, 
1999; Gourevitch, 1999, Prunier, 1997; Dalliare, 2003). These include histories of 
the period of the actual genocide, histories of the after-effects of the genocide, 
usually for the targeted population but sometimes also for the perpetrators, and 
                                                 
4
 Notably Helen Fein, 1979; Leo Kuper, 1981; Irving Horowitz 1976; Ervin Staub, 1989;  
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perhaps most common, histories of the events and philosophies leading to the 
particular genocide under consideration. 
While pertinent, such studies on their own do not explain why genocide, in 
general, occurs and how such atrocities can be prevented. Other comparative 
studies have created theories, which focus on a single primary precondition. The 
work of social scientists and historians have linked genocide to the advent of 
modernity (Bauman, 1989), radical, revolutionary and or racist political 
ideologies (Melson, 1992 and Weitz, 2003), totalitarianism (Horowitz, 1997), or 
the absence of liberal democracy (Rummel, 1994). Psychologists have focussed 
on the dehumanisation of the individual and the inaction of bystanders (Charny, 
1982 and Staub, 1989, Waller, 2002). Sociologists have examined the societal 
conditions, which are necessary for the emergence of genocide (Horowitz, 1976, 
1980; Kuper, 1977 and Fein, 1979). Quantitative cross national studies have been 
carried out by political scientists, such as Brabara Harff (2003) and Valentino and 
Huth and Krain (1997). The timidity, apathy, or outright complicity of foreign 
powers in the face of genocide has led to scholarly interest in the way the 
international community has responded to such violence (Barnett, 2002; Power, 
2002).  
 
In order to construct a truly comparative and comprehensive theory of genocide 
and the war and or regime crises, which accompany or precede it, the variables at 
play must be clearly identified and defined and the relationship between the 
variables set out and explored. A theoretical framework on genocide enables the 
identification of commonalties that extend beyond particular data to other 
comparable data. This moves the thought beyond the specific to the development 
of a range of general characteristics. A review of the literature reveals a host of 
different theories on the causes and conditions that have been linked to the onset 
of genocide. Different analysts accord varying importance to different groups of 
causal factors. The first half of this Chapter identifies these factors. These factors 
can be understood as structural, political, socio-psychological, socio-economic 
factors, and external factors, which include both international and regional 
dimensions. Following on from this analysis, the second half of this chapter 
establishes a framework of the preconditions that increase the likelihood of elites, 
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or those contending power, adopting a genocidal strategy in times of armed 
conflict and regime crisis. By examining the factors, which make genocide or 
politicide more likely to occur, this Chapter develops a model of the antecedents 
of genocide and or politicide.  
 
2.2 Theories examining structural factors 
Emerging from the literature are a number of theories, which examine structural 
considerations, such as the relationship between genocide and war, regime crises, 
power and impunity.  
 
2.2a Armed conflict and genocide 
Scholars of genocide and mass killing have increasingly recognised the 
relationship between armed conflict and genocide (Melson, 1992; Fein, 1992; 
Markusen and Kopf, 1995; Krain, 1997, 2005; Valentino et al 2003, Harff, 2003, 
Midlarsky, 2004 and 2005, Straus, 2007). While evidence is strongly suggestive 
of strong connections between war and genocide in no case does war simply 
cause genocide. However, genocide almost always occurs in the context of, or 
immediately following, warfare or violent political instability. More than one 
million Armenians were killed by the Ottomans during World War I. The Nazi 
regime annihilated six million Jews and five million Poles, Roma, homosexuals, 
political opponents, and others during World War II. The genocide committed by 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was preceded by two wars: the Vietnam War, 
which was also fought in Cambodia and Laos, and a five year civil war. It was 
during the Iraq-Iran war that Iraq targeted its Kurdish minority. The murder of 
some 800,000 Tutsi and some 10,000 moderate Hutu, in Rwanda, occurred during 
a civil war between the Tutsi rebel army and the Rwandan Government forces.  
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2.2b Political Upheaval 
Political upheaval is defined, by Harff (2003, p. 6), as ―an abrupt change in the 
political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent 
conflict, redrawn state boundaries or defeat in international war‖. Included in the 
list of political upheavals are major armed conflict, anti-colonial rebellions, 
coups, revolutions, decolonisation, and defeat in war. Political upheaval creates 
an environment more conducive to the use of state-sponsored mass murder by 
elites, as they often bring to power those with an exclusionary ideology (Fein, 
1979; Harff, 1986 and 2003; Mazian, 1990). Krain (1997) argues that ―the greater 
extent of political disruption the greater the opportunity for authorities to seek a 
―final solution‖ to present and potential future challengers‖. Revolution provides 
the conditions for the coming to power of ―ideological vanguards‖. While 
revolutions have different ideological roots, commonality is found in the drastic 
and violent nature of the restructuring of the social order that takes place preceded 
by and accompanied with the redefining of the political and national community 
into the ‗nation‘, ‗race‘ or ‗class‘.  
Illustrated with reference to the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, Melson, 
suggests that a fundamental internal revolution, followed by international war, is 
always a prerequisite for what he labels ‗total domestic genocide‘. Melson defines 
revolution as ―a fundamental transformation, usually carried out by violence, in 
[a] society‘s political, economic, and social structures and cultural values and 
beliefs, including its reigning ideology, political myth, and identity‖(1992, p.  32). 
Charles Tilly defines a revolutionary outcome, as ―the displacement of one set of 
power holders by another‖ (Tilly, 1978, p. 193). Revolutions are social projects, 
which substantially restructure the political and economic systems of a nation. 
Such structural trauma generally involves the rise of radical leadership and opens 
the door to a radical redefinition of the community, or ‗recasting of the political 
myth.‘ Groups previously regarded as merely stigmatised can be placed 
completely outside the moral realm of the new ‗in‘ group. The need for internal 
cohesion in a time of fundamental transition creates the need for ‗enemies of the 
revolution,‘ further encouraging the exclusion of whole groups (Melson, 1992, 
pp. 267 -271). A group already identified as ‗anti-people‘, in terms of an internal 
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threat, is often then identified with an external enemy, because of the distribution 
of the group‘s diaspora or simply through accusations of treachery.  
Harff (1986, p. 167) finds that genocides and politicides result from ―abrupt 
change in the political community caused…through violent conflict, when 
national boundaries are reformed, or when a war is lost‖. The relationship 
between changing territorial boundaries and genocide must be examined. Of 
significance, is the signalling of state vulnerability associated with territorial loss 
in time of war. Territory can be used to protect the state, as a buffer zone between 
the state and its enemies. When that territory is lost, state weakness can be 
perceived by both defenders of the state and its external opponents. Under certain 
conditions that weakness can lead to elimination of internal ―enemies‖ in order to 
buttress the newly vulnerable state (Midlarsky, 2005). The relationship between 
genocide and territorial expansion and decline is examined by Ben Kiernan. After 
surveying several cases of genocide, Kiernan argues that geographic diminution, 
whether real or perceived, often precedes or accompanies genocide. On the other 
hand, a regime‘s project of territorial expansion, as was the case with Suharto, in 
East Timor, can render a similar genocidal outcome (Kiernan, 2007). Loss can 
occur not only through the transfer of territory or authority of a population from 
one state or group to another but also through massive loss of life through war, 
and through significant socioeconomic contraction.  
As most cases of genocide and politicide take place during or around war, it is 
hardly surprising that there are many similarities between war and genocide. 
Several theoretical arguments have been proposed to explain the connections 
between war and genocide. Wars create an environment more conducive to the 
adoption of genocidal policies. It is in war that the normal rules of human 
interaction are suspended and the practice of violence is honoured and rewarded 
(Weitz: 2003, p. 56).  According to Markusen and Kopf (1995), many of the 
psychological, organisational and technical factors and preconditions, which lead 
to war have the potential to lead to genocide. War legitimates extreme violence: 
―aggrieved or opportunistic citizens feel licensed to target their neighbours‖ 
(Power, 2003, p. 91). War can also mask genocide, as Power argues, making it 
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difficult to ascertain whether what is taking place is a systematic campaign of 
elimination of civilians, consequently hindering diplomatic efforts (2003).  
According to Melson, there are three primary reasons why war is the final trigger 
for genocide: 
1. Wartime aggravates feelings of vulnerability and/or intensifies feelings of 
invincibility 
2. Wartime permits states to become more autonomous and independent of 
domestic and foreign public opinion, thereby encouraging radical solutions to 
social and political "problems"  
3. Wartime conditions may close off other policy options [such as expulsion], 
leaving genocide as a strong choice for an already radicalized regime 
(Melson, 1992, p. 273).  
Before going further, it is important to distinguish between war and genocide. The 
main distinction between war and genocide is that war is primarily a violent 
conflict between two or more organised armed forces, whereas genocide is the 
deliberate targeting of civilians, often in the context of war, to eliminate them 
from existence. Genocide is distinct from war in that non-combatants are key 
targets; ―genocide is about killing civilians based on their ascriptive categorical 
associations, not their actions in combat‖ (Straus and Knudsen, 2008, p. 7). The 
key difference lies in the nature of the enemy: in war, another state or armed 
force; in genocide, a civilian social group‖ (Shaw, 2007, p. 54).   
 
To Lemkin the crime‘s distinctiveness lay in the fundamental nature of its 
departure from the legitimate conduct of war‖ (Shaw 2007, p. 39). Lemkin 
compared genocide to legitimate war: Genocide is the antithesis of the Rousseau-
Portalis Doctrine
5
. This doctrine holds that war is directed against sovereigns and 
                                                 
3 The Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine holds that wars are fought between states, not people. Rousseau 
wrote (the following passage is a quotation taken from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract, in Sir Ernest Barker (ed. in trans.), Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and 
Rousseau (London and New York, 1947; 1967 reprint used), pp. 173-78.):  A state can have as its 
enemies only other states, not men at all, seeing that there can be no true relationship between 
things of a different nature ... The object of war being the destruction of the enemy state, a 
commander has a perfect right to kill its defenders so long as their arms are in their hands: but 
once they have laid them down and have submitted, they cease to be enemies, or instruments 
employed by an enemy, and revert to the condition of men, pure and simple, over whose lives no 
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armies, not against subjects and civilians. (Lemkin,1943, p. 80). Lemkin‘s 
understanding, however, is limited to legitimate war and does not address 
illegitimate war and asymmetrical warfare, which have both increased with 
ferocity in the past half century. The deliberate killing of civilians appears to have 
become a large part of the practice of warfare and is dominating the war strategies 
of many states, as evidenced in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Carl von Clausewitz 
famously described war as politics by other means and as Downes (2005, p.1) 
points out the targeting of civilians is often war by other means. This leads on to 
the next factor, identified in the literature, the nature of the warfare taking place, 
in particular guerilla warfare. 
2.2c Guerrilla Warfare  
Another structural factor to consider is guerrilla warfare, which unlike more 
conventional combat, requires a close relationship between civilians and the 
guerrilla combatants. Due to this, mass killing has become an attractive strategy 
for the ruling elite when challenged by guerrilla warfare (Valentino, 2004).  
The relationship between civilians and guerrilla armies, is explained by Mao 
Zedong (Tse-tung), who not only led the Chinese Revolution but was also one of 
history's most successful guerrilla strategists:  
 
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the 
masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist or 
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and 
cooperation. Many people think it is impossible for 
guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a 
belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship 
that should exist between the people and the troops. The 
former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish 
who inhabit it. (Mao Zedong (Tse-tung), quoted in  
Valentino, 2005, p. 198). 
 
Unlike more conventional combatants, guerrillas often rely directly on the civilian 
population for logistical support. ―Directly defeating a large, well-organized 
                                                                                                                                     
one can any longer exercise a rightful claim ... These principles ... derive from the nature of things, 
and are founded upon reason.  
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guerrilla army can be extremely difficult‖, stresses Valentino et al, ―because 
guerrilla forces themselves usually seek to avoid decisive engagements with 
opposing forces‖ (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). Civilian populations 
are largely defenceless and immobile. As a result, counterinsurgent forces often 
choose to target the guerrillas‘ base of support in the population, which can in 
turn lead to the intentional killing of massive numbers of civilians, with the 
desired outcome of isolating and alienating the guerrillas from their civilian 
support (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). Valentino et al (2004) argue 
that the likelihood of mass killing among guerrilla conflicts is greatly increased 
when the guerrillas receive high levels of active support from the civilian 
population and or when the insurgency poses a major threat to the regime. 
 
Counter-guerrilla tactics have often sought to defeat guerrilla armies by 
selectively terrorising those within the local population suspected of supporting 
guerrillas. This often occurs in full public view and or in an intentionally 
gruesome manner, thereby, setting an example to other civilians of the 
consequences of collaborating with the insurgents. As Valentino et al illustrate 
such a tactic easily degenerates into indiscriminate killing campaigns against all 
civilians regardless of whether they are actually providing logistical support 
(Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). This association is evident in the 
particularly brutal counter guerrilla campaign instigated by the President of 
Guatemala, General Efrain Rios Montt, in his public vow to ―dry up the human 
sea in which the guerrilla fish swim‖ (quoted in Richards, 1985, p. 95). His 
campaign to ―dry up the human sea‖ cost the lives of 75,000 civilians in 18 
months. Furthermore, in areas with the highest guerrilla activity, known as the 
Ixil triangle, approximately one third of the local civilian population were killed.  
While the literature suggests that there is distinct relationship between war and 
genocide, and guerrilla warfare, in particular, war on its own does not provide an 
adequate explanation, other factors must be examined.  
2.2d ‘Ancient Hatreds and Old Age Feuds’ 
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The violence of World War Two and the Holocaust, which accompanied it, were, 
according to some observers characteristic of a throw back to ‗medieval 
barbarism‘ or the breakdown of civilisation: the very essence of the 
Enlightenment project. Explanations offered in response to more recent events, 
such as those in the Balkans and Rwanda, have depicted the conflicts and 
atrocities committed as the resurfacing of age-old hatreds, most notably Robert 
Kaplan (1994). The simplicity of such approaches, which depict ethnic wars as an 
expression of primordial hatreds and, therefore, fixed, is evidenced in the article 
title: ― The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism‘s Primordial Roots‖ and also in George 
Bush Senior‘s statement about Bosnia: Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia is a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out [of] age-old animosities. 
The blood of innocents is being spilled over century-old feuds…Blood feuds are 
very difficult to resolve‖ (Bush, 1993). This is the approach most often adopted 
by the media in providing an explanation of such events; where it has become 
standard ―journalistic fare to portray ethnic and tribal enmities in the former 
communist states as seething since time immemorial‖ (Snyder, 1993, p. 79). 
 
In Rwanda, where the killings were at first pictured as frenzied and inevitable in 
nature, the literature convincingly demonstrates that the genocide was anything 
but, rather, it was of a systematic and institutional nature. Unfortunately, 
―Stereotype has shaped, to a large degree, informed commentary on the roots of 
the Rwandan genocide‖ (Straus, 2008, p. 518). This is not unique to Rwanda, 
argues Straus, but to African politics, in general, which is often reduced to 
tribalism. In direct contrast to these simplistic and distorted accounts of atrocities 
and genocidal events are the theories linking genocide with state power. 
 
2.2e Powerful State theory 
 
The development of a framework on genocide requires a significant examination 
of the issue of whether mass killing is committed by strong or weak states.  
Scholars have frequently sought to explain genocide from the perspective of state 
power. ―Power kills‖, argues Rummel (1995, p. 25), ―and absolute power kills 
absolutely.‖ Rummel expands: 
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The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily 
according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it 
will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic 
subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the 
more power is diffused, checked, and balanced, the less it will 
aggress on others and commit democide (1994, p. 1 -2). 
 
 Leo Kuper (1981), the main founder of genocide studies, argues that it is the 
modern state‘s monopoly of power over a territory which was, in reality, 
culturally plural and economically stratified, that created both the political desire 
and power to commit genocide against ‗out‘ groups. Zygmunt Bauman‘s 
Modernity and the Holocaust (1991) proposes that genocide is a product of 
modernity, not a throwback to a state of ‗savagery‘. Bauman argues that the 
economic and social forms that characterise the modern era paradoxically 
structure action in such a way that individual agency becomes impossible. 
Accordingly, the combination of advanced technologies, modern bureaucratic 
social organisations and the utopian ideals, which are at the base of the modernity, 
made the Holocaust possible (Bauman, 1989). Developments in technology, such 
as; firearms; motorised transport; and organisation charts can all contribute to the 
increased efficiency of mass, bureaucratic, depersonalised killing (Baumann, 
1991).   
 
It would at first appear obvious that to commit genocide a state must have the 
strength to organise, misinform and destroy (Semelin, 2003, p. 2). However, a 
careful examination of the context in which genocidal events occur poses a 
significant challenge to strong state theory. 
 
2.2f Weak States: Elite vulnerability and threat perceptions 
 
Several writers, in response to the ‗powerful state‘ theories, have pointed out that 
the perpetrators of genocide and politicide are less likely to be strong states than 
states that are threatened and factionalised as a result of war. A threat (fictional or 
real) coming from either within the state or from without, undermines the 
foundations of state power, placing those in power in a position of vulnerability 
(Melson, 1992; Midlarsky, 2004; Harff, 2003; Semelin, 2003). Rwanda serves as 
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an example for those who propose theories that it is ‗weak‘ states, which commit 
genocide, as they cannot win at war or succeed in a position of power without the 
destruction of civilian populations. In order to overcome its position of weakness 
and extend its position of power a state or non-state power resorts to genocide. 
The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia perceived themselves to be a vulnerable and 
extreme minority and a potential victim of Vietnamese hegemony in the region: 
―Why must we move so swiftly?‖ Pol Pot   asked ―Because enemies attack and 
torment us. From the east and west they persist in pounding and worrying us‖ 
(Weitz, 2003, p. 155).  
 
Midlarsky (2004) argues that changes in state security in a negative direction goes 
a long way in explaining genocide. As the security of the state diminishes the 
probability of violence against hapless civilians increases. This is illustrated by 
the Cambodian experience, prior to the Pol Pot regime, an exceptionally ―morbid‖ 
period in Cambodian history (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 321). Cambodia was turned 
into a battleground of Vietnam and the United States. The five years preceding 
the geno-politicide witnessed a high rate of fatalities from the war, and indirect 
killing from starvation and disease. The American war was fought in Cambodia 
against the Vietnamese by air and ground troops. 100,000 Khmer civilians were 
killed by US air bombardments. The US bombing campaign, of 1973, was a 
contributor to the mass destruction and CPK recruitment (Kiernan, 1996, p. 22). 
This period also saw two coup attempts, which were synonymous with the purges. 
The first of the great purges was in the aftermath of the failed coup of September 
1976.  A second coup attempt in late 1977 led to a second purge.  The Cambodian 
experience highlights the interconnectedness of state insecurity and upheaval, and 
genocide. Another element of this experience that needs to be explored further is 
identity construction.   
 
2.3 Socio-psychological theories and genocide identity construction  
 
An understanding of genocide requires an examination of the psychological 
conditions that allow human beings to develop the motivation to exterminate a 
whole group of people. Staub (1989) examines the causes of aggression in 
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society, and argues that natural adaptive tendencies can be manipulated for 
genocidal purposes. The basic human need for community and belonging, the 
relationship between individuals and the group, their desire to identify with the 
group, when combined with social/structural changes and increasing hardship can 
culminate in scapegoating and ultimately violence (Staub, 1989, p.  41-42).  
 
If the group views itself as superior and the other inferior, or itself as weakened 
and the other to blame for that weakness, there is an enhanced chance that the 
violent tendencies toward members of the opposing group will surface (Staub, 
1996).  
 
It is evident from much social science research that identity ties are historically 
constructed, as opposed to fixed primordial attachments. Accordingly, the ties and 
sentimentalities attached to identity can shift with changing circumstances 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.  75). In situations of relative security the identity of 
an individual or group is not a matter of particular concern. In a state of 
insecurity, however, when a threat arises or is perceived as such, identity becomes 
politically salient. This is of particular importance when the threat is aimed 
against the identity akin to those in power. Fundamental to the genocide process 
is the survival strategy born out of real or perceived threats to group identity or 
security. From which the next logical step is paved: you either eliminate ―the 
other‖ - or take the risk of being eliminated by them (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 
76).  
 
Theories of ethnic conflict range from primordial narratives of deep cleavages 
between people based on ancient antipathies to rationalist accounts of the 
instrumental employment of ethnically charged rhetoric by elites to mobilise the 
masses for murder. Valentino (2004, p. 17) asserts ―unusually deep pre-existing 
social cleavages are neither sufficient nor universally necessary conditions for 
mass killing‖.  There are many ethnically, religiously, racially fractured societies 
where genocide does not materialise and ―deep divisions, prejudice, and 
discrimination are fairly constant; genocide is not‖ (Straus, 2007, p. 481).  
Evidence suggests that ethnic/racial divisions and prejudice do not necessarily 
predate ethnic violence. In Rwanda, argues Straus, there was a fair degree of 
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integration, interaction and intermarriage across ethnic lines. Sekulic, Massey, 
and Hodson (2006) indicate that ethnic intolerance was not initially salient in the 
1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia, but rather became so after the war began. 
The shift was orchestrated by the Milosevic government‘s elite manipulation of 
public images and events. A concept described as ‗crisis framing‘ whereby at 
crisis moments ―cleavages, real and imaginary, reassert themselves‖ (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1997, p. 406).  
 
The security dilemma, a concept often used in explaining inter-state war, is also 
appropriate in examining ethnic conflict and genocide. In conditions of ‗emergent 
anarchy‘ when safety is no longer guaranteed, groups rationally mobilise in pre-
emptive self-defense. This leads to a security dilemma as other groups mobilise 
against them. As stated by Lake and Rothchild:  
 
 ….ethnic conflict is commonly caused by collective fears 
of the future. As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a 
series of dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas 
arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous 
violence‖ (1998, p. 4) . 
 
The binary construction of identity produces a discourse focussing on ‗us‘ and on 
‗them‘. The radical polarisation of the identity construction means that the 
affirmation of ‗us‘ implies the destruction of ‗them‘ – the enemy. In defence or 
construction of the ‗collective self‘ the destruction of the ‗other‘ becomes a 
necessity on the basis of fear, revenge or resentment. The feeling of fear, 
stemming from a rhetoric of threat (whether real or fictional), legitimates the 
destruction of the other. The assassin becomes the victim and the 
genocide/politicide is perpetrated in the name of group survival – kill or be killed 
(Semelin, 2003).  
 
The bestialisation or dehumanisation of the enemy is another crucial step in the 
genocidal process. The demonisation of ‗the other‘ as ‗insects,‘ ‗cock roaches‘ or 
‗parasites‘ allows for their extermination without the risk of this odious act 
incurring any moral problems for its perpetrators (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 76). 
―Whereas the dangerous threat conceptualisation makes the idea of genocide 
39 
 
credible, dehumanising the victim groups makes the actual genocide 
understandable and, therefore, its perpetration possible‖, argues Hiebert (2004, p. 
10).  
 
Semelin argues that a society regresses to a position of ―panic about putative 
threats‖ (2007: 50, 92) in times of war when its leaders convince the population 
that national survival depends on the destruction of the enemy. Such anxieties are 
fuelled by these leaders  or ―identity entrepreneurs‖  - who believe that they are 
―victims of History,‖ humiliated by rival powers, resentful at their subordinate 
status, and determined to defeat their enemies, including one‘s ―own‖ people who 
are ―traitors‖ and ―betrayers‖ (Semelin, 2007, pp. 24-32, and 54). Semelin links 
psychology to politics: such leaders are given opportunities to purvey their 
delusional fantasies during moments of genuine social and political crisis when 
they have a ready audience (Moses, 2008).   
 
2.4 Political Factors 
Another set of factors which emerge from a review of the literature  are political 
factors – factors relating to the nature of the political system, policies of 
militarisation or media censorship, and the ideological orientation of the political 
elite. One of the most important factors to consider is regime type. Research 
suggests that there is a strong relationship between the nature of the regime type 
and genocide  
 
 
2.4a Regime Type 
Studies show that democracies have killed substantially fewer of their own 
citizens than have other forms of government (Horowitz, Rummel 1994, 1995; 
Krain, 2005; Valentino et al 2004). Horowitz, goes as far as to call genocide the 
"operational handmaiden of a particular social system, the totalitarian system‖. 
The best assurance against genocide, asserts Rummel, is democracy, as the degree 
of totalitarianism is concomitant with the severity of genocide. Rummel‘s 
assertions on democracy are extremely important to an understanding of 
genocide. 
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Rummel (1994; 1995) discovered that, between 1900 and 1987, democracies 
killed about 160,000 of their own citizens, whereas non-democratic regimes killed 
almost 130,000,000 of their own people. Democratic institutions evidently reduce 
the likelihood of armed conflict, argues Harff (2003, p. 72), and ―all but eliminate 
the risk that it will lead to geno-/politicide.‖   
The connection that Rummel posits between warfare and what he refers to as 
democide draws on his and others‘ previous findings that democracies, for the 
most part, do not fight each other (Rummel 1983). Democracies create what 
Rummel described as an ―oasis of peace‖ (1992, p. 47) and, therefore, are less 
likely to sanction mass murder. This assumption has been disputed by political 
scientists such as Bremmer (1992). Bremmer asserts that democracies do in fact 
go to war against non-democracies. This is recently evidenced in the United 
States invasion of Iraq. Other scholars (Churchill, 1997 and Stannard, 1992) have 
highlighted the role of democratic states in mass killing during the colonial 
period. They chronicled the destruction of indigenous populations in Australia 
and North America, respectively. It is beyond the chronological scope of this 
thesis to examine the role of democracies in killing indigenous peoples during 
colonisation.  
While figures suggest that democracies are just as likely as autocracies to be 
involved in international wars, when it comes to internal wars evidence suggests 
that democracies are more pacific than non-democracies. Democracy impacts 
indirectly on the likelihood of a state adopting genocidal policies via its effect on 
the likelihood of internal war participation. Democratic states stand a better 
chance of avoiding internal wars, and consequently stand a better chance of 
avoiding the potentially deadly outcome of genocide.  
Competitive elections allow dissidents or disaffected members of a polity to 
participate in politics, through conventional and institutional avenues and 
ultimately redress their grievances in a non violent way (Krain, 2005).  By 
reducing the need of opposition groups for violent dissent, democracy has the 
potential to decrease the threat levels of the ruling elite.  At the same time 
democracy constrains the elites when it comes to adopting repressive and violent 
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policy towards civilians as it makes such behaviour politically costly. A 
democratic political system constrains leaders and redistributes power more 
evenly in society. The threat of electoral defeat makes it costly to use violence 
against one‘s own people (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004, p. 538). Indeed, the 
literature suggests that when the ruling regime perceive that they are threatened 
they are more likely to violate human rights (Stohl and Lopez, 1984; Poe et al., 
2000; Davenport, 2004). To the contrary, sustained and regular interaction 
between challengers and those in power, within a political and legal context, can 
actually lead to compromise and accommodation (Karstedt-Henke, 1980; Krain, 
2000b). 
 
Multiple studies find a relationship between political instability and regime type. 
Data from the Political Instability Task Force, updated through 2005, show that as 
a category anocracies are more likely throughout the 1950–2005 time period to 
have experienced instability. Pate‘s analyses show that anocracies were more than 
twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearly two and a half 
times as likely to experience adverse regime change. 
 
The outlook for political stability among different regime types is mixed. 
Democracies have seen radical improvement in terms of resistance to instability. 
This is despite the fact that the number of young democracies is relatively high. 
Anocracies, although still more susceptible to instability than either autocracies or 
democracies, have seen gains in resistance to instability in the post-Cold War era. 
However, entrenched authoritarian regimes have not seen the same improvement 
and seem resistant to whatever factors are leading to improvements in 
democracies and anocracies. 
 
There has been only one instance of genocide/politicide in a democratic state, 
since 1955, in Sri Lanka in July 1989 (Harff, 2003, p. 61). This exception did 
occur when the governing elite were under extreme threat from the Peoples 
Liberation Front (the Janathā Vimukthi Paraguay (JVP)), who by mid 1989 were 
close to military victory. The politicide, which followed was committed against 
the supporters of the JVP. 
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While Rummel found that democracies kill their populations less often than non 
democracies, Gurr (1994, pp. 361 – 363) shows that transitions to democracy 
often have murderous consequences. Outside pressure to democratise is 
sometimes blamed for engendering genocides and/or politicides.  For example: 
 
In Rwanda, outside pressure to democratize a minority 
dominated system led to majority rule which was highly 
authoritarian. Efforts to move toward greater minority 
representation then inflamed militants within the majority camp 
who were fearful of losing their power.  This situation 
degenerated into genocide directed against the minority.  
Unfortunately, democratization was not a panacea in Rwanda, 
but rather a factor contributing to turmoil (Klinghoffer: 1998) 
 
The State Failure Task Force reports ―that full or partially democratic regimes 
were somewhat less likely than autocracies to face impending genocides or 
politicides‖. It must be acknowledged, however, that young democracies often 
fail, and their failure can lead to genocidal episodes (Goldstone et al., 2000, p.14). 
This is what Mann describes as the dark side of democracy. ‗Murderous ethnic 
cleansing‘ he argues is a perversion of democratic ideals and such violence is 
likely to occur in weakly institutionalised states undergoing democratic 
transitions.  
 
In a democracy the inability to control the flow of information makes it difficult 
to construct ―others‖ within society as enemies worthy of extinction. Genocide 
requires mass mobilisation of the population by a media, which publicly 
encourages people to endorse and join in state sponsored genocidal acts (Chalk, 
1999). 
 
2.4b Media openness 
 
Essential to any study on genocide and the factors which enable it to occur is an 
understanding of the manipulation of the media to endorse and incite genocidal 
outcomes. Political actors control and regulate the media, allowing the degree of 
media openness. The role of the media in a country is a political factor because its 
influence is dependent on the political climate that it operates in. 
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The censorship and the manipulation of journalists by political elite through 
intimidation and bribery is common in autocratic regimes, as is  stereotyping and 
sensationalisation common in news stories in countries with a history of conflict, 
in particular the emphasis and promotion of divisive stories which emphasise 
communal difference(find reference).  Economically developing countries 
struggling to move from authoritarian, arbitrary rule to establish the democratic 
foundations of civil society are particularly vulnerable to genocide. Such societies 
have few competing media outlets, possess no tradition of independent media, 
lack deeply rooted professional standards for journalism and may endure a violent 
media culture that exhibits no sense of responsibility to society as a whole. 
Journalists in such societies are frequently manipulated and bribed by the 
dominant political faction ('envelope journalism'). Good, highly trained journalists 
with professional standards are frequently subjected to threats and, in the wake of 
assassinations and beatings, may surrender to manipulation and intimidation by 
the purveyors of fear (Frohardt and Temin, 2003). In poorer states, often marked 
by low literacy rates, radio is the main means of communicating to the public, and 
therefore, the most important medium for influencing public opinion, whereas in 
wealthy states there is a myriad of media; and television, internet and print 
dominate (Chalk, 1999). 
 
Chalk (1999, pp. 4-5) outlines five circumstances that are of particular importance 
to genocide:  
1. introduction of a new medium of communication, such as radio; 
2. the use of a completely new style of communication; 
3. the widespread perception that a crisis exists; 
4. a public with little knowledge of the situation from sources of 
information; 
5.  and a deep seated habit of obeying authority among the target audience.  
 
It was during the Nazi regime in Germany that radio broadcasts were pioneered, 
to promote genocide (Chalk, 1999, p. 5). Obviously, the media, alone, does not 
make genocide happen but does facilitate and legitimate it, as evidenced in 
Rwanda. This is best explained by professor William Shabas: ―Genocide is 
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prepared with propaganda, a bombardment of lies and hatred directed against the 
targeted group, and aimed at preparing the willing executioners for the atrocious 
tasks they will be asked to perform‖ (2002). 
 
2.4c Discourse to destruction: the Ideological Orientation of the 
Ruling Elite  
 
Lemarchand (2003), in his study of Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda discusses the 
importance of the ideological factor , which he categorized as either Marxist–
Leninism, nationalism or a perverted vision of democracy.  He points out, that ‗it 
is the reinterpretation …fabrication of myths peculiar to the history of these 
countries that allows this ideological graft on to the local to succeed‘ 
(Lemarchand, 2003). For the ideologies to have a ‗profound‘ impact on the 
masses, especially when their origins are foreign, ―their language needs to be 
radically transformed and adapted to the local culture‘‘ (Semelin, 2003, p.  196). 
  
Ideologies used by genocidaires are often built around themes of ‗purity‘, racism, 
identity and security.  The perpetrators of genocide commonly invoke the victims, 
whether they are political, ethnic or religious, as enemies of the state or regime 
(Harff, 2003).  The labels used range from heretic, class enemy, ―splittists‖—the 
Chinese Communist term for Tibetans, Uighers, and other groups seeking 
autonomy, or anti-revolution and associated with colonial rule. In some instances, 
it was enough to be labelled as undesirable, asocial or standing in the way of 
―progress‖ for a group to be deemed expendable. ―Exclusionary ideologies‖ 
argues Harff, ―often use ideology as a motivating and mobilizing factor against 
perceived opponents of the regime‖ (2003, p. 58); a point Harff illustrates, with 
the Sadam Husein‘s genocidal, al Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1987. The 
Iraqi elite were guided by an exclusionary ideology (Baath) that did not accept 
ethnic separation. Although originally secular, socialist and pan-Arab, Baath 
ideology became whatever Hussein‘s clan decided was necessary to consolidate 
its power. ‗Kurdish political aspirations,‖ observes Harff, ―had no place in these 
calculations‖ (2003, p. 58).  
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Other more obvious ideologically inspired geno-polticides include the Khmer 
Rogue. Pol Pot, in describing his quest for Utopia, said: ―what is infected must be 
cut out. What is rotten must be removed. If we wait any longer the microbes 
…will rot us from within… The old ones who remain in place give birth to new 
ones, one or two at a time‘‘ (cited in Rummel, 2007, p. 180). To a certain extent, 
their ideology and policies were modelled on those of China and the Soviet Union 
under Stalin. However, the Khmer Rogue believed these two models were 
insufficient and Cambodia could improve upon them with the addition of an 
ideology of extreme nationalism. Ieng Sary claimed ―The Khmer Revolution has 
no precedent. What we are trying to do has never been done before in history‖ 
(cited in Weitz: 2003, p. 149). Pol Pot, in 1978, described the project as ―building 
socialism without a model‖.  
 
2.4d Militarized regimes: arming genocide 
 
Studies have found that there may be a relationship between the degree of 
militarisation of a government and the degree of repression they adopt. McKinlay 
and Cohen (1975) found that military governments more likely to violate human 
rights. It is important to examine the role of arms in domestic political violence. 
Blanton (1999) analyses the relationship between arms imports and personal 
integrity rights. Little scholarly attention has been devoted to the role arms 
transfers play in domestic political violence. While arms have traditionally been 
perceived as a tool in a strategy to protect against an external security threat, arms 
however, have the potential to decrease the security of the individual.  
 
Arms provide the means of carrying out violent repression and abuses by a 
government, enabling them to choose brutal actions for resolving their problems. 
Acquisition and the accessibility of arms make violent strategies more feasible. 
‗When governments fear instability and loss of power, they make take advantage 
of arms supplies to repress and solidify their hold on power‖ though arms alone 
do not directly lead to repression. There is another aspect of arms to the genocidal 
outcome; where outside states continue to trade in arms with a country despite 
signs or mass killing on the horizon, which will be explored later. 
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2.5 External Factors  
"I long for the day when we can say with confidence that, confronted with a new Rwanda or a 
new Srebrenica, the world would respond effectively." - Kofi Annan, Speech to the 
Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, January 26, 2004. 
Genocide may not have exclusively domestic causes. International or external factors 
can exacerbate domestic trends and undermine efforts to of a state to respond to 
conflict in a non-violent way. It is important to examine what it is about the 
international system, its institutions and underpinning ideals, which affect genocide, 
allow it to occur and at the same time have the potential to affect the course of 
genocidal policy, ultimately preventing it. 
The tendency in the literature reviewed so far has been to focus on the conditions 
within the domestic setting. To focus solely on these is insufficient. Genocide is also 
the outcome of regional and international processes. All to often genocide is treated 
as a domestic humanitarian affair and in doing so is allowed to continue unnoticed. 
The repercussions of the crime of genocide inevitably affects immediate neighbours, 
as well as shaking the assumptions and institutions on which the international system 
rests. 
Genocide is a crime intimately bound up with the Westphalian state system. 
Offshoots of this system, the United Nations, its institutions and other international 
governmental organisations were founded on the premise of Westphalian notions of 
the sovereignty of national governments. A tragic consequence of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, according to Kuper (1981, p. 161) and Fein (1982, p. 26), is the 
misleading assumption that this doctrine has given the state the prerogative right to 
commit genocide within its borders. Kuper (1981) proclaimed against the ―right of 
the sovereign state‖ to wage genocide within its own borders and condemned the 
complicity of states, including Western states, in practical and political support for 
genocide.  
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2.5a Failure of the international community to act 
The history of the twentieth century is replete with instances of the international 
community‘s stance of passivity and complicity in regard to genocide, massacres 
and gross human rights violations. Following the genocide in Rwanda there has 
been an increase in literature and reports which implicate those states which watch 
on, as complicit in the genocide. The works of Power (2003), Melvern (2000) and 
Gouvertich (2000) explore such a crucial area. However, the literature has to large 
extent, with the exception of Power, examined individual instances, in particular 
Rwanda. Power's, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide 
surveys the inability and unwillingness of the United States and other Western 
powers to effectively confront genocides, because sometimes they were too busy 
supporting them or (post facto) their perpetrators.  
Any analysis of genocide must extend beyond that of the perpetrator or genocidal 
state to the other participants. Genocidal states need some form of international 
support or what Midlarsky calls an external permissive agent (2005, p. 212). He 
illustrates this point by examining the policies of Germany towards the Ottomon 
Turks, in World War I; the Vatican‘s ‗neutral‘ stance towards Nazi Germany and 
France‘s support to Rwanda before and during the Genocide of 1994 (p. 211).  
Some studies of the Jewish Holocaust, beginning with Arthur Morse's While Six 
Million Died (Morse, 1968) have highlighted Western passivity towards Hitler's  
extermination campaigns. Linda Melvern's A People Betrayed: The Role of the 
West in Rwanda's Genocide lambasted Security Council inaction in the face of the 
mass killings of Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The inaction of the 
international community is examined in the critically acclaimed movie Hotel 
Rwanda, which brought this issue to a wider audience.  
The kid-glove treatment accorded the Khmer Rouge's representatives to the 
General Assembly, after their genocidal reign had been ended by the Vietnamese, 
is indicative of political and diplomatic support of genocidal ideologues. Helen 
Fein (1994), writing after Bosnia and Rwanda, echoes Kuper when she says: 
―Abusive powers will continue to abuse as long as it works. The movement to 
change the taken for granted assumption that sovereignty implies indifference to 
48 
 
our neighbours‘ crimes is still to emerge from gestation in images of mass flight, 
chaos, blood and death‖ (Fein, 1994, p. 5). Fein writes, however, that ―genocide is 
preventable‖ for the very reason that it is usually ―a rational act: that is, the 
perpetrators calculate the likelihood of success, given their values and objectives‖ 
(Ibid).  
 
If, as Valentino (2004) asserts, perpetrators choose to pursue policies of state-
sponsored mass murder because their ability to overwhelm civilian targets makes 
it a ―useful‖ choice then interventions that support the targets (or oppose the 
perpetrators) may force perpetrators to change their calculations. According to 
Krain  interventions of this nature force perpetrators to divert time and resources 
otherwise dedicated to a policy of genocide or politicide toward defence against 
the external challenge. Such interventions make state-sponsored mass murder a 
more difficult project fraught with even more serious military and/or political 
consequences than had existed previously. This, even if only temporarily, should 
stem the violence, especially if the genocidal policy is being carried out by 
"thugs" or "opportunistic bullies" who are unlikely to put up too much of a fight 
against an outside force (Mueller, 2000). The effect would be akin to throwing a 
wet blanket over an emerging fire - it could prevent the spread of and perhaps 
even lead to a cessation of the killing by raising the costs to the perpetrator of 
continuing the policy (Rothchild and Lake, 1998). 
 
General Dallaire's shamefully ignored request to the UN for a more substantial 
military presence in Rwanda, in the face of the coming genocide, is indicative of 
such reasoning. Many now acknowledge that simply placing a well-equipped 
sizable force willing to oppose the perpetrator on the ground might have either 
prevented such killings or would have kept the killings from escalating. Recent 
re-evaluations of the situation in Rwanda in 1994 have suggested that Dallaire 
may have been correct, and that the genocide in Rwanda may have been averted 
or made less severe by a timely intervention to check potential perpetrators (Fein, 
1998; Gourevitch, 1998;  Des Forges, 1999; Power, 2002a; Krain, 2005). 
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2.5b Regional factors 
 
There is another outcome of war, which warrants consideration: refugee flows and 
refugee communities. With the exception of Midlarsky, scholars of genocide fail 
to examine the relationship between refugees and the onset of genocide. History 
has shown that some of the largest refugee movements are directly connected to 
the genocidal policies of a government. Research by Schmeidl (2001, p.  81) 
affirms that extreme violence is a stronger variable for the cause of refugees than 
institutional human rights violations. People are less likely to flee their homelands 
because of civil and political rights infringements than from life threats. Schmeidl 
agues that genocide/politicide is the strongest predictor of refugee migration.  
 
While genocide has been identified as a cause of refugees flows; refugees as a 
precondition for genocide is theoretically underdeveloped. Midlarsky, however, 
positions refugees as a significant indicator of socio-economic contraction and, 
when in large numbers, as a potential indicator of contraction of physical space 
and a strong provocation for genocide in their own right. 
 
The intersection of ―migration, ethno-religious identity, and social class‖ is, 
according to Midlarsky, ―combustible‖ (2005). Competing for the same resources 
in a shrunken environment, refugees and ‗native‘ populations can come to see 
each other as inevitable opponents in a contracting socioeconomic space 
(Midlarsky, 2005). Refugees sharpen an existential contrast with the ‗other‘ (Jews 
as the anti-German), especially if the victims are, on the whole, wealthier and/or 
more visible than the majority. Introducing the element of social class in the 
context of refugees competing with the ‗other‘, Hitler himself remarked, ‗our 
upper classes, who‘ve never bothered about the hundreds of thousands of German 
emigrants or their poverty, give way to a feeling of compassion regarding the fate 
of the Jews whom we claim the right to expel‘ (cited in Midlarsky, 2005, p.  89). 
The ‗refugee warrior‘ concept, a term coined by Astri Suhrke (1989), is important 
to understanding the relationship between genocide and refugees. Those refugees, 
which posed a military threat to the weakened sovereignty of the states from 
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which they fled are known as refugee warriors. Adelman describes a refugee 
warrior as having four characteristics. These are: first, the person is a refugee in 
the sense that the person, or that persons parents or even grandparents fled the 
geographical territory of their homeland; second, that person uses violent means 
aimed at overthrowing the regime in power in their homeland; third, the base for 
waging the violent conflict is normally located in refugee communities in a 
neighbouring state; and, fourth, the refugees are not fighting on behalf of their 
host state as surrogates of that state (Adelman, 1998).  
From the literature a number of key factors can be drawn, which are of particular 
significance to understanding why genocide occurs. Of utmost importance to this 
thesis is the work of Helen Fein, Matthew Krain, Barbara Harff and Benjamin 
Valentino, Manus Midlarsky and Scott Strauss, which shows that genocide is 
most often committed by elites that are attempting to stay in power against those 
they perceive as threats to their dominance. In desperation, ruling authorities 
resort to genocide, as a defence of their most important goals when other 
strategies have failed.  Any one casual variable does not fit neatly into the 
categories. To a degree the framework is compatible with the these factors 
identified in the literature review but it goes further than this and examines 
acceleratory factors.  
 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
The second half of this chapter establishes a framework of the preconditions that 
increase the likelihood of elites, or those contending power, adopting a genocidal 
strategy in times of armed conflict and regime crisis. This thesis proposes that 
states commit genocide when they cannot win at war or succeed in a position of 
power without the destruction of civilian populations. In order to overcome their 
position of weakness and extend their position of power a state or non-state power 
resorts to genocide/politicide.  
 
This chapter develops a model of the antecedents of genocide and or politicide, by 
examining the domestic and external factors, which make genocide or politicide 
more likely to occur. The approach this thesis adopts is that multiple conditions 
coming from both within and outside the country influence the likelihood that a 
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civil war will develop into genocide. Each precondition, examined by the thesis, 
is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities‘ choices about whether to 
resort to mass killing in conflict situations.  
 
The first part of the model refers to enduring characteristics of regimes and 
societies that are less time dependent. The second part of the framework looks at 
proximate or accelerator factors, which have a more immediate effect on the 
escalation of the violent conflict/political upheaval into genocide.  
 
2.7 Preconditions that increase the risk of elites adopting a 
genocidal strategy 
 
2.7a Structural Factors 
i) Armed conflict and political upheaval  
Political upheaval, a concept that ―captures the essence of the structural crises and 
societal pressures that are preconditions for authorities‘ efforts to eliminate entire 
groups‖, is the first point of analysis (Harff, 2003, p. 6). Political upheaval is 
defined, by Harff (2003, p. 6), as ―an abrupt change in the political community 
caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawn 
state boundaries or defeat in international war‖. Included in the list of political 
upheavals are major armed conflict, anti-colonial rebellions, coups, revolutions, 
decolonisation, defeat in war.  
Harff (2003) found that 24 genocidal episodes occurred during ethnic conflict, 14 
coincided with revolutionary war, 14 with adverse regime change and 4 with 
reformation of state boundaries.  
ii) The severity of armed conflict and political upheaval 
In analysing political upheaval, as a precondition for genocide, a crucial element 
to examine is the magnitude of the upheaval. The more intense and persisting the 
conflict the greater the chance that it will turn genocidal, as the more threatened 
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the ruling elite the more willing they are to take extreme measures. If those in 
control are unwilling to use peaceful means of resolving conflict and they have 
exhausted other violent means they may resort to genocidal strategies.  
To ascertain what it is about political upheavals that increase the risk of genocide 
within a state requires the analysis of the following factors: the nature of the 
conflict from which the genocide/politicide developed; and the magnitude of 
political upheaval. The nature of the conflict: the parties to the dispute; issue (the 
underlying causes of the conflict); intensity of the conflict (measured in the 
number of fatalities and duration), can influence whether a political upheaval 
becomes genocidal. 
This thesis proposes that the greater the magnitude of political upheaval during 
the years preceding the onset of genocide/politicide, the more likely that armed 
conflict situation would lead to war.  The magnitude of political upheaval is 
measured by how many instances there have been of political upheaval, prior to 
the genocide.   
Risk of genocide Open conflict in the 15 years preceding the genocide :  
 
High:   High or very high; continuing or escalating    
   
Low:   Low, medium, ended; low and continuing   
 
 iii) Military victory or mediated settlement 
 
The way in which a war ends may affect the likelihood of genocide or politicide 
occurring. A military victory, as opposed to a negotiated or mediated settlement, 
may increase the likelihood of genocide/politicide occurring in the post-war 
phase. A military victory enables the winner to set the terms of the postwar 
period, which may include punishing the losing side by eradicating them 
(Licklider, 1993).  If the war is ongoing then it can act as a smoke screen for 
indiscriminate murder. However, if genocide or politicide followed attempts at 
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conflict management and or the reaching of a settlement, as was the case in 
Rwanda, this pattern must be accounted for. Factors that need to be considered are 
the nature of the parties involved; the attitude of the parties to the conflict 
management process and if an agreement was reached; the terms of the 
agreement; the support by the parties for the agreement and the implementation of 
the agreement – including how it was to be enforced. This thesis proposes that 
where the war is ongoing or ended by a military victory then there is a higher risk 
of genocide than if the armed conflict was resolved through a mediated 
settlement. 
 
Risk of genocide How the armed conflict ended:  
 
High:   military victory; war ongoing   
Low:   mediated peace settlement 
 
iv) Guerrilla warfare or armed separatist movement  
 
The type of warfare is important in assessing the likelihood of genocide and 
politicide. Paul Huth, Benjamin Valentino and Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2008) 
conclude that mass killing is more likely during guerrilla wars than any other kind 
of armed conflict. The important aspect of guerrilla warfare to this thesis is the 
military threat posed by the guerrilla army. In order to assess this threat three 
factors must be taken into account: the number of guerrilla armed forces; the 
number of fatalities suffered by the government forces; and the success of the 
guerrilla campaign in advancing on government territory and or the destruction of 
government property. The greater the threat posed by the guerrilla armed forces 
the higher risk of a conflict developing into genocide/politicide.  
 
Risk of genocide Guerrilla warfare or armed separatist movement:  
High:   yes  
Low: no 
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v) Prior Genocides: a culture of impunity  
Of the forty-one countries that experienced genocide or politicide since 1955, ten 
experienced multiple episodes. This thesis asks if the risk of a new 
genocide/politicide occurring is more likely in countries undergoing political 
upheaval that have had a prior case of genocide/politicide. This concept, described 
by Fein (1993) as a repeat offender phenomenon, is explicable by the following 
three factors. Firstly, in states, which have committed genocide before the elite 
become habituated to mass killing as a strategic response to state security 
challenges. Secondly, the successful uses of violence to seize or maintain power 
establishes agencies and dispositions, which rely on repression in future conflicts. 
Furthermore, targeted groups are rarely destroyed in their entirety the first time. A 
country is at higher risk of genocide if there is a prior genocide or politicide in the 
same polity that went unpunished or is denied. Organisers of mass killings have in 
the past entertained few doubts that they could literally get away with murder - a 
perception intensified by the indifference or passivity of the international 
community.  
Risk of genocide  Genocides and politicides since 1955:  
High:   By current regime or its predecessors 
Low: No prior genocides 
 
2.8  Political factors 
Two other factors of utmost importance to understanding genocide are the 
ideological commitments, or underpinnings, of the elites and the extent of 
democratic constraints on elite actions. 
2.8a Exclusionary ideology 
Those in power usually have many options for dealing with opposition groups. 
The ideological orientation of the ruling elite is an important determinant in how 
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the elite will respond to conflict and challenges to their power. The ideological 
discourse propagated by those in power, offers a ‗reading‘ of the situation; 
‗designates‘ a threat; and calls for collective mobilisation to alleviate the 
situation, during times of serious crisis. An exclusionary ideology is defined as a 
belief system that ―identifies some over riding purpose or principle that justifies 
efforts to restrict, persecute or eliminate certain categories of people‖ (Harff, 
2003, p. 63). An exclusionary ideology is defined to include the following: 
adherents of strict variants of Marxist-Lennism; rulers of Islamic states governed 
on the basis of Shari‘a law; proponents of rigid anti-communist doctrines; 
regimes which advocate ethnic and ethno-national superiority or exclusivity; and 
those which advocate strict secular nationalism. The likelihood of genocide or 
politicide occurring is increased when the ruling elite holds an exclusionary 
ideology. 
 
Risk of genocide Exclusionary ideology:  
High:   Yes  
Low:   No  
 
2.8b Regime type 
This thesis proposes that a state, which maintains democratic governance in the 
face of political upheaval, is less likely to commit geno-politicide than autocratic 
regimes. Autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in severe repression of 
oppositional groups. While full democracies rarely fail, it is interesting is to 
examine whether states, which are anocracies or are in the transition to democracy 
-  are more or less at risk of genocide than autocratic regimes. Anocracies are 
countries whose governments are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic. 
Included are countries undergoing transitional democracy or countries whose 
central governing body has collapsed or lost control of its major territory.  
Risk of genocide Regime type:  
High:    Autocracy or anocacy  
Low:   Democracy  
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2.8c Low media openness 
Popular media is an important element in genocide and politicide, as the spread of 
hate propaganda through the general population mobilises the violence required 
for genocide and reinforces motivating beliefs. States with no tradition of an 
independent media, a lack of deeply rooted professional standards for journalism 
and a violent media culture, which exhibits no sense of responsibility to society as 
a whole, will be at greater risk of experiencing genocide or politicide at times of 
political upheaval, than states with more respect for the free flow of information 
and an independent press (Chalk, 1999).  
The Press Freedom Index is an annual ranking of countries by Reporters Without 
Borders, based upon an assessment of countries press freedom records. The 
Reporters Without Borders take into consideration the following four factors, 
which are also relevant to an analysis of the role of the media on genocidal 
outcomes:   
1. The plurality and diversity of the media including diversity of the 
ownership of the media 
2. censorship  
3. content creating fear  
4. threats, imprisonment, physical attacks against journalists 
Media openness is measured by a countries ranking on the Press Freedom Index. 
Countries.  
Risk of genocide  Media Openness:  
High:    low 
Low:    high 
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2.9   Ethnic and Religious Factors 
Research has identified ethnic and religious cleavages in a society as a 
precondition of civil war (Rabushka, 1972; Kuper, 1981; and Gurr, 2000). Of the 
genocides and politicides, since 1955, two thirds were preceded by, or occurred 
during or shortly after, ethnic conflict. There are different linkages between 
communal diversity and division and geno- politicide, which need to be explored. 
This study will ascertain which patterns of ethnic diversity and ethnic 
discrimination are linked with geno-politicide. This thesis will examine two 
variables, which may increase the risk of an elite adopting genocidal strategies:  
the ethnic character of the ruling elite and active discrimination.  
2.9a The ethnic character of the ruling elite 
Ethnic heterogeneity, alone, is not a precondition of genocide and politicide. 
Empirical research by Krain (1997) and Harff (2003) found that ethnic 
fractionalisation was uncorrelated with the onset of genocide. Of significance, 
however, is elite ethnicity, and ethnic representation of the governing elite. 
Ethnicity becomes salient when elite politicians over represent a particular ethnic 
group. Where the political elite of a country is mainly or entirely made up of one 
ethnic group then ethnic heterogeneity is more likely to lead to genocide and 
politicide. There are two possible consequences of the elite disproportionately 
representing one segment in a heterogeneous society, which may have genocidal 
outcomes. The group, which is grossly under-represented, challenges the elite. If 
threat perceptions are important, as this thesis proposes, then the narrower the 
ethnic base of a regime the greater the risks of a conflict becoming genocidal. 
Interethnic disputes are often over access to political power.   
Risk of genocide          Ethnic makeup of ruling elite:  
High:   single ethnic/communal group 
Low:   multiple ethnic/communal groups 
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2.9b Severe Political and or Economic Discrimination 
The differential treatment of certain groups increases the salience of group 
identity and its mobilisation for action. The pattern which emerges within states 
that experience genocide is a high level of discrimination or exclusion of a 
communal group, which leads to rebellion and then the governing elite 
responding with more repression and eventually mass killing. It is important to 
elucidate whether a state has a history of overt officially sanctioned racism or 
discrimination.  
If a minority is targeted for severe economic and political discrimination then that 
group is at greater risk of being subjected to genocidal policies. Groups that are 
marginalised are at greatest risk, as they are easily identifiable as ‗different‘ and 
easier targets for scapegoating and dehumanisation. A list of discriminated 
minority groups allows for the identification of possible target groups when 
assessing the risk of genocide or politicide in a country. The thesis proposes that if 
there are minority groups under severe political and or economic discrimination 
then the risks of genocide against this group increase. 
Discrimination in a country can be measured on five levels. 
1. No discrimination: no groups facing or suffering from substantial under 
representation  due to past discrimination, for example, the Scots in the United 
Kingdom. 
2. Remedial: Groups under represented due to past discrimination, but there are 
currently remedial policies to address this, for example, the Maori in New 
Zealand. 
3. Historical Discrimination: Same as above but the government is not doing 
anything to remedy the under-representation. 
4. Societal Discrimination: The existence of social practices, by the dominant 
group which substantially discriminates against a group or groups. 
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5. Official state discrimination: officially sanctioned discrimination whereby 
public policy actively discriminates against a group or groups. This can be further 
assessed by breaking it into political discrimination – the extent to which group 
members are barred from political participation, access to elite positions, and or 
recruitment into the civil service or military positions and economic 
discrimination – the extent to which groups are systematically excluded from 
economic opportunities.  
Genocide risk       Officially sanctioned discrimination against one or more 
minorities 
High:   Yes  
Low:   No 
2.10 Economic factors  
It is important to ask whether a relationship exists between a countries level of 
economic development and genocide. Research suggests that there exists a 
relationship between poverty and armed conflict but does it increase the risk of a 
state in political upheaval developing into genocide/politicide. Countries with low 
levels of economic development (measured by quality of life indicators such as 
infant mortality) are associated with genocide and politicide. Genocides are more 
likely to happen in poor countries and regions. According to Freeman (1991, p.  
188) the economic expectations of a people may ―lead to rebellion and ruthless 
repression‖.   
2.10a  Low Economic Development  
Harff initially considers infant mortality as a potential factor but then discards it 
once she determines that "infant mortality (and the basket of quality-of-life 
indicators it represents) has no independent effects on the odds of geno-politicide 
once a state failure has occurred." Harff does acknowledge, however, that infant 
mortality serves as a significant indicator of state failure. Given that geno-
politicides usually do occur within states in conflict, but that such events may 
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occur shortly after a state failure or conflict first occurs, infant mortality and other 
factors pointing toward state failures should be closely tracked. 
Genocide risk   Level of economic development 
High:   Low economic development (high infant mortality) 
Low:    High economic development (low infant mortality) 
While these internal effects of poverty are important, they are not sufficient in 
resolving the problems presented by this thesis. What is paramount, is the 
―weakness of many states in the world economic system‖ and how external actors 
react to these marginalised states when they are experiencing political upheaval. 
Economic interests cloud the judgment of potential interveners within the 
international system. A countries status, in the international arena, can impact on 
the evolution of genocide. This brings us to the next important phase of the 
model: external factors. As the above variable indicates the study of genocide 
must look beyond the immediate boundaries of the state in which it is committed. 
 
2.11 External factors 
2.11a Economic and political interdependence 
Harff, in examining the international context of genocide, highlights the 
importance of economic and political interdependence in attempts by leaders to 
commit genocide: ―the greater the degree to which a country is interdependent 
with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-politicides‖ (Harff, 
2003, 65). Two variables are used to measure the economic and political 
interdependence of a state:  trade openness and membership of intergovernmental 
and regional organisations.  
 
Trade openness is measured by the proportion of imports and exports within the 
GNP. The salience of this factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a 
country‘s connectedness to the international economic arena and, thus, its 
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dependency on it. States less open to trade are less connected to the international 
system. To the contrary, a country with a high degree of trade openness is less 
likely to engage in grave violations of human rights, fearing an international 
response. Also, such a country is more likely to enjoy a reliable flow of resources 
that can be used to solve political crises peacefully.  
Genocide risk  Trade Openness2004 (imports + exports as percent of 
GDP, indicating  international engagement) 
High  Very low (20 or less) 
Low   High (40 or more)  
 
Countries with a greater than average membership of intergovernmental and 
regional organisations would be subject to greater influence and get more 
political support when facing internal challenges. Arguably, authorities in 
countries with a below average membership are more likely to resort to 
geno/politicide.  
Risk of genocide membership of intergovernmental and regional 
organisations: 
High:   low 
Low:   high 
The following diagram summarises and outlines in schematic form the 
preconditions for genocide. 
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(Figure 5: Preconditions for genocide) 
 
 
 
Preconditions for Genocide 
 
Variable 
 
 
Countries at Greater 
Risk 
 
Countries at Lesser 
Risk 
Structural factors    
Prior Genocide  Prior genocide post 1955 No prior genocide 
Political Upheaval Higher  lower 
Guerrilla Warfare Yes No 
War ended Ongoing or military 
victory 
Mediated settlement 
Political factors   
Ideological Orientation of 
Ruling Elite 
Exclusionary Ideology  No exclusionary Ideology 
Ethnic Character of 
Ruling Elite  
Represents a ruling 
minority 
Represents most or all of 
ethnic groups 
Active political and 
economic discrimination 
Yes no 
Regime Type Autocracy or anocracy Democracy 
Media Openness Low high 
Economic Factors   
Economic Development  Low  High 
External Factors   
Membership in Regional 
and Intergovernmental 
Organisations 
Low high 
Trade Openness Low high 
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2.12 Acceleratory Factors 
In addition to the background conditions that make genocide more likely are the 
proximate causes or short-term
 
accelerators.  Acceleratory factors increase the 
level of significance of the back ground conditions and accelerate/escalate a crisis. 
In addition, one-off trigger events such as killing of a significant leader or a 
natural disaster can seriously escalate and push a regime over the edge. These 
catalytic factors have the potential to transform armed conflict/political upheaval 
into genocide and are relevant when the preconditions, in Figure 5, already exist.
  
2.12a Internal accelerators 
i) An increase in hate propaganda and hate crimes 
Hate propaganda is used to vilify the victim group. Leaders and public media 
encourage or commit hate crimes and hate speech, polarising society and driving 
groups apart. This may start with statements by political leaders/prominent people 
that express support for racial or an ethnic superiority, dehumanization and 
demonisation of minorities, the public scapegoating of groups associated with 
wealth, status, power, colonial power (real, fictional or historical), the condoning 
or justification of violence against a minority and moves on to calls for murder. 
ii) Compulsory visible identification of targeted groups through 
classification and symbolism. 
Groups are classified and names or symbols are assigned to people based on their 
belonging to this ethnic, religious, political or communal group. This can include 
the use of dress, colour, badges, and identity cards indicating ethnicity. Members 
of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. This process, which 
allows for  potential victims of genocide to be the identified and separated out 
because of their identity, can lead to physical segregation, for example into 
ghettoes or concentration camps and it makes it easier to draw up death lists. 
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iii) An increase in life integrity violation by government or 
government-supported groups against targeted groups 
An increase in life integrity violations of a particularly vulnerable group can serve 
as indicator that genocide is imminent.  Violations include, rape, torture, 
disappearances, forced population transfer, destruction of property, destruction of 
food supply, denial medical treatment, segregation. It is of particular concern 
when these life integrity violations are committed with impunity. 
iv) Increased militarisation and the arming of militias 
Expansion of the army, re-equipping of the army, an increase in the import of 
weapons, training of paramilitary groups and the arming of sections of the civilian 
population. This increases the chances of more perpetrators and of more people 
being killed for allows for genocide to be carried out at a wider level of society, 
especially concerning when it occurs  in the name protecting the regime or is 
racially motivated.  
 
v) Deterioration of government capacity brought about by 
fragmentation /competition within the governing elite or a change 
in the power sharing arrangement 
 
Intense factional contention within the elite is an indirect or accelerating condition 
that, in the presence of structural risk factors, increases the likelihood of genocide. 
Elections, the signing of peace accords, are examples of  events that can change 
the balance of power and potentially trigger genocide. 
vi) Economic crisis or decline 
A political and or military crisis is often intensified when the state is faced with an 
economic crisis; whereby, the already fragile state is threatened from another 
front. Therefore, this thesis examines whether an economic decline preceded the 
genocide or politicide.  
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2.12b External Accelerators 
i) External patron and indifference of the international community 
Tolerance and/or complicity, of the ruling elite‘s increasingly repressive 
behaviour, by a foreign power or foreign powers can make genocide/politicide 
more likely. Outside powers can offer a diplomatic guarantee of impunity and or 
military and financial means with which those in power can commit geno-
politicide. The continued trade in arms despite increasing severity of human rights 
violations and violence towards civilians, is one such example. 
ii) Threats of external involvement against government elites not 
backed by action  
 If state-sponsored mass murder has already begun, it is likely that the perpetrators 
have already evaluated the international context and decided that there is a degree 
of permissiveness sufficient to allow them to commit genocide or politicide 
without consequence (Harff, 1986, p. 168). If the credibility or resolve of potential 
interveners is viewed as low then there less deterrent for the elites (Carment and 
Rowlands, 1998; Rothchild and Lake, 1998). Interventions that directly challenge 
the perpetrator by acting against them, or for the target, clearly signal the 
credibility and resolve of interveners. 
iii) Politically active kindred group 
 
The belief that there is a strong tie between the domestic and external foes is 
crucial in the decision by those in power to eliminate a collective group – 
perceived or represented as the threat. Support by kindred groups living outside 
the state can impact on the magnitude of the armed conflict and political upheaval.  
Does the targeted group hold power in neighbouring states?  
iv) Increase in refugee and internally displaced persons flows  
The presence of refugees heighten threat perception of the ruling elite if the 
refugees are the same group as the targeted minority or ‗enemy.‘ A militant 
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refugee community in a neighbouring country is often an additional threat 
dimension. A neighbouring state where a persecuted or marginalized group sought 
refuge can become a base for invasion.  
The following framework sets out the factors which are preconditions that 
increase the risk of genocide in a country, see Figure 6. These factors will be 
examined in relation to Rwanda and Sudan in the case studies that follow in 
chapters three and four. 
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(Figure 5: Framework of preconditions for genocide) 
 
Structural Factors 
 
Political upheaval 
High or very high, ongoing or escalating 
armed conflict and regime crisis 
 
Guerrilla warfare  
Engaged in guerrilla warfare 
 
Prior genocides and politicides 
Existence of earlier geno-/politicides 
The current regime or its predecessors 
committed genocide, that went unpunished 
or is denied 
Political factors 
 
Autocracy or Anocracy 
partial autocracy or partial democracy 
because mixed regime types are inherently 
unstable  
 
Exclusionary ideology of the ruling elite  
The promotion and adherence to a belief 
system that identifies some overriding 
purpose or principle that justifies efforts to 
restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain 
categories of people 
 
Low media openness  
Low level of media independence and 
openness 
 
Governing elite are represented by a 
single ethnic, communal, regional group  
 
Severe political or economic 
discrimination 
Minorities are targeted under state 
sanctioned political and/or economic 
discrimination . 
Economic Factors 
 
Low economic development 
measured by a high rate of infant 
mortality. 
External Factors 
 
Low interdependence 
both trade openness and the rate of  
membership in regional and international 
organisations are low.  
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This thesis will also look out for the existence of any of the following acceleratory 
factors and examine the relationship they have with the preconditions mentioned 
above.  
 
 
 
 
 
Cvbcvvvbvvvbvbv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal accelerators 
An increase in hate propaganda and 
hate crimes 
Compulsory visible identification 
of targeted groups through 
classification and symbolism. 
An increase in life integrity 
violation by government or 
government-supported groups 
against targeted groups 
Increased militarisation and the 
arming of militias 
Deterioration of government 
capacity brought about by 
fragmentation /competition within 
the governing elite or a change in 
the power sharing arrangement. 
Economic crisis or decline 
 
External accelerators 
External Patron and Indifference of 
the International Community 
 
Threats of external involvement 
against government elites not 
backed by action  
 
Politically active kindred group 
Increase in refugee and internally 
displaced persons flows  
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Chapter Three: 
Rwanda 
“We owe respect to the living; to the dead we owe only truth” (Voltaire) 
“When I came out, there were no birds…There was sunshine and the stench of 
death.” 
(Survivor of the Rwandan Genocide) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
On April 6 1994, the president of Rwanda was assassinated. Two rockets were 
fired that struck down his plane
6
. All on board, including the president of Burundi 
and many top advisors to the Rwandan administration, were killed. This event 
became the catalyst for one the greatest calamities of our age. Following the 
assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana (who had ruled Rwanda for 21 
years), a campaign of violence ensued in which at least 800,000 Tutsis and 10,000 
Hutus were killed. The killings continued until the rebel army, the Rwandan 
Patriot Front (RPF), took control of the country, ousting the genocidal regime 
from Rwanda, on July 17 1994, and ending the genocide (Des Forges, 1999; 
Power 2002; Prunier, 1995). 
 
The genocide of the Tutsi, in Rwanda in 1994, by the Hutu extremist state, is the 
most rapidly executed genocide recorded. It surpasses that of the Holocaust, not in 
numbers but in the sheer speed with which the Tutsi were executed. In 1994, 
between the second week of April and the third week of May, the Rwandan Tutsi 
suffered ―one of the highest casualty rates of any population in history‖ (Prunier, 
1995, p.261). The decimation of the population was led by the military and 
National police (gendarmes), with civilians, in particular the militia 
                                                 
6
 There was no investigation and to this day there is no certainty over who is responsible 
for the attack.  
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(interahamwe), as active participants. Rape and mutilation often preceded the 
deaths of Tutsi. Victims were treated with incomprehensible cruelty and sadism. 
 
The tragedy and the totality of genocides, such as the one in Rwanda, where as 
one survivor expressed it ―there is nothing there. Everything is killed‖ - where the 
very word ‗survivor‘ itself is suspect (in Jones, 2004, p.135), compels any 
thinking human being to ponder the question of how this could possibly have 
happened  and to try and grasp the nature of events that could possibly have lead 
to it? In human terms, the Rwandan genocide is, perhaps, the most sickening and 
most chilling example of our imperfect nature, but, in academic terms, it provides 
the perfect case study. In Rwanda, unlike many other cases, it is now almost 
universally accepted, with the exception of the perpetrators and their most ardent 
supporters, that what took place, during the 100 days, was genocide. It is one of 
the cases most easily identified as genocide. Before delving into the conditions 
and causes detailing the events that lead to the genocidal violence in Rwanda, the 
nature of the genocide must be examined and assess why it is actually defined as 
genocide.  
3.2 The genocide 
The genocide was primarily directed at Tutsi (who comprised about 15% of the 
population) and perpetrated by the Hutu (about 85% of the population)
7
. The Hutu 
regime labelled all Tutsi, men, women and children, as enemies to be killed. It 
was secondarily directed at anti-Habyarimana government and opposition 
members, Hutu who opposed the extremists, human rights activists and journalists 
critical of the regime. In fact, anyone who wouldn‘t participate in the genocide 
was also targeted and killed. The genocide was countrywide and was not focussed 
on one locale, though there was some regional variance in start time. The first five 
weeks of genocide were the most intense with the most fatalities occurring during 
this period (Straus, 2006 and 2008). 
When assessing whether genocide has occurred, what must be taken into account 
is whether the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group. The 
                                                 
7
 These figures are not exact, as the Twa made up 1 % of the population, but are used in all reports 
and literature on Rwanda. 
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violence against Tutsi was exterminatory and in this respect was successful. An 
extremely high percentage of Tutsis were killed as a percentage of the pre-existing 
Tutsi population. Between 75 and 80% of all Tutsi residing in Rwanda before the 
genocide were killed (Straus, 2006). There was a high degree of direct killing in 
Rwanda; where Tutsi were found they were killed, and relatively little forced 
displacement, as was the case with other genocidal violence, such as Yugoslavia 
or Darfur.  
 
 The literature clearly dispels the ―spontaneous action from below‖ thesis 
(Alvarez, 2001; Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand; Straus, 2006 and 2009). 
―Rwanda‘s genocide was not a simple matter of mutual hatred between tribes 
erupting into irrational violence. Neither were the mass killings the result of a 
huge and sudden outpouring of rage on the part of Hutus following the murder of 
their president‖ (Keane, quoted in Alvarez, 2001, p.83). The violence was top 
down, systematic, intentional and state driven‖ (Straus, 2007, p.523). The new 
Hutu extremist government sworn in after the plane crash had spent several 
months preparing death lists, importing tens of thousands of machetes and other 
weapons, and disseminating anti-Tutsi, hate propaganda. The genocide was 
planned, promoted, organised and carried out by state officials, who used the state 
apparatus and the media to carry out the genocide (Alvarez, 2001; Des Forges, 
1999; Lemarchand; Straus, 2006, 2007 and 2008).  
 
Of significance to the Rwandan case is the degree of civilian mobilisation and 
participation in the acts of violence. The number of Rwandans that directly took 
part in the genocide is subject to much debate. Straus, who carried out wide-
ranging field research in Rwanda and interviewed convicted perpetrators, 
estimates the figure to be about 200,000. ―Even though soldiers and militias often 
were involved in killings of the greatest magnitude, ordinary civilian men were 
probably more numerous in the perpetration of the genocide than were soldiers 
and militarily trained militias‖ (Straus, 2006, p.44). The largest massacres at 
churches, schools, and other public location where large numbers of Tutsi had 
gathered were largely committed by government militias and soldiers (Ibid). 
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The events in Rwanda clearly fit with the operational definition of genocide 
adopted by this thesis, that 1) there was complicity by the state (or, in the case of 
civil war, either of the contending authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger 
human life; 2) evidence, even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities 
to isolate or single out group members for mistreatment; 3) victims members of an 
identifiable group; 4) there are policies and practices that cause prolonged mass 
suffering; and the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group,  
 
3.3 Structural Factors  
3.3a Political Upheaval and War 
A history of political upheaval, including abrupt and violent regime change, 
revolution and armed conflict are associated with genocide and an analysis of 
Rwanda shows such a history of political upheaval. In 1959, colonial rule in 
Rwanda ended. The five years that followed were a period of extreme political 
upheaval, resulting in the exile of thousands of Tutsi. From November 1959 to 
September 1961, there was a revolution in which the Hutu seized power, resulting 
in the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy and the proclamation of a Hutu dominated 
republic. This saw an explicit reversal of the structure of political domination that 
existed under colonial rule, where Tutsi were the favoured group. This transition 
was supported by the Belgian authorities, who hastily gave up their indirect rule 
of Rwanda, bringing Rwanda to national independence. Uvin explains:  ―In the 
name of a suddenly discovered attachment to representative structures as well as 
out of fear of the more radical (leftist, anti colonial) Tutsi elite, [the former 
colonial power] had switched their favour to the Hutu‖ (Uvin, 1999, p.256). The 
aim of the revolution was to ―end the hegemony of the Tutsi minority…and in 
doing so free the Hutu masses of the shackles of the Tutsi-dominated monarchy‖ 
(Lemarchand; p. 5). The tone of the revolution was populist and anti-feudal, with 
an ethnic underpinning.  
 
An examination of the violence during this period is essential to understanding the 
events of 1994. There were three stages of the revolutionary violence. Firstly, 
there was localised anti-Tutsi violence, in late 1959, accompanied by small 
pogroms. This activity was specific to some provinces (Uvin, 1999, p. 256). The 
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violence resulted in the death of hundreds of Tutsi and the first main refugee flow. 
The second phase followed elections in 1960 and 1961, which resulted in a 
massive victory by the Parmehutu, a radically anti-Tutsi group. This victory was 
followed by the overthrow of the monarchy and the second large outflow of Tutsi, 
particularly those who had held positions of power, ensued. The next stage of 
violence was small guerrilla assaults by Tutsi refugees, largely those who were 
attempting to return, from bases in Burundi and Uganda. These incursions by 
refugees, known as inyenzi (cockroaches), came to an end in 1967.   
 
The response to these guerrilla activities was mass killings of Tutsi in Rwanda. 
During this time about half the Tutsi population of Rwanda fled, which 
corresponds with about 9% of the total Rwandan population (Prunier, 1995 and 
(Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996; and Kiernan, 2008, p.557). The Hutu 
revolution, by forcibly displacing some 200,000 Tutsi, who sought refuge in 
neighbouring states, planted the seeds of the refugee warrior militancy that gave 
birth to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in the 1990s. A second element of the 
revolution that impacted on future events was the association of the revolution as 
anti-feudal, anti-colonial and democratic, and with it, the depiction of ‗the 
enemies of the revolution‘, namely the Tutsi, as the opposite. In Rwanda, argues 
Lemarchand (2002), ―as in Nazi Germany the roots of genocide are traceable to 
the lethal combination of revolution and war, each contributing to redefine the 
victims as "the enemies of the nation", and thus shifting the blame away from the 
perpetrators to the victims.‖ 
 
Political Upheaval:   yes – high degree of political upheaval, with armed conflict 
escalating  
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
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3.3b Guerrilla Warfare  
 
In Rwanda the relationship between war and genocide is central to an 
understanding of the subject. In the immediate years preceding the genocide there 
was a civil war in Rwanda. There were two primary phases to this war. From 
1990 to 1993, the civil war was fought between the Tutsi dominated rebels and 
the Hutu led government forces. The RPF fought a guerrilla war against the 
Rwandan government. According to Human Rights Watch the Government 
identified the Tutsi as "accomplices" providing "cover" for the invaders 
(HRW,1993).  
The fighting was ended by a peace agreement, the Arusha Peace Accords, signed 
in August 1993, but following the assassination of the Rwandan President, the 
civil war resumed. It was during this second phase of the war that the genocide 
took place. The wartime environment was a central rationale for the mass killing 
of Tutsi civilians, who, due to their ethnicity alone, were all labelled wartime 
enemies and rebel accomplices (Des Forges, 1999 and Reed, 1996).  
The Rwandan Patriotic Army, mainly drawn from Tutsi refugee families living in 
Uganda since the early 1960s, also included both Hutu and Tutsi refugees from 
other neighbouring countries. Its political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF), claimed it sought plural government and not Tutsi domination of Rwanda. 
The rebel army's strategy, developed after reported leadership infighting in 1990, 
was not to pursue military victory but rather to seek limited advances into 
Rwandan territory, as leverage for a negotiated settlement with Habyarimana. 
Only after the Hutu-initiated genocide of 1994 did the RPA change its goal to 
seeking the violent seizure of the government in Kigali. The RPF grew out of 
nearly 40 years of exile, in mostly Eastern and Central Africa, Europe and North 
America (Reed, 1996, p.479). 
In October 1990, under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsis, living 
exile in Uganda and other neighbouring countries invaded Rwanda. In response 
the Rwandan government staged a fake attack on Kigali. This was intended to 
frighten the Hutu majority into supporting the war effort and, according to 
74 
 
Melvern (2004), encourage the reporting of suspected RPF sympathizers among 
the Tutsi. More than 10,000 people were arrested. Direct killing of Tutsi also 
followed, including the use of grenades to kill Tutsi, and according to witness 
testimony orders from the para-commando for ethnic cleansing of Bahima village. 
At least 348 civilians were killed in the first 48 hours (Melvern, 2004, p.14-15). 
Ten days after the invasion, local officials in Kibilira were told to kill the local 
inyenzi and burn down their homes because of the threat of the RPF offensive.  
The first RPF invasion was considered a failure. However, in January 1991, under 
their new leader, Paul Kagame, the RPF improved their strategy and prowess. 
Kagame was ―a truly impressive leader‖ – a military tactician of enormous talent‖ 
(Melvern, 2004, p. 19). A highly successful guerrilla fighter who trained at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, he believed that the only way to destroy Rwanda‘s 
―rotting regime‖ was with classic guerrilla warfare. On his arrival, Paul Kagame 
began to reorganize his forces, which had been reduced to less than 2000 troops, 
and decided to develop a guerrilla style war in the north of the country. He pulled 
his forces back into Uganda and then moved them into the forested Virunga 
mountains. The RPF spent two months in this area, without engaging the 
government forces. This time was spent rebuilding the army. On 23 January 1991, 
the RPF captured Ruhengeri, a town in the North, freeing numerous political 
prisoners and capturing a large amount of weapons and equipment, before 
retreating back to the forests that evening. However, these actions only caused 
Habyarimana to increase his resistance to the RPF and its sympathisers. By early 
1991 the RPF had grown to 5,000, by 1992 it had reached 12,000 and by the time 
of 1994 genocide numbered 25,000. The RPF made rapid advancements over the 
north and east of the country and the new government was forced to flee from 
Kigali to Gitarama, due to RPF advancements. This civil war lasted until 
Habyarimana government signed the Arusha Peace Accords with the RPF in 
1993. Even with the peace agreement, a climate of fear and insecurity blanketed 
the country.  
Having been attacked by the RPA since 1990, the security of the Hutu 
government in Kigali was under threat. The Habyarimana government, already 
facing economic problems, was seriously threatened. This external Tutsi threat 
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was crucial to the promotion and popularisation of an ideology which depicted 
Tutsi as a menace, coming from both within and from without the country, who 
were plotting to take power. Losing the war with the RPF was associated with the 
destruction of Hutu power, and, therefore, the destruction of the Tutsi was a 
means of protecting the existing Hutu power structure (Semelin, 2003, p.194). In 
Rwanda, a climate of fear prevailed. Hutus knew of massacres that Tutsis had 
carried out against Hutus in Burundi. In a climate of conflict, suggests Straus, it 
was not unreasonable to wonder, ―Am I next? Who are the enemies? The RPF? 
My Tutsi neighbours?‖ With the Hutu government at war with the RPF, war 
against the RPF quickly transformed into war against Tutsis. War provided the 
rationale for killing and legitimized it. It also brought a level of training and 
organization to the violence that would otherwise have been missing.  
The civil war began again on April 7, 1994 after the assassination of President 
Juvenal Habyarimana. Habyarimana's assassination opened a gap in authority. 
Hardliner Hutus stepped into the power vacuum and took advantage of the 
insecurity of the people to make extreme violence the de facto policy. 
 
Guerrilla warfare:   yes – RPF against the Rwandan Government forces 
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
 
3.3c Prior Genocide – a culture of impunity  
 
The 1994 genocide was not the first in Rwanda‘s history. Genocide was 
committed against the Tutsi by the Hutu led state between 1963 and. Harff puts 
the death toll at between 12,000 – 20,000 1964 (2003, p.60). One of the leaders of 
the 1963 genocide, Theoneste Bagosora, would often quote the then President 
Kayibanda who warned the ―Inyenzi‖ (cockroaches) invaders: ―Some of you are 
causing trouble for your brothers who are living in peace in a democratic 
Rwanda… and suppose you take Kigali by force how will you measure the chaos 
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of which you will be the first victims… it will be the total end of the Tutsi race‖ 
(quoted in Malvern, 2004, p. 9).  
 
There are similarities in the killing patterns of the genocide in 1963 and the 
genocide which followed 30 years later. Of note is the disposal of the dead bodies 
in the Nyabarongo River. The disposal of bodies in the Nyabarongo River was of 
symbolic significance. The river was seen to flow in the direction of the Horn of 
Africa, where the Tutsi supposedly originated from. The Tutsi were constantly 
referred to as foreigners, both in the lead up to and during the 1994 genocide, and 
the river  became  a symbolic means of sending these ‗foreigners‘ back to where 
they came from (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 60). 
 
The international spotlight briefly shone on Rwanda, following the genocidal 
violence in 1963. British philosopher Bertrand Russell described the genocide of 
1963 as the most horrible and systematic extermination of a people since the Nazi 
extermination of the Jews. Journalists at the time made similar comparisons 
(Melvern, 2004, p. 9). The attention, however, was short-lived and Rwanda 
slipped quickly back into obscurity. Unfortunately, with this genocide, as with 
many others, it went unpunished and it was never officially acknowledged as 
genocide (Melvern, 2004). This lack of consequence for the perpetrators of 
genocidal violence and other human rights violations was to continue in Rwanda‘s 
history and ultimately have devastating consequences. 
 
Massacres of Tutsi occurred, without consequence, in the four years preceding the 
genocide of 1994. The first took place in 1990 in direct response to the invasion 
by the RPF. After the first massacre in October 1990, there were a further 15 
massacres. Of particular severity were the episodes in January 1991, February 
1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993, March 1993 and February 1994. 
According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report released in 1993, the 
government killed approximately 2,000 Tutsi between 1990 and 1992, ―some 
singly or in small groups, others in massacres that took hundreds of lives at 
Kibilira, Bugesera and in northwest Rwanda‖( HRW, 1993). 
The report also found the government arrested or detained without charge at least 
10,000 Tutsi and members of the political opposition, during the same period. 
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Many of whom were tortured and held incommunicado in military camps rather 
than in regular prisons (HRW, 1993). The massacres of the early 1990s were 
‗dress rehearsals‖ or ‗test runs‘ for what the Hutu themselves described as the 
―final solution‖ (Gourvetich, p.140 and Adelman, p.31).  As Des Forges stresses: 
conspirators grew bolder; acting within a ―culture of impunity‖ (Des Forges, 
1999, p. 42).  
 
Prior genocide:   yes, in 1964 against the Tutsi 
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
3.3d Military Victory or Mediated settlement? 
For those that argue a military victory, as opposed to mediated settlement, 
increases the likelihood of a war developing into genocide, Rwanda presents a 
complicated picture. The Arusha Peace Accords had a significant impact on 
events that led to the genocide in 1994 and were a fundamental acceleratory factor 
of the Rwandan genocide. In an assessment of the peace process in Rwanda, 
Kuper highlights the complicated and delicate nature of peace negotiations and 
how ―mediators sometimes inadvertently provoke the very tragedies they seek to 
prevent‖ (1996, p. 221).  
On 4 August 1993, a peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, was signed between 
the RPF and the Rwandan Government. The culmination of 14 months of 
negotiation and mediation by Tanzania, in conjunction with OAU, France, 
Belgian and the US, the agreement was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy. The 
comprehensive settlement provided a new system of government for a new 
Rwanda; moving Rwanda from presidential system of governance to a multiparty 
parliamentary one. Power was to reside with a Council of Ministers and no longer 
with the President. The President was a figure head whose power was second to 
that of the Prime Minister. The rule of law, human rights, political pluralism and 
national unity were lauded as the guiding principles that this new Rwanda would 
be governed by. 
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At the time of signing, many considered the Arusha Accords to be ―the best peace 
agreement in Africa since Lancaster House‖ (Adelman and Surkhe, 2000, p.142), 
but it failed miserably in its implementation. The Accords demonstrate, in an 
almost unprecedented way, the responsibility of third parties, once involved, to 
maintain their full commitment to seeing the process through, and that until 
implemented the conflict resolution process is not complete. In some cases, 
―partial efforts‖ may in fact be ―worse than no efforts at all‖ (Stettenheim, 2000, 
p. 236).  By failing to give the extremists a steak in the new government, the 
Accords broke a ―fundamental tenet of conflict resolution‖ (Stettenheim, p. 234). 
Ultimately, the extremists were not neutralised and would play a significant role 
in the breakdown of the peace process.  
In retrospect, Herman Cohen, US diplomat at the time, suggests that alternatively 
a more sustainable solution would have been to ―condemn the RPF‖ (2000, p. 
177). Cohen asks somewhat repentantly: ―Looking back to the first day of the 
crisis, 1 October 1990, why did we automatically exclude the policy option of 
informing Ugandan President Museveni that the invasion of Rwanda by 
uniformed members of the Ugandan Army was totally unacceptable, and that the 
continuation of good relations between the USA and Uganda would depend on his 
getting the RPF back across the border?‖ (15).  
 There were five significant features of the new Accords that threatened the power 
of the Hutu elite and pushed them further on a genocidal trajectory. Under the 
new accords, the presidential system, which had favoured Hutu power, was to be 
replaced by a system which promoted pluralisation. In place would be a 
parliamentary system. Opposition parties were to be favoured under the new 
system. However, the extremist Hutu party, the CDR, that had already began 
arming and training the interhamawe, were to be completely excluded from the 
transitional system.   Prunier argues that the Arusha Accords threatened the 
―sociological majority‖ principle of the 1959 revolution, which was based on the 
premise that the ethnic majority, who in Rwanda were Hutu, would always hold 
political power (1995). Under this system established by the Accords, the ruling 
party, Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement (MRND), 
would be allocated one third of the parliamentary seats, rendering it a minority 
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party, and its extremist wing no seats at all. Under a multiparty democratic 
system, such a change could have a huge impact on the power of the Hutu elite. 
The agreement also removed the extremists‘ control over the military. Not only 
were there changes to the political system but, furthermore, the military structure 
was amended. Under the new power sharing arrangement, the army would 
comprise of 40% RPF, with command positions split evenly between the RPF and 
Government forces. Also of significance, the ambitious Accords went as far as 
including the right of return of all Rwandan refugees. The peace agreement 
required the right of return to Rwanda for all Tutsi refugees from Uganda and 
other neighbouring countries. The repatriation of mainly Tutsi refugees, and the 
fact that those who had left within the prior 10 years could get back their property, 
would engender a dramatic change in the Tutsi demographic. There was to be no 
amnesty for previous human rights violations; anyone, even the President, was 
now open to investigation and prosecution. Additionally, the Accords sought the 
removal of the ethnic designation on identity cards. Any gains Tutsi garnered 
under this new system and those made by an RPF military successes were to be 
―nullified by the act of genocide‖ (Midlarsky, 2005, p.166).  
The CRD is an archetypal example of ‗spoilers‘ in a peace process. Spoilers as 
defined by Stedman are "...leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace 
threaten their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine 
attempts to achieve it"  (…) According to Clapham, the CDR and the interhamwe 
saw the negotiations as a façade to build up their support. This is evidenced in a 
statement made by the leader of the CDR, who suggested that the ―extermination 
of the Tutsis would be the inevitable consequence…of the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords‖ (quoted in Scorgie, 2004, p. 72). For the CDR there was never a 
vision of co-sharing.  
Mediated peace agreement:   yes – Arusha Accords mediated in 1993, 9 months 
before the genocide 
  
Risk of genocide:    low 
 
 
80 
 
3.4 Political Factors  
 
3.4a Regime Type 
The first republic, following the revolution, was the Kayibanda regime (1962 – 
1973). This was a repressive dictatorship, which chased out or killed most of its 
opposition, including not only Tutsi but also opposition Hutu politicians. Anyone 
who did not join the Parmehutu was defined as an enemy (Uvin, 1999, p. 257).  
Kabyibanda asserted in a speech that ―[a] proliferation of political parties would 
distract the population, render the progress of the country rather incoherent and 
lead to harmful stagnation of the nation‖ (quoted in Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 
1996, p. 4). People couldn‘t even move house without permission. In this new 
Rwanda, ushered in after the revolution, Tutsi faced severe discrimination.  
 
The Second Republic under general Habyarimana (1973 -1994) was a military 
dictatorship. Described as ‗bloodless,‘ the Habyriarmana coup was anything but; 
an estimated fifty-five people closely associated with the old regime were 
murdered, by poisoning, or they were beaten to death with a hammer, following 
arrest and imprisonment. Fearing that the blood of his predecessor could cause 
him harm, Habyrimana had Kayibanda and his wife starved to death (Prunier, 
1988, p. 82). Also murdered were 700 soldiers from the national army. They were 
killed for retribution or to eliminate witnesses, to prevent the atrocities of 
Habyrimana‘s regime being exposed (Melvern, 2004, p. 11).  
  
The legal system, while independent, was imbued with a culture of impunity, and 
corruption was rife. Farcical elections would take place with Habyarimana 
winning 98% of the vote. Habyarimana ―went on to create one of the most rigidly 
controlled countries in the world‖ (Melvern, 2004, p. 11). Rwanda was a one 
party state, where all other political parties were banned. Every Rwandan, 
including babies, had to be a member of Habyarimana‘s party, the MRND, 
formed in 1974. The role of the party in everyday life was invasive - no one could 
move house without telling the party and distribution of subversive materials or 
insulting the president were punishable with long prison sentences (Melvern, 
2004; 11).  
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The perception of Habyarimana by outsiders was of a good economic manager 
and an ardent catholic, whose lifestyle lacked the excesses of many of Africa‘s 
other dictators of the time (Melevrn, 2004: 11). While extremely dictatorial, 
Rwanda under Habyarimana was relatively politically and economically stable. 
However, in the late 1980s the economy began to fail. President Habyarimana 
became increasingly authoritarian and support for the regime began to fall. The 
regime‘s grip of absolute power began to look increasingly untenable. Support for 
political reform, democratisation and opposition to the Habyarimana regime came 
from Tutsi from all over Rwanda and from Hutu from regions other than 
Habyarimana‘s home region in the North West.  
 
In response to the burgeoning opposition movement and outside pressure, 
Habyarimana made some concessions, including the legalisation of other political 
parties. One party rule ended in Rwanda in 1991, under pressure from France. 
What followed was the emergence of several opposition parties. These new 
political parties were an additional threat to that already faced by Rwanda‘s ruling 
elite from the RPF.  
 
3.4b Democratisation 
 
Democratic reform can present a potential threat to those groups whose power 
rests on their having exclusive control of the state and markets (Reed, 1996, p. 
480). This ‗dark side of reform‘ is exemplified in the Rwandan tragedy, where 
premature democratisation ultimately ended in tragedy. Excessive democratisation 
in weak states leads to challenges, asserts Tilly (2007). Tilly argues that during 
periods of threat state cohesion should take precedence over democratic liberties. 
This challenges the orthodoxy that democratisation is a necessary positive strategy 
for peaceful conflict resolution. Ugandan President Misenvi was likely correct 
when he told foreign journalists in October 1993, following the bloody coup, ―that 
he did not believe Burundi was ready to adopt a Western style democracy. The 
Rwandan experience echoes this sentiment. As Harff argues, ―in a country torn 
apart by communal bloodshed  stability may come at a price namely minority rule 
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or at best a carefully engineered power sharing agreement prior to any more 
conventional democratic formula‖ ( 2001, p. 91). 
 
In Rwanda, the ruling administration was dominated entirely by northern Hutu. 
With reform, parties emerged with mixed membership, both ethnically and 
regionally. There were parties with Hutu from the south and central regions and 
parties with both Hutu and Tutsi members. The northern Hutu had the most to 
lose from a Tutsi rebel victory, but they had almost as much to lose in terms of 
power, prestige and wealth from genuine political pluralisation, since they 
represented only a minority of Rwanda's Hutu. According to Lemarchand, ―[f]or 
the first time since the Hutu revolution of 1959, the circumstances were ripe for a 
strategic alliance between the enemies from within and those from without‖ 
(2009, p. 487).  
 
Authoritarian or anocracy:   anocracy 
  
Risk of genocide:               high 
 
3.4c Media Openness 
 
During genocide and in the lead up to it, propaganda campaigns and fabrications 
about the targeted group are used to justify genocidal acts. These campaigns are 
run through the media. With no independent media, which can serve as a structure 
to deter genocide, the elite have easy access to the majority of the population. In 
Rwanda, to ensure widespread dissemination of calls to ethnic violence, 
prominent figures from the President's circle set up the media to promote ethnic 
hatred and fear. Radio Rwanda, the state broadcaster, was the only radio station. 
Kamilindi, a Rwandan journalist of 20 years, who stopped working during the 
genocide, due to intimidation, said: ―Radio Rwanda was the voice of authority, 
and authority is respected in Rwanda. People are raised and taught to take what 
they hear on the radio as gospel truth‖ (Kamilindi, 2007, p. 136). Radio-
Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was the ―mouth piece‖ of the Hutu 
elite and a ―means to propagate‖ their ideals and encourage genocide and the war 
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against the Tutsi dominated RPF (Kimilindi, 2007; 110). According to Gaspard 
Rwamulinda, who murdered Tutsi during the genocide, ‗[t]he radio was telling us 
to do it. So were the leaders. Our Mayor was very clear. He directed us. I killed 
eight people. I killed people I knew did not deserve to die. It was that simple‘ 
genocidaire (Rwamulinda, 2010). Tragically, ―[n]o one succeeded in combating 
these hate media in Rwanda. They were very powerful and entrenched with those 
who held power‖ (Kimilindi, 2007, p.137). The Minister of Information, Faustin 
Rucogoza, who failed in his efforts to close down and sanction the extremist hate 
media outlets, was one of the first assassinated by the interahamwe, on the 
morning of April 7 1994.     
 
Radio broadcasts in particular and the media in general, exercised great influence 
over the Rwandan population. The saturation of radios in Rwanda was 25 per 100 
persons by 1992. RTLM broadcasts were relayed to all parts of the country 
through a network of transmitters owned and operated by the government. To 
emphasize the impact of Rwandan media on the genocide, Des Forges wrote: 
Some 66 per cent of Rwandans are literate and those who knew how to read were 
accustomed to reading for others. In many cases, the written word was 
underscored by cartoons, most of which were so graphic that they could not be 
misinterpreted. (Des Forges,1999). 
However, the general census of the population conducted on 15 August 1991 
indicates that: 'The population that cannot read nor write represents 44 per cent of 
people who are more than six years.' In other words, only 56 per cent of the 
population could read and write in 1991. The same general census adds: 'In 
comparison to 1978, this represents a decrease of 13.4 per cent, since the illiteracy 
rate was 57.4 per cent for the entire country.' Des Forges, literacy figure suggests 
that there had been a change of 10 per cent between August 1991 and 6 April 
1994.  
A mimeographed, anonymous document found in Rwanda after the genocide, 
described propaganda techniques for genocidists and includes a detailed analysis 
of Roger Muccielli‘s book Psychologie de la publicite et de la propaganda, 
published in Paris in 1970. The document recommends a particular technique that 
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is calls ―accusation in the mirror‖, whereby the ―party which is using terror will 
accuse the enemy of using terror‖. This technique was evidenced in Rwanda, for 
example in the claim, broadcast on RTLM, that ―the objective of the Tutsis is 
obviously to exterminate the Hutu, the majority mass‖.  
 
A 1992 issue of Kangura states: ―Find out again your ethnicity because the Tutsi 
have taught you not to recognise it… Know that a proud and bloodthirsty minority 
mixed with you in order to dilute you, divide you, dominate you, and massacre 
you… The nation is artificial but ethnicity is eternal.‖  The Kangura newspaper 
was the most well-known example of Government-sponsored hate propaganda. 
From April 1991, the newspaper with a circulation of approximately 10,000 was 
printed free of charge by the National Printing Press. Rwanda Armed Forces, 
Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of Military Intelligence, personally assisted 
in the distribution of the newspaper in Kigali. The newspaper repeated calls by the 
authorities for the elimination of the Tutsis. It carried the warning: "Let us learn 
about the Inkontanyi plans and then let us eliminate every last one of them". 
Closely, linked to propaganda and the language of genocide is the ideology of the 
elite.  
 
Low media openness:   yes 
  
Risk of genocide:    high 
 
 
3.4d Ideology of the Ruling Elite 
 
The use of exclusionary ideology and the construction of identities in terms of 
―us‖ and ―them‖ to accentuate differences was an important factor in the Rwandan 
genocide. Also of significance was the depiction of the targeted group, the Tutsi, 
as dangerous and disloyal, as a threat and as unworthy or inferior so as to justify 
action against the group. The ideology that underpinned the genocide in Rwanda 
was one of racial supremacy, whereby the Hutu were supreme. The extreme 
version of this ideology culminated in genocide. The ideology developed and 
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promoted by the Hutu extremists was based on a particular history of ethnicity - 
the Hamitic thesis, a populist and racist version of Rwandan history, which 
suggested the Tutsi were of alien origins and did not belong in Rwanda.  
 
An ideology of hatred began to grow based on the presumed Hamitic origins of 
Tutsi. A 1993 issue of Kangura  stated: 
 
―A cockroach can not give birth to a butterfly. It is true. A 
cockroach gives birth to another cockroach…The history of 
Rwanda shows that a Tutsi stays exactly the same, that he has 
never changed. The malice, the evil are just as we knew them 
in the history of our country‖ (Quoted in Des Forges, 1999, p. 
73). 
 
The core of this ideology and the discourse surrounding it are best exemplified in 
the words of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the military officer in charge of the 
elite forces when the genocide began: ―The Tutsi never had a country of their own 
to make themselves into a people… They are people who came to Rwanda and 
were naturalised‖ and with ―arrogance and pride‖ they imposed ―their supremacy 
on the Hutu of Rwanda‖. He continues: ―the Tutsi were proud, arrogant, tricky 
and untrustworthy and were convinced that the only good Tutsi was a Tutsi in 
power‖. The Hutu, he argued in comparison, were ―modest, honest, loyal, 
independent and impulsive‖ (Melvern, 2004, p. 3).  
 
The Ten Commandments of the Hutu, published in Kangura, in December 1990, 
was a manifesto against Tutsi that clearly set out behaviour expected of Hutu. 
Like ―Hitler‘s Nuremberg Laws or the Bosnian Serbs‘ 1992 edicts, ―these 
commandments,‖ argues Power, ―articulated the rules of the game‖ (2003, p. 
338). For example, the commandments defined any ―Hutu who marries a Tutsi 
woman; befriends a Tutsi woman; employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or 
concubine‖ as a ―traitor‖. They also declared: ―Every Hutu should know that 
every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic 
group‖. Particularly chilling is the eighth commandment, which states: ―The Hutu 
should stop having mercy on the Tutsi‖.  
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In a letter dated 21 September 1992, the General Staff of the Rwandan Armed 
Forces ordered that an extract from a commission report be circulated among the 
troops. In the extract the primary enemy was defined as : "The Tutsi from inside 
or outside the country, who are extremists and nostalgic for power, who do not 
recognize and have never recognized the realities of the Social Revolution of 
1959, and are seeking to regain power in Rwanda by any means, including taking 
up arms." The secondary enemy was defined as: "Anyone providing any kind of 
assistance to the main enemy". The document specified that the enemy was being 
recruited from within certain social groups, notably: "the Tutsi inside the country, 
Hutu who are dissatisfied with the present regime, foreigners married to Tutsi 
women..."  In the document, the enemy was also accused of "the diversion of 
national opinion from the ethnic problem to the socio-economic problem between 
the rich and the poor" (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1998). 
 
The extremism is evidenced even in popular music, for example, singer Simon 
Bikindi‘s lines: ―I hate them and I don‘t apologize for that. I hate them and I don‘t 
apologize for that. Lucky for us that they are few in number‖ (Quoted in Des 
Forges, 1999: 83).  
 
3.4e The Arming of Rwanda – a military regime 
 
By the start of 1994, Rwanda was awash with arms and while other sectors were 
collapsing, the military was expanding. There was a massive increase in the army, 
from 3000 to 40,000 soldiers, between 1990 and 1993 (Cohen, 2007, p. 31). 
While the quantity of arms should have been a concern, and the nature of the 
distribution of arms should have sent the alarm bells ringing, apprehension at 
rapid militarisation was kept to a minimum because the government was in a war 
with the RPF. War can act as a smoke screen for genocide and in Rwanda this was 
no exception.  
 
The preparations for genocide occurred in a civil war and nations engaged in a 
civil war will naturally see an expansion of the military. However, as Stephen 
Goose and Frank Smyth of Human Rights Watch point out, the ―proliferation of 
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weapons in Rwanda expanded the conflict... Their wide availability helped Hutu 
extremists carry out their slaughter on a horrendous scale‖ (1994). Michael Klare 
wrote, in The Observer, a year after the genocide ―Although the vilest images 
from last year are of massacre by machete, it is important to remember that 
Rwanda‘s government was backed in its tyranny by a formidable armoury 
provided by the West‖ (in McNulty, 2000). An arms embargo was not imposed on 
Rwanda until a month and a half into the genocide.  
 
Rwanda became the third largest importer of weapons in Africa, in the three years 
from October 1990, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. In the 
three years preceding the genocide, Rwanda spent $US 112million on weapons 
and tools. Melvern questions how an impoverished nation like Rwanda could 
afford it. The answer, she proposes, is ―straightforward‖. The money came from 
international backers, including international institutions, the World Bank and the 
IMF and powers such as France, Germany, Belgium and the US. Large-scale 
projects to import tools into Rwanda began in 1993. There were eighteen separate 
deals to import agricultural/gardening tools and machetes in to Rwanda. Many of 
the companies that were now importing tools into Rwanda had no such imports in 
1991 and 1992. Tools included saws, spades, machetes, knives, axes, hoes, 
hammers, and shears. To understand the magnitude of the tool imports an 
examination of machetes is illustrative: in 1993 alone, 581,175 kilos of machetes 
costing US$ 725,669 were brought in. There was a new machete for every third 
male in Rwanda) (Melvern) 
 
Not only was France financially supporting Rwanda‘s rapid militarisation but she 
was also involved in the actual supply of arms. In 1991 and 1992, France sent 
$US 6 million in arms, and in 1993 alone $US4 million worth of armaments were 
provided. 
 
The Human Rights Watch Arms Project report concluded: Much of the killing 
was carried out with traditional weapons and farming implements… however, the 
security forces often finished off the survivors seeking refuge in churches, 
stadiums or school buildings with automatic rifles and grenades‖(1994) 
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3.5 Economic factors  
 
―Economic tensions on their own do not create genocide‖ (African Rights, 1994, 
p. 14), however, the state of Rwanda‘s economy and the impact of this on its 
people is important. During the period, 1970-79, Rwanda‘s GDP grew by an 
impressive annual average of 4.7%. However, it slowed to 2.2% in the years 
1980-88, and fell further in the early 1990s (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1995). By 1993, GDP per capita was an estimated US$200, compared with 
US$330 in 1989, which signifies a 40 % drop in only four years. This dramatic 
decrease coincided with a 50% fall in foreign earnings from coffee, Rwanda‘s key 
export. 
 
External debt for Rwanda culminated in 1992 at US$873 million from US$189 
million in 1980. In 1989 the value of imported goods was three times higher than 
the value of goods exported, a consequence of the decline in Rwanda‘s terms of 
trade, which fell by 47% between in 1980 and 1987.  
 
Rwanda was ranked 21
st
 lowest by Human Development measures in 1990, see 
figure 7 for the indicators. This rank is based on statistics from the years 1985 – 
1987. Life expectancy during this time was 49 years. The infant mortality rate in 
1993 was 119.4 deaths/1,000 live births. 
 
Economic development:   low (high infant mortality) 
Genocide risk:           high     
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(Figure 7: Rwanda statistics) 
 
 
Before the civil war Rwanda was facing severe socio-economic problems. A 
number of factors had a negative impact on the economy including: land shortage, 
very high population growth, limited industrialisation, its landlocked situation, 
high prices for imported goods, regular famine, high youth unemployment. 
―During Habyarimana‘s rule, almost everyone was working in agriculture, the 
degree of urbanisation was the lowest in the world‖. Long before the 1990s, 
writes Uvin: ―life in Rwanda had become devoid of hope and dreams for the large 
majority of people: the future looked worse than the already bad present. Peasant 
life was perceived as a prison without escape in which poverty, infantilisation, 
social inferiority and powerlessness combined to create a sense of personal 
failure‖ (Uvin, 1998..) 
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3.6 Ethnic Factors 
Straus (2009) says that ancient tribal hatreds and ethnic animosity do not really 
explain the Rwandan genocide. He argues that this explanation leaves too many 
questions unanswered. Ethnicity mattered in the Rwandan genocide, but not in the 
most obvious way. Looking to longstanding ethnic prejudice, as an explanation 
for the events in Rwanda will not provide a satisfactory explanation.. In general, 
Hutus, did not kill Tutsis because of a long deep-seated hatred. Certainly, the 
ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi predated the conflict, but this awareness was 
not marked by antipathy and hatred between groups (Straus, 2006 and 2009). 
 Ethnic violence in itself did not cause the genocide, though ethnicity was a salient 
cleavage. The Hutu and Tutsi did not fit the classic model of deeply divided 
ethnic groups. The two groups spoke the same language, practiced the same 
religion, and lived in the same neighbourhoods. Intermarriage was also common 
between Hutu and Tutsi. However, Rwanda does have a history of political 
ideologies based on ethnicity and race. Critical to an understanding of the 
violence and repression that has marred Rwanda‘s recent history is the colonial 
and independence periods.  
The Hutu and Tutsi identities were racialised and deemed immutable by the 
Belgian administrators. During the colonial period identity cards, introduced by 
the Belgians in 1930, identified Rwandans along ethnic and racial lines. The Tutsi 
were favoured by the German and Belgian administration as the superior race and 
were privileged with positions of authority. Straus argues that some writers have 
placed too much emphasis on the role of colonialism: ―Some consumers of this 
history attribute too much blame, in my view, to colonialism.‖ He concludes, 
nonetheless, that ―colonialism did have an impact‖. Colonial rule altered the 
meaning and salience of ethnicity: what it meant to be Hutu or Tutsi. ―The 
colonial experience racialised and hardened previously more fluid and complex 
identities‖, argues Straus (2006, p. 46) and to some extent, the Rwandan 
population began to adopt this colonial perception of themselves. 
According to Lemarchand ―ethnic identities are not pure invention‖ Hutu and 
Tutsi ― are not figments of the colonial imagination‖, rather these ― identities have 
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been invested with a normative load which they did not have before colonialism‖. 
The colonial system took ―advantage of these relations by making them more 
rigid [and helped] ―intensify the antagonism between the privileged Tutsi And the 
disadvantaged Hutu‖ (Nzongola: 64). 
 From 1926 – 1957, Hutu were opposed to Tutsi, predominantly for reasons of 
political domination, of which the Tutsi were the ‗dominant‘ or ‗superior‘ group. 
Between 1957 and 1994, despite the change to this hierarchy, the Hutu still 
remained vehemently opposed to the Tutsi. 
 ―While not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful under colonial rule, almost no 
Hutu were, and most Hutu suffered greatly from the increased demands imposed 
upon them‖ (Uvin, 1999: 255-256). This power imbalance resulted in a struggle 
for independence, defined largely in ethnic terms, whereby the politics of 
decolonisation was also characterised in this way. Ethnic cleavages played an 
important role in the fierce competition for state power.  
 ―When ever [the] elite was threatened‖, argues Uvin, ―it exacerbated ethnic 
divisions to thwart democratization and power sharing‖ (Uvin, 1999: 253). At a 
public level there existed an institutionalisation of prejudice, the radicalization of 
animosity, routine violence and the moral exclusion of a people, which allowed 
for, firstly, their social death and then their physical death. 
3.6a Ethnic Character of the Ruling Elite 
What Rwanda shows is the importance of the ethnic character of the ruling elite 
and its fragile grip on power. President Habyarimana was a northern Hutu. As a 
result, since 1973, this group had controlled political patronage and dominated the 
civil service, the key source of wealth and power in Rwanda, as in many 
developing countries.  Their position of privilege was maintained through 
institutionalised discrimination. There was a smaller group of elite within the 
larger circle: the akazu or ‗little house‘. The divide was not just between Hutu and 
Tutsi but also within Hutu, between the Hutu from the North and those from 
Southern Rwanda. In the North there was little intermarriage between Tutsi and 
Hutu, unlike in the South. Northern Hutu viewed the southerners as ‗other‘ 
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because of their close ties with Tutsi. This perception, argues Midlarsky is what 
probably ―inspired the northern dominated government to unleash especially 
severe genocidal action in the south of Rwanda‖ (2005, p.176). Moderate Hutu 
from this region were also targeted ―You understand that when the majority is 
divided, the minority becomes the majority‖ (Midlarsky, 2005, p.176). Political 
upheaval, the civil war, peace negotiations and the conditions which it promoted, 
in particular, multi-party governance, had the potential to erode ethnic exclusivity 
and the power this gave the northern Hutu elite, in particular the akazu.  
3.6b Policies and Practices of Discrimination  
 Past and present patterns of discrimination against members of a group, with 
significant socio-economic disparities and a pattern of deliberate exclusion from 
economic resources and social and political life increases the likelihood of a group 
being targeted for genocide. The Tutsi in Rwanda faced discrimination on a 
number of fronts. They were subjected to institutionalised discrimination from the 
beginning of Hutu power. Following the dramatic reversal in their status after the 
Hutu revolution, and with it the reprisal killings, the socio-political position of the 
Tutsi continued to decline, even once the violent persecution subsided. Tutsi were 
relegated to the status of ‗second class citizens‘. All Tutsi were removed from 
public office and their enrolment in the public education system was curtailed. 
Perhaps most importantly, the government continued, via official literature and 
the public education system, to characterize the Hutu/Tutsi divide as racial in 
nature, not ethnic. The purpose of this distinction was that, via a ―racial‖ 
differentiation, Tutsi could be characterised as alien, non-indigenous, and thus not 
genuine Rwandan nationals, where as ethnic differentiations could perceivably 
exist within a single national identity. Under Kayibanda, domestic Tutsi were 
viewed not as Rwandan citizens by the Hutu government, but as domestic aliens 
to be tolerated; aliens who participated in civil life, yet were removed from the 
political sphere and from its corresponding rights and protections. 
 Under Habyarimana, the Hutu/Tutsi divide was reclassified by the government as 
―ethnic,‖ not racial, and the moratorium on Tutsi government participation was 
lifted, though Tutsi participation in government remained low. Quota systems 
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were established for ethnic participation in education and public sector jobs which 
attempted to proportionally distribute participation between the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic groups. In his stated quest to redress historical wrongs, Habyarimana 
committed the government to a policy of ―reconciliation.‖ However, a 
reclassification of the Hutu/Tutsi differentiation from racial to ethnic was not 
equivalent to a repudiation of the differentiation itself, and discrimination was still 
prevalent in society and policy. Although the ―Tutsi‖ were defined by the state as 
an ethnic minority, they were denied recognition as a protected minority and 
remained conspicuously absent from elected offices. Some vestiges of the old 
regime remained codified as well, such as the law that Hutu military officials were 
not allowed to marry Tutsi women. Despite years of relative peace following the 
formation of the Second Republic, Habyarimana‘s goals of reconciliation 
ultimately failed. Hutu/Tutsi differences remained codified in law. Under 
Habyarimana‘s regime ― there would not be a single Tutsi burgomaster or prefect, 
there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, there were two Tutsi Members 
of Parliament out of seventy‖ (Prunier, p.258). There also existed a pattern of 
regional discrimination and power concentration, notably the northern prefectures. 
(Straus, The Order of Genocide. Cornell University Press. p. 23) 
When Habyarimana‘s government began the transition to a democratic system in 
the late 1980s, it was, perhaps, inevitable that divisions would manifest once 
again along Hutu/Tutsi lines.  
Ethnic classification on ID Cards in Rwanda, instituted by the Belgian colonial 
government and retained after independence, was central in shaping, defining and 
perpetuating ethnic identity (Fussell, 2001). This was a significant factor, 
according to Fussell (2001), in facilitating the speed and magnitude of the 
genocide. Once the 1994 genocide in Rwanda began, an ID card with the 
designation "Tutsi" spelled a death sentence at any roadblock.   
3.7 External factors 
 Harff, in examining the international context of genocide, highlights the 
importance of economic and political interdependence in attempts by leaders to 
commit genocide: ―the greater the degree to which a country is interdependent 
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with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-/politicides‖ (Harff, 
2003, 65). Trade openness in Rwanda , in 1993,  measured by the proportion of 
imports and exports within the GDP was low, at approximately 14%. The salience 
of this factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a country‘s connectedness to 
the international economic arena and, thus, its dependency on it. States less open 
to trade are less connected to the international system.  
There are a number of other external factors that influenced the genocidal 
outcome of the conflict in Rwanda. Upheaval and the presence of a large 
politically active or militant refugee presence, which shares the identity of the 
target group, in neighbouring states can have a spill over effect and incite or 
accelerate genocide.  
 
Events in neighbouring Burundi played an important part in the events that 
occurred in Rwanda. Of significance is the assassination of Burundi‘s first Hutu 
president by the Tutsi dominated army. In Burundi, unlike in Rwanda, the Tutsi 
stayed in power following independence to the exclusion of Hutu. Burundi‘s 
social structure paralleled that of Rwanda but in Burundi the Tutsi had clung to 
power. Melson suggest that the Burundian leaders of the Tutsi dominated army 
had ―learned the lessons of the Hutu led revolution of 1959 only too well and 
were determined to prevent the rise of a Hutu ethnocracy in Burundi‖ (Melson, 
1992, p. 332) The mass murder of Hutu in Burundi in 1972 by the Tutsi 
dominated military regime, with as many as 100,000 dead, resulted in the 
escalation in killing of Tutsi in Rwanda ( Kiernan, 557). The power balance 
moved, in 1993, with multi-party elections that brought to power a Hutu 
government.  The assassination, which took place in October 1993, and the 
killings of Hutu that ensued, were ―rich material for the extremists in Rwanda‖ 
who used it as ‗evidence‘ that the Tutsi led by the RPF would return to Rwanda to 
reassert their historic dominance over the Hutu. The assassination was broadcast 
on RTLM and was depicted as a plot by Tutsi  to eliminate Hutu and to gain 
control of the entire region (Melvern, p. 72). At a rally in the days following the 
death, Karamira, a Hutu extremist leader in Rwanda, stated ―we can not sit down 
and think that what happened in Burundi would not happen here,‖ the ―enemy‖ he 
asserted ―was everywhere.‖  
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3.7a Exile and Refugee communities  
Another significant regional influence was the presence of Tutsi refugees in the 
countries neighbouring Rwanda (Midlarsky, 2005 and Mamdani, 2001). Mamdani 
looks beyond the political boundaries of ‗Rwanda‘ and puts the history of Rwanda 
in a regional context, examining the behaviour of the perpetrators from this 
perspective. By 1962 there were 120,000 Tutsi refugees, who had fled Rwanda in 
response to post-revolutionary violence; two years later there was an estimated 
330,000. The refugees ―constituted an element of structural insecurity, especially 
since the communities of Tutsi refugees never accepted exile as a fait accompli - 
on the contrary they always claimed…their right to return‖ (Sellstrom and 
Wohlgemuth, 2001 or 1997, p. 3). From bases in Burundi and Uganda, guerrilla 
assaults were mounted by Tutsi refugees, who were attempting to return. A large 
number of Rwandan Tutsi in exile received training in guerrilla warfare in 
Uganda. The Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) recruited anyone who 
was willing to fight, regardless of ethnicity. The presence of refugees ―grievously 
accentuated the dimensions of loss‖ (Midlarsky, 2005, p.  164) and heightened the 
threat perceptions of the ruling elite in Rwanda. The civil war and RPF advances, 
beginning in late 1990 saw as many as 80,000 Hutu in Rwanda displaced. By 
1992 the figure had grown to 350,000 and by 1993 the number of internally 
displaced in Rwanda reached 950,000 (Mamdani, 2001, p.  205). The civil war, 
and the displacement that went with it caused widespread hunger and starvation.  
Faced with dislocation and deprivation, argues Mamdani, memories of the Tutsi 
monarchy, their position of superiority and the 1959 revolution, were easily 
invoked amongst the poor Hutu. Hutu Power took advantage of the increased 
destitution, displacement and the fear that went with it. Many of the internally 
displaced Hutu were recruited into the militias.  
 
Genocide is a strategic, rational decision or policy choice by those in power or 
those contending power. Genocide, as was the case in Rwanda, was planned, pre-
meditated, a policy option advance their agenda and maintain their grip on power. 
For this reason the actions of outside actors, as country progresses a long a 
genocidal path must be considered. Other actors intervene to make genocide a 
more or less likely option. As Lemarchand aptly points out ―[c]ertainly no one 
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familiar with the extent of French complicity during the Rwanda bloodbath, or 
indeed with the extraordinary indifference of the international community…can 
avoid the conclusion that the organizers of the killings entertained few doubts that 
they could literally get away with murder‖ (Lemarchand, p. 20).  
 
The actions, and lack of action, of international actors had devastating 
consequences in Rwanda. These however, are overwhelmingly problems with the 
response, after the outbreak of mass violence, rather than an underlying 
precondition. An examination of the response of the international community to 
the Rwandan genocide is beyond the scope of this thesis, but some of the main 
issues will be discussed. Dallaire: 
 
 "Let there be no doubt: the Rwandan genocide was the 
ultimate responsibility of those Rwandans who planned, 
ordered, supervised and eventually conducted it… Next in 
line when it comes to responsibility are France, which 
moved in too late and ended up protecting the genocidaires 
and permanently destabilizing the region, and the U.S. 
government, which actively worked against an effective 
UNAMIR and only got involved to aid the same Hutu 
refugee population and the genocidaires, leaving the 
genocide survivors to flounder and suffer (515). 
 
 The role of France, the US and the United Nations is worthy of examination and 
this thesis will touch upon this.  Firstly, France had 600- 1000 troops in Rwanda 
beginning in 1990. The Rwandan army at this time had only 3000 men, of which 
only 2000 were competent fighters. Arguably, the French presence stopped the 
RPF offensive reaching Kigali, in February 1993. Secondly, military aid and troop 
training supplied by the French to the Rwandan Army is of importance. While 
arms had been continually supplied, there was an rapid escalation in supplies, 
after February 1993, up to twenty tons of arms and ammunitions were coming in a 
day. Furthermore ―French soldiers on the ground were assisting in combat, in 
interrogating the military prisoners, and in enforcing control measures on the 
civilian population‖ (Des Forges, 1999, p. 68).  
 
The use of the term genocide was desperately avoided and there was among the 
Clinton administration at the time an ―extreme aversion to US military 
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involvement‖. This was due to some extent to the ‗Somalia effect‘. Less than a 
year before, in a disastrous peacekeeping mission in Somalia ,American soldiers 
were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Following this, the US  
―vowed never to return to a conflict it couldn't understand, between clans and 
tribes it didn't know, in a country where the US had no national interests‖. There 
was, as Power argues ―no appetite for deploying troops in a risky situation in 
Central Africa. Nor did UN officials want to expose peacekeepers to increased 
risk after Somalia‖. Midlarsky, ― When salient embarrassing events such as the 
Somalia intervention occur, the probability of immobilizing  even potential great 
power interveners increases‖ (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 392). Thereby increasing the 
risk of genocide. ―When faced with causalities to their forces, the international 
peace keepers would withdraw, allowing the extremists a free reign  to scuttle the 
Arusha Accords, or to do far worse‖ (Ibid). Since forceful action was off the table, 
American officials did not want the term ‗‗genocide‘‘ used—despite 
overwhelming evidence that genocide was indeed occurring in Rwanda 
 
Power (2002) argues that inactivity came from a lack of political, moral and 
imaginative effort and will and it was not as some argue a matter of ignorance, or 
the belief that what was taking place was a continuation of the civil war between 
the RPF and the RAF. Dallaire supports this argument:  
 
A representative of one major power came to me within the 
first weeks of the genocide and said quite clearly that, after 
doing an assessment, they had decided that they were not 
going to come and stop the carnage…. This representative 
said, 'You know, this country is of no strategic value. 
Geographically, it provides us nothing. It's not even worth 
putting a radar station here‘‘ 
 
Doing nothing, as was the case in Rwanda, ―merely allows the killing to continue 
unabated, and may even escalate it by signaling apathy or consent‖ (Valentino). 
Neutral interventions do not appear to have much of an ameliorative effect, and 
might also exacerbate the killing, as the establishment of "safe areas" in Bosnia 
and Rwanda demonstrated (Power, 2002a).  
 
As Des Forges(1999) and  Power (2002a) point out General Dallaire may have 
been correct, had his infamously ignored request to the United Nations for larger 
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military presence been acted upon, the genocide may have stopped or been made 
less severe by a timely intervention. In retrospect, many policymakers, including 
President Clinton, have admitted that this was a crucial error, and that early action 
was necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
Chapter 4: 
Sudan 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
“Kill all the blacks,” “Kill all the slaves”  
 
April 2004 marked the ten year anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The 
commemoration of the 800,000 Rwandans whose lives were lost was also a 
reminder of the failure of the international community to act to stop this atrocity. 
This date was also marked by reports that genocide was underway in the Darfur 
region of Sudan and had, in fact, been underway since late 2003. On the 7
th
 April 
of that year, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, expressed his sense of 
foreboding about the imminent threat of genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. 
While debate raged over the word best fit to describe the events in Darfur, 
thousands died and thousands continue to die. Six years later genocidal violence 
in the Darfur region of Sudan persists, and the international community has yet to 
reach a consensus on how best to act.  
 
The situation in Darfur has been characterised by numerous terms, such as the 
world‘s worst humanitarian crisis, an ambiguous genocide, a counter-insurgency 
campaign, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Regardless of the term used to define 
the situation in Darfur, massacres, systematic rape, aerial bombardment and 
torching and looting of villages have claimed the lives of up  to 400,000 black 
Sudanese and continue to claim more lives, as well as heightening insecurity in 
the region (John Hagan and Alberto Palloni, 2004: Reeves, 2007 
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article181.html). The past three years has seen 
changes in the dynamics of the conflict   ‗but there has been no dramatic or 
sustained improvement in security for civilians‘ (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 
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29) and an almost total lack of accountability for the genocidal crimes that have 
taken place allows it to continue. 
 
4.2 The genocide  
 
Large-scale attacks on civilian populations in Darfur have now been occurring for 
over six years. This thesis will focus on state sponsored violence that took place in 
the Darfur region of Sudan, between 2003 and 2005. Darfur‘s six million people 
are around one fifth of the total Sudanese population. Darfur‘s population before 
the violence began in 2003 was about 6.5 million and an estimated 300,000– 
400,000 civilians have been killed since then. The primary target of the violence 
in Darfur was and continues to be the Black Africans. Darfur is home to three 
large black African tribes: the Fur, the Massaleit, and the Zaghawa (population 
size is 800,000, 185,000 and 190,000 respectively).  The genocide victims belong 
to these three groups Straus, 2006).  
 
There are three clear distinguishing characteristics between victims and 
perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur. First, the Janjawed and Sudanese 
Government leaders and soldiers are Arab and define themselves as such and their 
victims are members of three non-Arab African tribes. Second, the killers are 
frequently lighter skinned and they routinely use racial epithets about ‗blacks‘ and 
‗slaves‘ to describe those they kill. Third, the Janjaweed are predominantly 
Nomadic herdsmen as opposed to the sedentary farmers, which the victim (Straus, 
2006, p.5).  
 
The killings were carried out by the Government troops, in tandem with the 
Janjaweed (Arab militia). A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report aptly points out 
‗[c]onflicts such as [the one, in Darfur] which appear to revolve around land and 
livestock, enable the government to claim the fighting is ―inter-tribal and not their 
responsibility. However, as in so many cases, the facts show the government 
agents were involved in the attack. The Government‘s failure to protect civilians 
and bring perpetrators to justice is not a passive failing, it is systematic policy‖ 
(Human Rights Watch, 2007 p. 40).   
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According to Straus, there is ―considerable evidence that the militia, army and air-
force act in a coordinated fashion‖ (2006, p. 43), which dispels those who argue 
that it does not fit the definition of genocide. The events in Darfur do fit the 
definition of genocide. In 2004, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Bertrand Ramcharan, issued a report, Situation of human rights in the Darfur 
region of the Sudan. It characterized the situation in Darfur by the following: ―(a) 
[r]epeated attacks on civilians by the military forces of the Government of the 
Sudan and its proxy militia; (b) [t]he use of indiscriminate aerial bombardments 
and ground attacks on unarmed civilians; (c) [t]he use of disproportionate force by 
government and Janjaweed forces; (d) [t]hat the Janjaweed have operated with 
total impunity and in close coordination with the forces of the Government of the 
Sudan; (e) [t]hat the attacks appear to have been largely ethnically based with the 
groups targeted being essentially the Zaghawa, Masaalit and Fur tribes, which are 
reportedly of African origin […]; (f) [t]he pattern of attacks on civilians includes 
killing, rape, pillage, including of livestock, and destruction of property, including 
water sources; and (g) [t]hat there has been massive, often forced, displacement of 
much of the population of Darfur‖( 2005, p. 22-23). The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights went on to say: ―[t]he patterns of violence point to an intent on the 
part of the Sudanese authorities to subjugate those populations perceived to be 
providing a support base for the rebels.  In some instances, there were reports of 
actions by the Government of the Sudan and the militia to prevent the populations 
from crossing international borders‖ (2005, p. 23). 
 
United States‘ State Department officials concluded that there was close 
coordination between the Government and the Janjaweed. Former Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, ―There was a coordinated effort, not just random violence…The 
government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility (2004).‖  
Reportedly, militia leaders admit they take orders from the Government and 
Government soldiers and militias frequently sleep in the same camps.  In an 
interview, by the Aegis Trust, a former militia member who had defected said 
―Firstly, we send a group to survey, to find out about if there are people in the 
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village or not. Then the next step is to attack the entire village after surrounding it. 
We have to know whether there are people who are able to fight or not. If not, we 
will burn down the entire village….The orders come directly from the 
Government, and they are to wipe out the entire village completely. The 
Government will give the order to commanders and these commanders give 
orders to us…They give you a camel worth 2m Sudanese pounds. They tell you 
this camel is for you, and you will be on a monthly salary of 500,000 Sudanese 
pounds‖ (Aegis Trust, 2006).  
The Physicians for Human Rights conclude that:  
 
"[b]y eliminating access to food, water and medicine, expelling 
people into inhospitable terrain and then, in many cases, 
blocking crucial outside assistance, the Government of Sudan 
and the Janjaweed have created conditions calculated to destroy 
the non-Arab people of Darfur. By eliminating access to food, 
water and medicine, expelling people into inhospitable terrain 
and then, in many cases, blocking crucial outside assistance, the 
Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed have created 
conditions calculated to destroy the non-Arab people of Darfur" 
(2006, p. 1). 
 
According to a HRW report (2007) on one particular attack in the town of Saraf 
Umra, which killed hundreds of civilians and displaced 10,000, eyewitnesses saw 
the police officer in charge of Saraf Umra distributing weapons to militia during 
the attack. They also reported that other members of Sudanese security forces 
were actively taking part. This example is not unique and reports from a number 
of organizations, which interviewed refugees who fled to camps in Chad confirm 
the direct involvement of Government forces as well as the use of militia 
supported by Government.  
 
The Government of Sudan ―exploited tensions in the region‖, connected largely to 
land shortages, desertification and water shortages  and mobilized thousands of 
―desperately poor men, most of  whom identified themselves as Arabs, in to 
militias, whish went on to commit widespread atrocities. ―Although the mission 
accepts that there are complex tribal and resource dimensions permeating the 
current conflict, it considers that there are other powerful undercurrents rooted in 
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the systematic marginalization of certain groups‖ (UNOHCHR, 2004, p. 21).   
Flint points out, however, ―[it] can not be stated too often that the majority of 
Arab tribes in Darfur have refused to join the government‘s war in Darfur, despite 
blandishments, threats and inducements‖ (Flint, p. 1). 
 
The violence in Darfur is characterised by mass forced displacement, killing of 
men, women and children, mass rape of women and girls and destruction of 
villages, as well as the villagers‘ means of survival. Many of the deaths are 
attributable to malnutrition and disease, which stands in stark contrast to Rwanda, 
where death was predominantly the result of direct killing. This thesis has 
established that what took place in Darfur, 2003-2005 was genocide, the next 
phase is to establish why and what led the elite to commit genocide. 
 
4.3 Structural Factors  
4.3a Political upheaval 
Since independence in 1959, Sudan has seen only 11 years of peace. The 
Government waged a war in the South for more than 30 years, which cost the 
lives of an estimated 2 million people (Straus, 2006, p.  45). Bordering nine 
countries Sudan has also experienced violent cross border conflict with most of these 
countries. It has been both a victim and cause of ―instability that has rocked the Horn of 
Africa‖ (Natsios, 2006, p. 25). Not only has the country been plagued by war but 
also successive regime change.  
 
4.3b Regime crises 
A Military coup, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, overthrew parliamentary 
democracy in 1958. The Constitution was abrogated and opposition political 
parties were suppressed. This military dictatorship was in place until October 
1964. What followed was a ―succession of ineffectual civilian combinations‖ 
(1989, p. 52) of multiparty government until 1969 when there was a communist 
coup d‘etat. The coup d‘etat failed and was followed by a one party military 
dictatorship, under Colonel Ja‘afar Nimeiri, which lasted until April 1985. During 
this period, all political parties were declared illegal. The Nimeri regime survived 
an attempted coup in 1970 and prevented another coup the following year. It was 
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eventually toppled, in 1985, when Sudan returned to civilian multiparty 
government, which, after only two years, was ―cracking at the seams‖ (Khalid, 
1990). The current Salvation regime came to power in 1989, ousting the only 
elected government in Khartoum. Sudan‘s history from independence until 1989 
was riddled with regime crises, a factor common to countries who have suffered 
from genocide. 
 
4.3c Armed Conflict  
i) War in the South  
The first civil war began, in 1955, shortly before independence. The war 
continued until 1972, when a peace agreement was reached between the rebels 
and the government in Addis Ababa. The Addis Ababa agreement gave the South 
its own regional government (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 130). Despite the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, autonomy in the South was more rhetoric than reality 
and any development in this area was curtailed, with the dissolution of the 
southern regional government, in 1983 (ibid.). An underlying cause of the civil 
war, which resumed again in the 1980s, was the economic and cultural gap 
between the Muslim, Arab inhabitants of the central northern regions, whose 
elites had  state control since independence, and the non-Arab, largely non-
Muslim peoples of the South.  Southerners faced constant discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnicity and religion; and the southern region was marginalized 
economically. This pattern of armed conflict driven by uneven regional 
development and discrimination at the expense of the hegemonic North is also 
evident in the Western region, particularly Darfur.   
Straus (2006), highlights a more proximate link between the violence in Sudan 
and the war in the South: the gradual ending of this war, starting with negotiations 
in 2001 through to an agreement and an end to the civil war, in 2005.  There are 
two aspects of note, one, the impending peace agreement had the potential to 
diminish both the power and territorial size of the Government of Sudan; and two, 
it alienated the Darfurians, who were completely left out of the negotiations. 
Black Africans in Darfur, argues Straus, ―worried about the future in post-war 
Sudan‖ (2006, p. 46).  
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ii) In the Darfur region:  
 
For several decades, the region has been affected by intermittent bouts of conflict. 
These were often fought over water sources and grazing in the dry season, 
problems caused by increased desertification and drought. Land disputes occurred 
between the Arab pastoralists and the agricultural communities. Conflict over 
resources between the nomadic Arabs and the sedentary Africans  increased in 
intensity during the 1970s and 1980s, due to desertification resulting from severe 
droughts in the early 1970s (Igiri and Lyman, 2004, p. 8).  
 
With the introduction of automatic weapons into the disputes, the late 1980s saw 
an increase in the number of fatalities in the conflict. A devastating and prolonged 
drought in Darfur, during the mid 1980s, incited armed banditry, whereby many 
pastoralists who lost their livestock during the drought, restocked their herds by 
raiding others (Straus, 2006, p. 5; and HRW, 2007). 
 
Policies at the national level, argues Straus (2006), impacted on the conflict in 
Darfur. Conflict in Darfur soon developed from competition for resources to 
large-scale warfare, due to the involvement of the national Government, in 
Khartoum. Northern leaders, asserts Straus, ―supplied weapons to local Arabs and 
promoted Arabs in local government positions, thereby, increasing Arab power 
and leverage in the region and marginalising black Africans‖ (2006, p. 5).  
 
Of particular importance to decisions by elite to adopt genocidal strategies is the 
threat that they are faced with (real or perceived) to  their position of power. In 
Sudan the Government faced increasing threats to their power and feared they 
would lose their power in the Western region of Sudan.  
According to Human Rights Watch, hostilities broke out in West Darfur in 1998 
when Arab nomads began moving south with their flocks earlier than usual.
 
This 
conflict, while minor, compared to what was to come, saw the displacement of 
5000 Masalit into Chad, 60 villages burnt down and 69 Masalit and 11 Arab killed 
(HRW, 2004). The conflict that followed in 1999 was even ‗bloodier‘, with many 
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hundreds killed, including a number of Arab tribal chiefs. A reconciliation 
conference held in 1999 agreed on compensation for Masalit and Arab losses but 
what followed was the arrest, imprisonment and torture of many Masalit 
intellectuals and notables, as in the towns as government-supported Arab militias 
began to attack Masalit villages; a number of Arab chiefs and civilians were also 
killed in these clashes (HRW, 2004). From there on, violence in the region 
steadily rose.  
iii) Guerrilla Warfare  
In 2003, two Black African groups, in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), launched an armed rebellion 
against the Sudanese state - accusing the government of oppressing non-Arabs in 
favour of Arabs, and Darfur in particular.   
 
These groups justified their action as a counter-marginalization movement; ―they 
claim to  take up arms to fight against the legacy of decades of discrimination for 
more political power and  a share of Sudan‘s $1 million-per-day oil revenue‖ 
(Wax, 2004). Valentino points out that ― mass killing is most accurately viewed as 
an instrumental policy – a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders‘ most 
important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their 
most dangerous threats.‖ (Valentino, 2004, p.3).  According to Human Rights 
Watch (2004,  p. 10), the Darfur rebels ―pose a far greater menace to their hold on 
office than the rebellion [in the South] …ever did‖.  The JEM, was predominantly 
made up of Zaghawa.  The Government response in Darfur, is to large extent, a 
response to the perceived threat of the Zaghawa. The guerrilla warfare waged by 
these groups was seen by those in Khartoum as a means of coming to power, as 
the Zaghawa had in neighbouring Chad.  Dagne, argues that ―the JEM and SLA 
gained the upper hand in 2003 in initial phase of the conflict as they enjoyed the 
support of the local population, as well as that of some officers in the Sudanese 
army‖ (Dagne, 2005, p. 6). By mid  2003 the Khartoum‘s regular military forces 
were regularly defeated by Darfur insurgency groups. Which meant the regime 
resorted to the classic counter insurgency strategy of destroying the civilian base 
of military resistance in the region, through scorched earth tactics, which 
systematically targeted civilians. Attacks on government installations were 
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considered an attack on the Arab leadership, which was at the same time facing 
threats from other regional groups. In addition, Valentino (2004) also  attested that 
―a ‗final solution‘ is chosen when leaders believe that their victims pose a threat 
that can be countered only by removing them from society or by permanently 
destroying their ability to organize politically and militarily‖ (Valentino, 2004, p. 
5).  
In response, the government mounted a campaign of aerial bombardment 
supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed. At the time of the 
genocide the Janjaweed numbered more than 20,000 men. The attack on Al-
Fasher airport in April 2003 in which 70 government soldiers were killed as well 
as the destruction of helicopters and planes led to an increasingly severe response 
from the Government. The Janjaweed was used to suppress rebellion in Darfur, 
which arose in reaction to increasingly discriminatory development policies; what 
followed was a policy of genocidal proportions.  
 
Political Upheaval:   yes – high degree of political upheaval  
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
Guerrilla Warfare:   yes  
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
4.3d Prior genocide/politicides 
 
Sudan is one of the few countries which have had more than two genocides. The 
two prior genocides were in 1956- 1972, with a death toll of 400,000 – 600,000 
and between 1983 and 2001, with the killing estimated at 2,000,000 (Peace and 
Conflict, 2005, p. 58). The first genocide, which started in October 1956 and 
ended in March 1972, was carried out by the northern Muslim-Arab dominated 
Government to suppress mostly non-Muslim Africans who support a secessionist 
movement in the South. The second genocide in Sudan targeted secessionist, non-
Muslim southerners and Nuba for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks, 
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massacres by government-supported tribal militias and government-induced 
privation and population displacement.  
 
Between 1998 and 2002, 5,000 people were killed and 40,000 homes destroyed by 
Government sponsored militias, in Darfur. One attack in May 2002, killed 17 and 
destroyed 600 homes; in September of that year 15 were killed; and in December 
35 killed and 28 injured (Austin and Koppelman, 2004, p. 24). 
 
Also evident is an increase in human rights violations in the years preceding the 
genocide in Darfur, in particular, the government‘s manipulation of the justice 
system and its security forces to persecute the people of Darfur. In May 2001, the 
Sudanese government used the National Security Emergency Law to suppress 
possible Darfur uprisings under the guise of trying acts of banditry and possession 
of weapons, as well as ―anything else considered a crime by the Governor of the 
State or the Head of the Judiciary‖ (United Nations Special Rapporteur, 2003). 
The clamp down on the possession of weapons only applied to Fur communities, 
and Arab nomadic groups were excluded from this, leaving the Fur communities 
defenceless. Indicative of the systematic human rights abuses is the increase in 
torture and the use of the death penalty. According to the World Organisation 
against Torture, between March 2002 and March 2003 there was an increase in 
the use of the death penalty. In this period, 19 were executed, with 133 awaiting 
execution, and nearly all occurred in Darfur (2005, p. 16). 
 
Prior Genocide:   yes:  2 prior genocides, since 1955  
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
4.4 Political Factors  
4.4a Regime Type 
 
Sudan is ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist regime under the 
leadership of General Omar al-Bashir, and he, along with nine Arab Muslim 
leaders, make up the Group of Ten, which forms the Salvation Regime. The 
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Group of Ten is an alliance between the military junta and the National Islamic 
Front (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, 2001). The NIF has its powerbase in the 
primarily Arab and Muslim north of the country. Sudan is a ‗theocracy‘‘ or an 
‗autocracy‘ and has been described as ‗predatory state‘ (Thi Quach 2004, p. 11).  
This is evident in the action of the NIF, who within weeks of coming to power 
had  closed down the free press, tortured or disappeared opponents and critics of 
the regime in "ghost houses", and banned any open assembly or public expression 
of opposition to the new regime. The only legitimate political party recognized 
was the NIF (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban), 2001, p. 1).  It was at this point, in 
1990-91, ‗that the world began to take notice that this was no ordinary militarist 
state‘‘ (Ibid). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published lists of 
the ‗ghost house‘ detainees and a campaign was launched to put pressure on the 
Bashir-Turabi alliance to release these political prisoners and to stop their policy 
of state torture. The Sudan Human Rights Organisation was abolished in early in 
1993 and many of its most active members were forced into exile. The NIF sought 
to create an Islamic state. After crushing dissent the regime began a policy for the 
implementation of an aggressive and sustained Islamisation and Arabisation of 
Sudan, which continues today (Ibid). 
 
Autocracy :    yes 
  
Risk of genocide:   high 
 
 
4.4b Exclusionary Ideology  
Sudan is governed by an ideology of Arab supremacy, which dictates the 
superiority and supremacy of the Arab race in Sudan (Straus, 2006, p. 5). Arab 
leadership is considered untouchable. Arab supremacy is an ideology that 
perceives and defines Arab beliefs and way of life as superior to all others, 
deeming those who are not Arab, as inferior. As an ideology, it calls for Arab 
dominance in all areas of life, including social, political, cultural, judicial, and 
economic. The pursuit of Arab dominance is at the expense of non-Arabs. 
According to Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, the Sudanese regime had already 
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―instituted a number of measures that had steered it along the path of politicised 
Islam‖ (2001, p. 1), before the Islamist coup of 1989. In 1983, General Ja'afar 
Nimeiri declared that Shari'a was to be the sole law in force in the Sudan, thus 
Islamising a basic state institution (Warburg, 2003, p. x). By 1985, the application 
of hudud punishments, for example amputations of hands and feet for theft, had 
reached over 200 in number, as Courts of Prompt Justice carried out the state 
Islamic law. In the late 1980s, the ‗Arab Gathering‘ was established, with a 
supremist ideology that alluded to the killing of lesser non-Arabs and the looting 
of their farms.  
 
Under the ideology in Sudan, the Arab race is credited with civilisation and black 
Africans, in contrast, are depicted as slaves (Flint and de Waal, 2005).   A guiding 
aim of the NIF is to return society to 7th century Islam under its Civilisation 
Programme. Under Article 126 of the Penal Code, introduced in 1991, the 
government legalised the annihilation of populations they regarded as obstructing 
an agenda of Islamisation (Miller, 1996 and Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, 1993). Accordingly, indigenous forms of Islam were 
rejected and the adherents decried as apostates. 
 
Sudan‘s radical National Islamic Front military regime uses Islam as a 
justification for the atrocities it commits on civilians, primarily in the Nuba 
Mountains in central Sudan and throughout the provinces of southern Sudan and 
Darfur. The current regime is attempting to ‗Islamise‘ and ‗Arabise‘ both ‗black‘ 
Muslims, and ‗black‘ animists and Christians. By declaring jihad, and instituting a 
fundamentalist Islamic government with Islam as the state religion, the war being 
in Sudan has boiled down to a struggle over religious freedom, race and political 
rights (Deng, 2001).  
 
The presence of an exclusionary ideology in a time of crisis can help to 
differentiate the threat of genocide from other forms of conflict. It is an important 
factor in a genocidal risk assessment. When an exclusionary ideology exists and 
civilians are being systematically targeted during a conflict, the situation should 
be described as genocidal regardless of whether a consensus is reached about 
whether it is genocide or not. In Sudan the violence was taking place in the 
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context of exclusionary ideology – a pattern which increases the likelihood of 
genocide taking place.  
 
Exclusionary Ideology:       yes  
 
Risk of genocide:               high 
 
4.4c Low Media Openness 
 
Human Rights Watch reported that from 2001, there was a reported increase the 
suspension of publications by the regime, the detention of journalists and pre 
publication censorship. The National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) 
have sweeping powers granted under the 1999 National Security Forces Act 
(NSFA) to control the content of the country‘s media, and engage in direct 
preprint censorship of newspapers (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 10). The 
Ministry of Defence is the only source which can write on Government policy in 
the Darfur region. In conjunction with the 1999 National Security Forces Act 
(NSFA) Sudanese authorities rely on the 2004 Press and Publications Act, to 
control the country's media and censor newspapers that report on any politically 
sensitive issues, including the work of the International Criminal Court, 
developments in Darfur, and human rights concerns (HRW, 2009, p. 12). These 
laws severely restrict journalists‘ ability to report independently. In 2003, Sudan 
was ranked by Reporters without Borders as 142 on its Media Freedom Index 
(142). The use of these laws to control, restrict and harass journalists and the 
media is in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
to which Sudan is  party. 
 
Low media openness:  yes  
 
Risk of genocide:  high 
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4.5 Ethnic and Religious Factors  
 
Ethnic distinctions in Darfur are highly politicized and complex. Initial reports 
and analysis suggested that genocide was being committed by Muslims against 
Christians and animists. The genocide in Darfur is not, ―a case of religious 
persecution, since the killers as well as the victims of this genocide are Muslim‖ 
(Kristof, 2006). The majority of Darfur‘s six million residents are Muslim. Darfur 
is populated by some ninety tribes and is described by Power (200?), as an ethnic 
―kaleidoscope‖ (ibid). ―To a visitor, Darfurians appear indistinguishable‖ 
(Power). Groups in the region have historically identified themselves as Arab and 
Non Arab. Prunier argues that descriptions of Arabs killing Black Africans is over 
simplified. There has been intermarriage between tribes and ―it‘s hardly accurate 
to talk about Arabs killing Africans when they‘re all Africans‖ (quoted in 
Kristoff, 2006). 
 
While competition and conflict among the tribes is nothing new, tribal leaders 
customarily resolved these disputes, and their decisions were respected by the 
authorities in Khartoum.  These conflicts were fought for economic and not ethnic 
reasons. Of importance is the ways in which the Sudanese government have 
manipulated ethnic tensions serving to polarize much of the Darfur population 
along ethnic lines. For Prunier (2005), the growing Arabism of Khartoum has 
fuelled a racial politics that interacts in complex ways. The government continues 
to stoke the chaos and, in some areas, exploit inter-communal tensions that 
escalate into open hostilities, apparently in an effort to "divide and rule" and 
maintain military and political dominance over the region‖ (Human Rights Watch, 
2007). 
 
4.5a The Ethnic Character of the Ruling Elite 
 
State is controlled by Islam from the North. The NIF consolidated its hold on the 
state, in 1989, asserting control of financial institutions and purging the army of 
non-Islamists (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, 2001 and Totten, 2008). The 
Government of Sudan is dominated by Arab Muslim elites from the Khartoum 
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and Northern region of Sudan. The northern region (where Khartoum is located) 
comprises just over five percent of the population of Sudan; however, it controls 
almost all of the country; its resources, wealth, political power (Totten et al, 2008, 
p. 471). All Sudanese Presidents and Prime Ministers are from the North, as are 
most of those in positions of power (ibid.). 
 
Elite ethnicity :   yes, Arabs from the Northern regions  dominate 
  
Risk of genocide:       high 
 
 
4.5b Severe Economic and Political Discrimination  
 
The Government of Sudan discriminates against the peripheral regions and Non-
Arab populations. In the Peace and Conflict Report 2005 (Gurr and Marshall, 
2005), Sudan was ranked as having active government policies of political and 
economic discrimination against minority groups who comprise at least 10 percent 
of the population. According to Thu Thi Quach ‗[s]tructural violence, in the form 
of pervasive discrimination, marginalization and inequality, created resentment 
and resistance that triggered overt violence‖ (2004; 1). Discrimination along 
ethnic lines, marginalization of the African tribes from the central government 
power, and uneven distribution of national wealth has a long history in Sudan and 
is a significant contributing factor to the violence in Darfur, as well as the civil 
war in the between the north-south (Wax, 2004, p. 9).  
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
following his mission to Sudan and the border refugee camps in Chad, in 2004: 
―The sense of injustice, discrimination and marginalization was so deep amongst 
refugees and IDPs that it cannot be ignored.  Both refugees and IDPs felt that they 
were being persecuted for belonging to certain communities. They expressed a 
lack of confidence in the objectivity and fairness of government structures in 
paying due attention to their concerns‖ (2004, p. 21).  Uneven development, 
during the colonial era, between the North and the South, whereby the North 
developed at a faster rate, has had a significant impact on future relations, not only 
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between the North and South but also other regions of Sudan. Independence 
favoured the Northerners over the peripheral populations due to their generally 
better educational level. The central government was established in the North, in 
the region of Khartoum and from the offset required the resources of the regional 
areas for power. It was dependent on the recruitment often forced of people from 
the southern and western areas and of resources, of which oil later became crucial 
importance (Khalid, 1990, pp. 39 – 62).  
Darfur is sorely undeveloped and requests for assistance for underfunded and 
often non existent roads, schools go unheard. The discrimination and neglect of 
Darfur is evidenced in the high infant mortality figures of the region. In the West 
122.5( boys) and 104.2 (girls) die per 1000 live births compared to the North 
101.1 (boys) and 88.8 (girls). The difference can be accounted for by inadequate 
health facilities and trained medical personnel in the region (Totten, 2009, p. 564).  
―The entire State of Western Darfur has two medical specialists in the field of 
obstetrics  and gynaecology, one in Geneina and the other in Zalengay. They are 
to serve a population of 1,650,000 aided by a few medical students who visit the 
area for training‖ (Totten, 2008).  
 
The pattern is not unique to Darfur. In Southern Sudan, 60% of the population is 
non-Arab and 30% are non Muslim yet the government continues to insist that the 
language is Arabic and the state religion be Muslim.  Furthermore, black Africans 
in Southern Sudan have historically been denied equal treatment and political 
rights or freedoms because of race (Totten, 2008).  
 
State sanctioned economic and  political discrimination :  yes,  
  
Risk of genocide:  high 
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4.5c Low Economic Development  
 
Poverty in Sudan was, and still is, widespread, according to a 2007 joint World 
Bank-UNDP findings, about 60-75% of the population in the North and 90 per 
cent in the South is estimated to be living below the poverty line of less than US $ 
1 a day. Development has been very uneven and favoured the North, in particular 
around Khartoum.  Investments and services are concentrated in and around 
Khartoum state growth, where it occurred was not broad-based.  Besides 
Khartoum state, the infrastructure (roads, railways, power and water) is either 
non-existent or underdeveloped across the country. Human Development 
indicators for 2003, the year that the genocide in Darfur started, are indicative of 
low economic and human development.  In 2003, 40% of the population were 
illiterate and the infant mortality rate was 64 deaths per 1000 live births.   
 
Economic development:   low (high infant mortality) 
Genocide risk:           high     
 
4.6 External Factors  
 
Trade openness, in Sudan, in 2003, by the proportion of imports and exports 
within the GDP was very low, at approximately 7 percent. The salience of this 
factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a country‘s connectedness to the 
international economic arena and, thus, its dependency on it. States less open to 
trade are less connected to the international system.  
 
Of direct relevance to the genocide in Darfur are a number of other 
external/regional factors that need to be examined. If as Valentino suggests mass 
killing is an instrumental policy – a brutal strategy designed to accomplish 
leaders‘ most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they 
see as their most dangerous threats‖ (Valentino, 2004, p. 3) then Chadian 
connection is important aspect of this perceived threat.  The role of Chad in 
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Darfur illustrates the impact of external regional actors on genocide. The 
government of Chad has been accused of inciting and aiding the rebels in Darfur, 
as the Darfuri population has the same ethnic background as the Chadian 
leadership (Straus, 2006). The JEM appears to have received support from Chad, 
and some captured rebels were found to have Chadian identification and arms. 
According to Human Rights Watch, Darfur has traditionally been a staging base 
for Chadian coups and insurgencies (2004, p. 10). The President of Chad Idriss 
Deby, a Zaghawa, came to power in 1990 through a Darfur based insurgency 
(Ibid.). 
 
The report, argues further, that Darfur‘s rebel groups appeared to have the support 
of the Chadian Zaghawa community. Support for the rebels came not only from 
Chad but the Darfur rebels fighting the government of Sudan allegedly were given 
military training in Eritrea, according to the Eritrean opposition. These factors 
heightened the threat perception of the Sudanese Government, who felt their 
control over Darfur region was threatened.  
 
A culture of impunity has arisen in Sudan because of the continued support of 
Sudan by some powers, and due to the lack of consequences for the vast human 
right violations and genocide in the South. International support for Sudan comes 
from the League of Arab States, which is sympathetic to the Northern 
government. What Doane sees as most ironic, however, was the membership of 
Sudan on the UN Human Rights Commission. The acceptance of such an abusive 
government ―reveals the extent to which the world has turned a blind eye to the 
genocidal actions of the government of Sudan‖ (Doane, 2004, p. 6).  
 
The continual trade in weapons with Sudan during the genocide contributed to the 
genocidal violence.  The sale of weapons to the Sudanese government and state 
sponsored militias came  from Bulgaria, China, Russia, Iraq, Iran and Former 
Soviet Republics. Russian ambassador to Khartoum congratulated Sudanese 
government for ―reinforcing freedoms‖.  A report by Amnesty International, 
based on testimony from hundreds of survivors, along with commercial 
documents and UN arms trade data concluded: 
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 Military aircraft and components sold to Sudan from the Russia, China and 
Belarus, with helicopter spare parts from Lithuania, despite repeated use of 
such aircraft to bomb villages and support ground attacks on civilians;  
 Tanks, military vehicles and artillery transferred to Sudan from Belarus, 
Russia and Poland, even though such equipment has been used to help 
launch indiscriminate and direct attacks on civilians;  
 Grenades, rifles, pistols, ammunition and other small arms and light 
weapons exported to Sudan from many countries, but mainly China, 
France, Iran and Saudi Arabia;  
 The recent involvement of arms brokering companies from the UK and 
Ireland attempting to provide large numbers of Antonov aircraft and 
military vehicles from Ukraine and pistols from Brazil (Amnesty 
International, 2007) 
As Jan Egeland, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, stated: ―the only thing in 
abundance in Darfur is weapons. It‘s easier to get a Kalashnikov than a loaf of 
bread (2004).‖  
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Chapter 5 
 Conclusion  
‘Never Again’: turning the rhetoric of genocide 
prevention into a reality 
  
"Can I see another's woe, and not be in sorrow too? Can I see another's grief, and 
not seek for kind relief?" -- William Blake 
A destruction that only man can provoke, only man can prevent. --Elie Wiesel 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Genocide is not something that happens over night. It is not something that 
happens spontaneously. Genocide is not something that happens without warning. 
This thesis shows that it is, in fact, a deliberate strategy; a policy employed by 
elites or those contending power, often to stay in power.  The effects of genocide 
are felt beyond the borders of the affected country as it negatively impacts the 
safety and security of people in neighbouring areas. The political radicalism 
surrounding genocide is not usually confined within borders either. Whatever 
social, political, and economic instabilities allow the implementation of genocide 
as a policy in one area are likely to link, possibly even directly, factions and 
groups beyond the zone of current perpetration to populations within it. In this 
same vein, its course is influenced by actions and events occurring from outside 
the State, by regional actors and those in the wider international community. The 
impact of genocide on future generations is truly enormous and the repercussions 
of this ―odious scourge‖ on human kind are, at times, incomprehensible. But we 
cannot allow the enormity of the problem to overwhelm us. Indeed, it is the very 
enormity of the problem that makes it imperative that we resolve it. 
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With genocide the very State which is responsible for protecting its citizens 
becomes their killer, and the potential victims can only turn to others to seek 
protection. Following the Second World War, during which some 12 million 
people were systematically murdered by the Nazi regime for reasons of their 
ethnicity, sexuality or political affiliations, the need to prevent genocide and 
punish those responsible for it was at the forefront of the international community. 
 
In the aftermath of the War, genocide became a crime under international law in 
the 1948 Genocide Convention. Under the Convention, it is a crime not only to 
commit genocide, but also to plan or conspire to commit genocide, incite or cause 
other people to commit genocide or be complicit or involved in any act of 
genocide.  As the Genocide Convention has the status of customary international 
law, it binds all States, regardless of whether or not they are an actual signatory 
(United Nations and Genocide Prevention website, 2010).  
 
Despite the Convention, massive atrocities have occurred since – including the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda and the genocide in Darfur - which have underscored 
the international community‘s failure to make the prevention of genocide a reality. 
Genocide is a crime rooted in the intolerance of a group (ethnic, racial or religious 
or other) – different to your own. Of paramount importance to an understanding of 
genocide, and which is clearly evident in the cases of both Rwanda and Darfur, is 
that the conflicts rarely emanate from the real or perceived differences among 
these groups, but from the political and economic inequities associated with these 
differences. In multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, different groups do learn 
to live together in peace. Democratic ways are developed to share resources and 
power, to manage differences peacefully and prevent violence. However, in times 
of political or economic upheaval and crisis, and in an environment which lacks 
the institutional mechanisms of democracies, trust between communities begins to 
weaken and is replaced with fear and prejudice (United Nations and Genocide 
Prevention website, 2010). The manipulation of these fears and prejudices, for 
political reasons by governments, can lead, as Rwanda aptly illustrates, one group 
to turn against another group who they had previously lived with side by side and 
in some cases known intimately.  
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Even then, such hostility rarely leads to genocide. Several other factors must come 
together before genocide becomes more likely. 
5.2 Factors contributing to genocide 
 
This thesis identifies several factors that come together for genocide to become a 
reality. These conditions were tested and applied to Rwanda and Sudan. The 
results of this analysis is depicted in figure 9.  
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Preconditions for Genocide: Sudan and Rwanda 
 
 
Country 
 
(No. of risk factors 
 
Sudan 
 
 
Rwanda 
Structural Factors   
 
Prior Genocide 
 
Yes  - two (19 and  
 
Yes  (1964) 
 
Political Upheaval 
 
Very high 
 
Very high 
 
Guerrilla Warfare 
 
Yes – JEM and SLA 
 
Yes – RPF 
Political Factors   
 
Exclusionary Ideology 
 
Yes: Islamic supremacy 
 
 
Yes: racist nationalism 
 
Autocracy 
 
Yes 
 
No (anocracy) 
Low Media 
Openness 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Ethnic Factors   
Active, state sanctioned 
discrimination 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Governing elite 
represented a single 
ethnic, regional group.  
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Economic Factors  
 
 
 
Low economic 
development  
Yes, infant mortality rate in 
1993, 119.4 deaths/1,000 
live births. 
Yes, infant mortality rate in 
2002, 64 deaths/1000 live 
births. 
External Factors   
Low International 
Interdependency 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
(Figure 8: Preconditions for genocide: Sudan and Rwanda) 
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The research found that these factors are cumulative and interconnected and lead 
the ruling elite to commit genocide. Evident from the research is that there are a 
number of acceleratory factors which impact on the preconditions. For this reason 
it is important to explore the inter-connected nature of the causes of genocide. The 
outcome of this research suggests the following causes:   
  
i) The country is at war or there is a lawless environment in which massacres can 
take place, unnoticed, in the smoke screen of war. The atrocities are not easily 
documented and distinguished as genocide, as Power points out in Rwanda, ―the 
simultaneous war and genocide confused policymakers who had scant prior 
understanding of the country. Atrocities are often carried out in places that are not 
commonly visited, where outside expertise is limited. When country-specific 
knowledge is lacking, foreign governments become all the more likely to employ 
faulty analogies‘‘ (Power, 2001). A wartime environment justifies more extreme 
measures and military solutions to social problems. It also justifies increased 
militarisation, military expenditure and creation of civilian militias, as evidenced 
in both Rwanda and Sudan.  
 
ii) There must exist a capacity by the perpetrator to carry out genocide. Both 
Rwanda and Sudan illustrate the role of arms in genocide. Arms are of importance 
for two reasons. Of importance is the sudden increase in armed groups or 
increased militarisation. The proliferation of arms, in a context of emergency 
security laws, which erode civil rights and liberties, is dangerous.  This, along 
with the preparation of local population to commit killing of civilians, may 
suggest a trajectory towards perpetration of genocide. The formation of armed 
groups/ militias who have the support of the State and carry out genocidal acts on 
their behalf, was evident in Rwanda with the interhamwe and in Sudan with 
Janjaweed.  
 
iii) Of particular importance, which both Rwanda and Sudan illustrate, is if the 
war being waged is one between the Government and rebels and follows a pattern 
of guerilla warfare. In such cases, the civilians who share the same identity of the 
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rebels may be targeted and defined as enemies of the state or supporters of the 
guerillas.  
iv) Countries with a totalitarian or authoritarian government, where only one 
ethnic/regional/communal group controls all power are more at risk of genocide. 
This was applicable to Sudan and still is. With Rwanda, the situation was more 
complicated. Rwanda has a history of totalitarianism but, in the immediate years 
before the genocide, was in the process of democratic reform. Rwanda highlights 
how the introduction of electoral competition into divided societies can heighten 
the prospect of conflict, particularly where the elite are in a position of perceived 
or real vulnerability. Democratic reform, multi party politics, electoral 
competition, while essential to peace in the long term,  can and as was the case 
with Rwanda pose a threat to the ruling elite in the transition period.  
 
v) One or more national, ethnic, racial, religious, or political group is the target of 
discrimination or is made a scapegoat for the serious social or economic 
problems facing the country. Both Rwanda and Sudan have a history of political 
and economic discrimination and marginalisation of the targeted groups. 
Discrimination and inequality are important for two reasons. Inequality often 
drives the political upheaval: whether it be revolution, insurgency or guerrilla 
warfare, which threatens the exclusive power of the ruling regime who may then 
adopt a genocidal policy as away of suppressing this threat, ultimately, targeting 
those civilians who are associated/kin groups of the armed group, the Tutsi in 
Rwanda and the Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit in Darfur. Secondly, groups which 
face targeted discrimination are more vulnerable to becoming victims of genocide, 
as they have no political power and there may be no legal safeguards to protect 
them. In fact, the discrimination may be institutionalised.  
Serious discriminatory practices against members of a particular group can 
include: compulsory identification, permission required for social activities, such 
as marriage, the systematic exclusion of the group from positions of power, the 
army, employment in state institutions, from education.  
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Explicit justification for such discrimination may occur through an ideology that 
elevates the status of the majority group or those identified with the ruling elite 
and perpetuates and promotes the discriminatory practices.  
 vi) The ruling elite have adopted and promote an ideology that identifies some 
overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or 
eliminate certain groups of people  and that also signifies or defines a certain 
group as less than human. It ―dehumanizes‖ members of this group and justifies 
violence against them. Messages and propaganda supporting this belief are spread 
through the media. In countries with tight state control over the media this is able 
to happen more easily and the media is used as the ‗mouth piece‘ of the elite and, 
therefore, its ideology.   
 
vii) There is a growing acceptance of violations of the targeted group‘s human 
rights and a history of genocide and discrimination against them. Where the elite 
operate in a context of impunity, genocide is more likely. One of the lessons of 
history that has yet to sink in is that unpunished crimes can provide a precedent 
for later crimes. In the words of Hitler, who in 1939, addressing a group of Nazi 
leaders and Wehrmacht generals, said, ―Who, after all, speaks today about the 
annihilation of the Armenians?‖ Akhavan (2001, p. 13) argues that ―the long term 
consequences of such a culture of impunity cannot be underestimated. The failure 
to uphold elementary international norms has created a political climate in which 
extermination, deportation, and wanton destruction lies within the range of viable 
conduct‖. Evident in both Rwanda and Sudan was an increase in life integrity 
violations of the targeted groups, those groups already alienated and vulnerable 
through systematic discrimination. Violations included, rape, torture, 
disappearances, forced population transfer, destruction of property, destruction of 
the food supply. It is of particular concern when these life integrity violations are 
committed with impunity. Particularly, evident in Rwanda witnessed was an 
increase in hate propaganda and hate crimes against the Tutsi, including the 
compulsory visible identification of targeted groups through classification and 
symbolism. This process allowed for the easy identification of Tutsi and a quicker 
more efficient execution of the genocide through death lists and check points. In 
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Rwanda and Sudan, both countries had experienced prior genocide which had 
gone unpunished and to a large extent unnoticed by the international community. 
 
viii) Both Rwanda and Sudan highlight the way in which external factors, forces 
and actors can impact on genocide. The more closed off a country is from other 
actors in the international community, both politically and economically the more 
likely genocide will occur unnoticed and without serious repercussions. The 
critical question, Harff, proposes, ―is whether states and international 
organizations do in fact engage in preventive actions in the early stages. What 
counts is the political will to engage‖ (Harff, 2003, p. 70). Tolerance and/or 
complicity, of the ruling elite‘s increasingly repressive behaviour, by foreign 
powers can make genocide/politicide more likely. Outside powers can offer a 
diplomatic guarantee of impunity and or military and financial means with which 
those in power can commit geno-politicide. The continued trade in arms despite 
increasing severity of human rights violations and violence towards civilians, as 
occurred in both Rwanda and Sudan, is one such example.  
 
There are other ways in which outside actors and forces can impact on a trajectory 
of genocide. The belief that there is a strong tie between the domestic and external 
foes is crucial in the decision by those in power to eliminate a collective group – 
perceived or represented as the threat. The refugee dimension in Rwanda, 
illustrates this, as does the military and financial support Darfur rebels received 
from the Chad government. The extent to which support by kindred 
groups/diasporas living outside the state can impact on the magnitude of the 
armed conflict, threat perceptions of the elite and ultimately genocide, raises 
interesting questions, which require further exploration. 
As evidenced from the research the factors identified above are cumulative, 
interconnected, and lead governments or rival authorities to choose a strategy of 
genocide during or following civil war. The relationship between the different 
factors and the behaviour and decisions of the governing elite is illustrated in the 
diagram in figure 9, below.  The Taskforce for Genocide Prevention emphasises 
the importance of leadership: ―The difference comes down to leadership. Mass 
atrocities are organized by powerful elites who believe they stand to gain from 
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these crimes and who have the necessary resources at their disposal. The heinous 
crimes committed in Nazi-occupied Europe, Cambodia, and Rwanda, for 
example, were all perpetrated with significant planning, organization, and access 
to state resources, including weapons, budgets, detention facilities, and broadcast 
media‖ (2008).  
The question then, is what motivates the leadership. This underlying motivation 
may have political, economic and security elements, but at its heart is power. 
Grievances over the inequitable distribution of power and resources appear to be a 
fundamental motivating factor in the decision to commit genocide. That same 
inequality, considers the Taskforce for Genocide Prevention, ―may also provide 
the means for atrocities to be committed. For example, control of a highly 
centralized state apparatus and the access to economic and military power that 
comes with it makes competition for power an all-or-nothing proposition and 
creates incentives to eliminate competitors‖ (2008). This dynamic was evident in 
Rwanda and is a serious cause of concern for Burma, today. A country like 
Burma, which has its first election in 20 years, planned for 2010, a culture of 
impunity, extreme human rights violations, a history or authoritarianism and 
militarism, an extremely controlled and closed off media and ongoing armed 
conflict, should be of considerable concern to the international community. 
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(Figure 9: the relationship between different factors, the behaviour and decisions 
of the governing elite, and a genocidal outcome) 
 
State  
Autocracy 
or 
Quasi-
democracy 
Repression and 
Discrimination  
Exploitation Marginalisation 
Resistance 
Guerrilla warfare 
Conflict: Threat to 
power 
 
Counter conflict: 
eliminate threat 
 
Genocide 
 
Political 
Factors 
Exclusionary 
ideology. 
 
Low Media 
Openness 
Structural 
Factors: 
Political 
Upheaval 
Regime Crisis 
Impunity: Prior 
Genocide 
 
External 
Factors 
Low level 
international 
inter-
dependency 
 
Ethnic 
Factors: 
Governing elite 
represented a 
single ethnic, 
regional group.  
State sanctioned 
discrimination  
 
Economic 
Factors 
 
Low economic 
development  
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5.3 Future research  
A natural next step in the research would be to identify a country, which has a 
number of the preconditions identified above and then look for entry points for 
prevention. An examination of Burma or Afghanistan, two countries identified by 
Harff as being at risk of genocide in her 2009 analysis, would be a good place to 
start (in Gurr, 2010, p.6). Gurr suggests, ―[w]hat is needed is a close examination 
of past, current, and future international policies toward each of these countries, 
with assessments of whether and how different modes of engagement mitigate 
armed conflict and change the underlying potentials for genocidal violence‖ 
(2010, p.6). This would allow policymakers, researchers, and those in the 
international community to understand how the elite in the countries respond to 
the various external actions and threats. Growing awareness of how strategies, 
whether they are diplomatic, political, economic or military, may help or harm 
efforts to prevent genocidal violence is crucial.  
  
An interesting study would be an analysis of cases where conditions were ripe for 
genocide but where it did not occur; where a strategy of prevention may have 
actually worked.   As Gurr, points outs ―[l]ogically we cannot say that a genocide 
or mass political killing has been prevented, because we can never know for 
certain whether targeted violence aimed at eliminating an ethnic, religious, or 
political group would have occurred in the absence of preventive actions. But we 
can say that some combination of international actions mitigated the conditions 
that elsewhere have led to genocide‖ (2010, p. 1). By examining successful 
international engagement in a situation that contained a number of preconditions 
for a genocidal outcome, lessons for future engagement can be learned. 
5.4 Policy implications from the research: the responsibility to 
prevent.  
The possible responses to genocide fall under two broad categories: halting 
genocide, when it is already in progress; and preventing it, when conditions exist, 
which make genocidal violence possible. Staub states it is ―necessary to develop a 
conception of when action is needed, what kind of action, who is to perform these 
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actions, and a related system of initiating and performing action‖ (Staub, 2000, 
pp. 375 – 376). A lot of discussions focus on whether or not outside actors should 
intervene in a country that is committing acts of genocide against its people. As 
both Rwanda and Sudan show us, unfortunately, outside actors often do not react 
fast enough or in a sufficient manner, the onus therefore should be on prevention.  
The first step is to recognise when genocide is taking place, but more importantly, 
recognise the steps that lead to genocide, the variables that make genocide more 
likely and in doing so prevent the deaths of thousands of civilians.  The United  
Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, 
in a statement at the anniversary of the Genocide Convention, called upon States 
to ―implement the preventive aspects of the Convention and to support efforts to 
prevent massive and serious human rights violations that could lead to genocide‖ 
(2009).  
An important component of genocide prevention is identification, gathering 
information and the establishment of an early-warning system. Early warning is 
defined by the UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, as the 
collection, analysis and communication of information about escalatory 
developments in situations that could potentially lead to genocide, crimes against 
humanity or serious war crimes. It is worth noting however, as Iqbal Riza, former 
UN Chef de Cabinet, did, ―We did not give the information [the warning of 
impending genocide in Rwanda] the importance and the correct interpretation it 
deserved. We realized only in hindsight‖ (Riza, 1999).  Any effective response to 
genocidal violence requires the influence and power of the international 
community to be wielded. It requires political will for, if early warnings fall on 
deaf ears, then the consequences can be incalculable.  
5.5 Prevention  
The Genocide Prevention Taskforce goes to the heart of the need for early 
intervention – ―not only [is early prevention] the preferred course of action in 
strategic, resources, and moral terms; we also believe that engaging early can 
successfully obviate the need for a much more difficult crisis response at a later 
stage‖ (2008). Though, as they argue this is no easy task and requires serious long 
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term investment. ―Seizing on opportunities to prevent mass atrocities requires a 
comprehensive approach, breaking through bureaucratic silos to draw on a wide 
array of analytical, diplomatic, economic, legal, and military instruments and 
engaging with a variety of partners‖ (Genocide Prevention Taskforce, 2008). 
By understanding what leads elites down a trajectory of genocide those who study 
genocide can identify points to intervene before it has got to the point of ‗no 
return‘  - an understanding of common features of genocide that often emerge 
early in the process before it is actually underway. This thesis presents some ideas 
for preventing genocide, by looking at how to counter the conditions that lead to 
genocide. It is in no way an exclusive list. 
5.5a Poverty reduction  
 
As this thesis established genocide most often takes place during and in the 
aftermath of violent conflict and regime crises, and that these factors are most 
prevalent in countries with low economic development and limited or 
discriminatory economic opportunities for its citizens.  Where the gap of 
economic equality is greatest and inequality is at the expense of a particular 
targeted group then serious consideration must be given to poverty. Poverty 
reduction, therefore, is a necessary component of genocide prevention, in the 
sense that it is crucial to the prevention of regime crises and armed conflict that 
often precede it.  
 
It is not economic deprivation, itself that is a cause of armed conflict and 
genocide. If it were there would be a lot more bloodshed but as Gareth Evans, 
President of the International Crisis Group said: I don‘t think anyone needs to be 
persuaded now about the existence of a basic interrelationship between poverty 
and conflict, captured in the familiar mantra that there can be no security without 
development, and no development without security‖ (2009, p. 1) 
 
Economic growth, alone, is not the answer. Where economic growth does occur it 
must be widespread, accountable, with conflict sensitive approaches to 
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development assistance and economic development, such as programmes that 
focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants into employment.  
 
5.5b Early intervention in armed conflict 
Research has shown that protracted civil wars are at risk of parties to the conflict, 
especially, but not exclusively, the government, resorting to genocidal violence to 
eliminate their opponents' supporters. Considering this, an important aspect of  
prevention is early intervention in the early stages of internal warfare. The 
prevention of armed conflict, was the first point in Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan‘s  five-point plan for preventing genocide. Where armed conflict has 
already broken out, then the protection of civilians, must be central to any 
intervening and de-escalating strategies.  
 
The diplomatic, political, and economic instruments brought to bear in the 
prevention of armed conflict must focus on rebels as well as governments. Both 
sides are likely to need inducements, and the threat of loss of international 
support, to reach ceasefires and negotiate their differences. Both sides are likely to 
need security guarantees and promises of longer-term economic assistance to 
reach and implement settlements. There are many case and comparative studies of 
the international stratagems that can help de-escalate civil wars and get 
participants to negotiate binding agreements. 
 
5.5c Combating a culture of impunity  
 
Accountability for past violations, independent judiciary, legislative protections 
and an independent human rights institution can all go some way in countering 
impunity and preventing future violations. ―International condemnation of abusive 
practices irrespective of national interest of course is a prerequisite to effective 
action‖, asserts Harff, (2003a, p.10). Power and resources must be distributed in a 
fair and equal way based on fundamental principles that protect the basic rights of 
citizens and with a strong commitment to the rule of law. For example, argues 
Harff, ―promoting the observance of minimal human rights standards and the 
practice of inclusiveness should continue to be on the policy agenda of 
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governments and organizations that care what happens in countries such as Burma 
and Burundi‖ 2003, p. 72).  
 
The realisation of international human rights law can go some way ensuring that 
vulnerable peoples are better protected and gross violations do not go unpunished. 
A country‘s national sovereignty can not be used to shield people who wantonly 
violate the rights of their fellow human beings. 
 
 5.5d Media  
The media plays a role in genocide and, therefore, an important one in its 
prevention. Not only is an open and free media important to the prevention of 
genocide but also a responsible one. These characteristics can ensure that both 
citizens and governing elites are well informed and the government more 
accountable. Integrity of information, independence from state control are 
essential to promoting healthy political dialogue. It is also important that the 
media develop a sense of ethical responsibility, supporting the rule of law and de-
escalating intergroup conflict where it arises. 
5.5e Democratic reform  
Democratisation presents a complicated picture. It is critical that governance 
arrangements remove the mentality of zero-sum, winner-take-all politics that drive 
impulses to demonize, exclude, and exterminate. Where democratic reform does 
take place, the focus should be on increasing electoral cooperation rather than 
competition and to ensuring that electoral systems produce democratic actors. 
Attempts to force democratization prematurely have proven problematic. Such 
efforts, as was the case in Rwanda, often fail. However, as Harff, rightly points 
out, ―those failures usually prompt efforts to redesign and rebuild democratic 
institutions. Once in place, democratic institutions—even partial ones—reduce the 
likelihood of armed conflict and all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-
/politicide‖ (2003, p. 71). 
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5.5f Healing and Reconciliation   
Healing and reconciliation, is a relatively new approach to preventing violent 
conflict and breaking cycles of ongoing violence. The psychological wounds of 
past victimisation, discrimination and violence need to be addressed. Addressing 
the psychological needs of victims ―make it less likely that victims engage in 
unnecessary ‗defensive violence‘. Healing, posits Staub, makes reconciliation 
possible (Staub et al, 2005, p. 300). One aspect of reconciliation and healing is 
learning about the influences which lead to the genocide.  
Where reconciliation, rehabilitation and reform take place, whether it be political, 
judicial or economic, combating racism, discrimination and intolerance must be a 
central focus of these developments. As the UN Special Adviser said: "we must 
work to eradicate all kinds of discrimination and promote tolerance, respect for 
cultural and ethnic diversity and discourage anything which tends to strengthen 
identity-based division" 
 
5.5g Conclusion  
This thesis has sought to determine the conditions that make genocide more 
likely. Of utmost importance, in determining whether upheaval will develop into 
genocide, are the characteristics of the political system, of the elites, and structural 
conditions, a propensity to extreme violence and genocide, impunity and the 
nature of the conflict. These factors, more so than low economic development and 
ethnic or societal cleavages, are what count. Ethnic and societal cleavages and 
poverty, however, do matter, especially when an authoritarian elite is faced with a 
power struggle. It is the salience of these factors and the deliberate use of these by 
the elite to manipulate public opinion that lies at the heart of an understanding of 
genocide. 
  
Tackling the underlying social, economic and political conditions that contribute 
to genocide is no easy task. It requires a long-term strategy and efforts that require 
sustained investment of resources and will. The model established in this thesis 
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can be used to identify potential victims, minorities and political opponents at risk 
of being targeted for destruction and determine countries where those in power are 
more likely to adopt a genocidal strategy, during or in the aftermath of political 
upheaval. Engaging early in high-risk situations should save more lives, at less 
cost, than responding once the killings are already underway. Understanding the 
way genocide occurs and what motivates elites, and learning to recognize signs 
that could, in a certain environment, lead to genocide are important in turning 
'Never Again' from  rhetoric into a reality.  
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